

164 A. 10



MEMORANDUM

ON THE

NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

BY

ALEXANDER MACKENZIE,

OFFICIATING JUNIOR SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

Calcutta:

BENGAL SECRETARIAT PRESS.

1869.

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MEMORANDUM

ON

THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

THE hills which border either side of the Assam Valley are the *habitat* of various warlike and uncivilized tribes with whom, since the close of the first Burmese war, the British Government has had more or less to do. With those dwelling on the Sub-Himalayan ranges, we have not on the whole cultivated intimate relations. There was little to gain by doing so. There was work to be found elsewhere. Our chief attention has been concentrated on that great mountain system which, commencing where the Brahmaputra turns suddenly to the south, interposes between Assam and the regulation Districts of Mymensing, Sylhet, and Cachar,—a broad and well nigh impenetrable belt of hill and plateau. These ranges next run east and north, filling up the angle between the Brahmaputra and the Irrawaddy. Then turning southward they border the Irrawaddy Valley on the west through 12 degrees of latitude to its mouth at Cape Negrais.

The River Mouass, rising in the Bootan Hills, falls into the Brahmaputra nearly opposite Gowalpara, and forms the western boundary of North Assam, separating the District of North Kamroop from the Cooch Behar Commissionership. The Bor Nuddi, which meets the Brahmaputra opposite Gowhatti, divides North Kamroop from Durrung, and this again is separated from North Luckimpore by the River Kuboojan.

The hills which form the northern boundary of the three Districts we have named are those in which we may begin our survey of the North-Eastern Frontier. We do not propose to touch upon the general relations subsisting between our Government and the Governments of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, because those States are in no sense subordinate to us. We are in no way responsible for their management, and our intercourse with them is confined to limits laid down by Treaty. We decline absolutely to admit that we have at present a "Mission" to these nations. They are as foreign to British India as are the men of Afghanistan. The Cooch Behar Commissionership has to do on the north only with the three States abovenamed, and hence we have commenced our task on its most easterly border.

North Kamroop—Bhuteas.—Indeed, we might almost have passed by the District of North Kamroop also, inasmuch as the only hill tribe with which its authorities come in contact are the Bhuteas of the Kamroop Dwars, or Passes.

These Dwars are five in number—Bijni, Chappakamur, Chappaguri, Banska, and Ghurkulea. On our taking possession of Assam, we found them in the hands of various Bhutea Jungpens, who paid a nominal tribute to the Assam Rajah. But as every authority in Bhutan does what is right in his own eyes until he is made to do otherwise, it may be supposed that the payments to the imbecile Native Government of Assam were not particularly regular. A system of gang robbery too had been organized under the auspices of the Bhutea Soubahs, by which the ryots of the low country were kept in a state of constant alarm. This state of things continued for some time after the British Government had assumed the management of the District. Numerous punitive expeditions and many fruitless negotiations were undertaken. Unable to realize a state of complete anarchy where all the forms of Government existed, we always believed that could we but reach the central authority in Bhutan, the peace of the border might be effectually secured. It was not, therefore, till 1841 that the Governor General became convinced that more decisive measures were required. In that year the whole of the Assam Dwars, comprising about 1,600 square miles of territory, were annexed to British India. The Jungpens, who had hitherto drawn their revenues from the Dwars, were thus deprived of their means of subsistence. Our choice lay now between making these men desperate foes or converting them into harmless stipendiaries. A sum of Rupees 10,000 per annum was accordingly paid to the Bhuteas as compensation for these resumed lands. Time showed the wisdom of the step. North Kamroop for twenty years suffered only from the devastations of its rivers. How the peace of the frontier was broken by the just retribution exacted by the British Government for outrage committed on the side of Bengal, it is not necessary here to tell. We need only note that inasmuch as theoretically the allowance for the Assam Dwars was made to the Central Government, its disbursement was at once stopped when war broke out. On the return of peace a similar arrangement was made for the whole of the Bhutan Dwars, and the Assam allowance merged in the general treaty grant, which is paid only to Officers deputed by the Central Government. At present the hope that this support would create a strong central power in Bhutan has not been realized. The outlying Chiefs who formerly shared in the distribution of the stipend, or rather levied their own shares therefrom as it passed through their hands, now find themselves overlooked. They fortunately have had too salutary a lesson to venture to reimburse themselves in British territory, but swooping down on the unfortunate Deb and Dhurm Rajahs at Head-Quarters, they have reduced the country to a state of anarchy and confusion, in which, if British interference be barred, an invasion from Thibet would be rather a boon.

Durrung.—Crossing the Bor Nuddi in our eastward progress we enter the District of Durrung. This District has five great local divisions, Desh Durrung, Chatgari, Chutea, Chardwar, and Nowdwar. Desh Durrung and Chutea lie to the south of the District upon the Brahmaputra; and with them we have here no concern. North of Desh Durrung lies Chatgari, and in the country between Chatgari and the hills are the Dwars of Kulling, Buriguma, and Kuxiapara. Kulling and Buriguma, with the

five Kamroop Dwaras already enumerated, were at the time of our occupation subject to the Dewangiri Rajah and the Tongso Penlo, and nominally to the Central Government of Bhutan. But while the Kamroop Dwaras were entirely under Bhutea control, Kulling and Buriguma were held by the Bhuteas for only eight months in each year, and by the Assam Rajahs for the other four.* The consequences to the unhappy cultivators of such a mode of management may easily be imagined. These Dwaras were resumed along with those of Kamroop, with the same happy results.

In Kuriapara Dwar we come in contact with a different element altogether. The Thibet Bhuteas, who are locally the dominant race, are subject to a body of Chiefs known as the "Sath Rajahs" and these again owe allegiance to the Towang Rajah, who is himself a tributary of Lhasa. Here then the British frontier in Assam may be almost said to march with that of Thibet. The Sath Rajahs, after their manner, oppressed the helpless Cachari and Assamese ryots of the plains, and in 1844 the British Government bought out the Bhutea claims for an annual sum of Rupees 5,000.

This Dwar forms the great avenue down which the hillmen pour to the celebrated fair of Udalgiri. "Sixty years ago," writes the present Commissioner of Assam, "the trade between Thibet and Assam by this route was estimated to amount to two lakhs of Rupees per annum, and this though Assam was then in a most unsettled state: and up to the time just prior to the Burmese invasion, the Lhasa merchants brought down gold to the value of Rupees 70,000. The occupation of the country by the Burmese, however, killed the trade, and in 1833 only two Thibetan merchants are said to have come down, but since that period there has been a gradual revival of it which even our late quarrel with Bootan did not interrupt, and it has now every appearance of being flourishing and on the increase.

"I visited the fair in 1837, and again this year, and was much interested by what I saw there of the Thibetan traders. I found men among them from all parts of Thibet, from Lhasa, and other places east and west, and even north of it. Some of them looked like Chinamen; they wore Chinese dresses, ate with chopsticks, and had about them various articles of Chinese manufacture, as pipes, strike-a-lights, and embroidered purses, such as I have seen in use among the Chinese at Rangoon and Moulmein; they were accompanied in some cases by their families, and carried their goods on sturdy ponies, of which they had a great number; I should think some hundreds."

This promising avenue of Central Asian trade will doubtless attract ere long the attention which it merits. The annual stipend of the Sath Rajahs is spent at the fair, and finds its way in the shape of cotton and other goods towards Towang and Lhasa. In 1852, one of these Rajahs, called the Gelling, fled to our protection to avoid certain demands of his Thibetan superiors. A Tartar army was pushed up to within a few miles of our frontier, and but for the resolute face shown by the local British troops, Assam would once more have

* 15th June to 15th October.

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been the field of a great invasion. These facts are somewhat foreign to the subject, but they are worth noting.*

The extensive division of Char Dwâr is said to have taken its name from its having been annually spoiled by four different races, the Assamese, the Bhuteas, the Akhas, and the Duphlas. The Bhuteas here

Independent Bhuteas. found are the subjects of the Sath Rajahst of Rooprai Garw and Sher Garw, all of whom are subordinate to their principal Chief called Durjee Rajah. They claim to be independent of Towang. From 1839 to 1844 the British Government excluded them from entering the Dwârs to trade, as a punishment for outrages committed by them. On their submitting, they were granted moderate pensions in lieu of the black mail, which they, like the other hill tribes on this frontier, used to levy on the ryots.†

The most easterly tribe of Bhuteas are the Thebengeas. They live in the interior of the hills, and formerly levied black mail in Char Dwâr along with the Rooprai Bhuteas. A bitter feud however sprang up between these allies, and for years they only entered Assam to trade *via* the Kuriapara Dwâr. Their annual visit to purchase goods was made to a mart called Mazbat in Char Dwâr. Their chief village is said to be sixteen days' journey from the plains. They receive a small annual pension of about Rupees 140.

The Akhas are the people whom we next meet. They are of two sects. (1.) The Hazari Khawa Akhas--the "eaters at a thousand hearths."

Akhas. (2.) The Kuppachor Akhas--the "thieves who lurk amid the cotton plants." These are a most energetic and savage tribe, who for twenty years spread terror throughout Durrung, while with the aid of the Meechis, a fierce and cognate race in the interior, they defied the power of the Towang Rajah in the hills. Both tribes of Akhas together did not in 1844 number over 260 families, while the Meechis were said to amount to three or four hundred households. The Hazari Khawas levied "Posa" or black mail on the plains, and woe to the ryot who refused their demand. The Kuppachors were looked on more as outlaws, and though they had no quasi legal claim to "Posa" yet the name of their Chief, the Thaghi or Thaugi Rajah was a word of power along the border, a bugbear with which to frighten the village children. In 1820 this formidable freebooter was captured, and for four years kept close in Gowhatty Jail. In 1832, however, the Governor General's Agent released him, in the vain hope that clemency might secure fidelity. He fled to the hills, rallied his broken clan, put to death all who had been in any way concerned in his capture, and brought his career to its climacteric in 1835 by cutting up a British out-post at Balcepara, massacring therein men, women, and children. For seven years after this he evaded capture, and his tribe remained outlawed in the jungles of the hills. At length weary of being hunted he surrendered. To have slain him judicially in cold blood would have been of little use. His influence with that of the other Chiefs, who also at this time came in, was made

* The agreement with the Kuriapara Bhuteas will be found at page 145, Vol. I, of Aitchison's Treaties.

† This is a common Bhutea title along this frontier.

‡ Their agreement is printed at page 146, Vol. I, Aitchison's Treaties.

use of to secure the future peace of the Char Dwâr. Small pensions were granted. Solemn oaths were sworn; "the Chiefs taking into their hands the skin of a tiger, that of a bear; and elephant's dung, and killing a fowl."* To the Akhas' credit be it said, the oaths have been kept. The arrangement cost Government Rupees 360 per annum!

The last of the Darrung Hill tribes is the Duphlas, who are found also in East Luckimpore. The Duphlas are not so much a single tribe as a collection of numerous cognate petty clans, independent of each other and quite incapable of combined action. In the time of the Assam Rajahs they had however established a system under which certain plain villages were allotted to each clan, to which it paid an annual visit for the purpose of collecting stated dues of black mail. From each freeman's house they took goods and cash amounting in value to Rupees 8. The Cachâri slaves paid 5 Rupees each family. For some years after our taking possession of Assam the Duphlas were a constant trouble. Their fearless raids and numberless atrocities compelled the establishment of a line of Military posts all along the frontier; and it was only after long and tedious negotiation that in 1836-37 their claims were commuted for money payments to the Gams or Chiefs, amounting to about Rupees 2,500. The result has been perfectly satisfactory. The Duphlas have many of them settled permanently in the plains and become peaceful cultivators in the villages they once harried.

The "Posa" or black mail which, under the Assam Government, was paid to most of the hill tribes bordering on the plains, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, an uncertain, ill-defined exaction depending entirely upon the rapacity of the different hordes who might descend to levy it, but was really a fixed well ascertained revenue payment, on account of which a corresponding remission was made in the rent of the ryot satisfying it. Whether it arose from pre-existent claims in the soil asserted by the hillmen, or was imposed originally by them in the days of the weakness of the Ahom Kings, we cannot tell. It had existed time out of mind, when we annexed Assam, and what the British Government did was to stop the direct collection of the stated dues from the ryots by the hillmen themselves,—a practice which, as might be expected from the characters of both, led to many quarrels; and to pay the amount to the tribes in the hills or at established marts, collecting at the same time the full rent from the ryots. The power of the purse being thus held by the same authority who wielded the power of the sword to the terror of evil-doers, the hill tribes have accepted regular payments, and peaceful lives, in lieu of wild tax gathering forays and quarrels on the plains.

Luckimpore.—The Division of Luckimpore Proper, which we now enter, lies between the Rivers Kuboojan and Dehing, and is intersected from north to south by the River Subunshiri.†

* Aitchison, Vol. I., pages 148-9.

† The District of Luckimpore contains also the Divisions of Muttuck and Suddya. An interesting account of a visit to tribes of Hill Miris on the Subunshiri will be found in Vol. XIV. of the Journal of the Asiatic Society.

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The hills which form the northern boundary of Luekingpore Proper are in their western parts inhabited by Duphlas, as we have already seen. Beyond the Duphlas eastward we find in the lower ranges Miris and on the upper ranges Abors, to whom in former days the Miris owed some kind of rude fealty, not yet altogether extinct. The Abor clans are numerous, savage, and dangerous. They are found from 94° to 97° E. Longitude. The Miris do not appear to have extended beyond the Dehing. In the neighbourhood of the Dehing and the Debong the Abors crop out on the lower hills, and seem to have held sole command of the Dwaars and Plains, fighting many a sore battle with the Khampuis, who about the year 1750 first entered the valley from the side of Burmah. The Hill Miris and a few Abor Chiefs claimed black mail from the lowland villages, but most of the Abor clans in the interior had no such rights, probably because this corner of Assam had never been rich enough to make it worth their while to set them up. The black mail claims which did exist, were commuted by the British Government for annual money payments as had been done elsewhere. The Miris are now to be found as peaceful cultivators and indefatigable jungle clearers all over Luekingpore and even in Suddya and Muttuck. The original Assamese inhabitants to the North of the Brahmaputra have indeed been gradually thrust across that river partly by dread of Abor raids, but mainly by the advance of the Miri settlers. The Miris themselves, relieved by the presence of British troops at Suddya and other frontier posts from the position of entire dependence upon the Abors in which they were wont to live, have become extremely prosperous both as traders and cultivators, and have had wit enough to turn the tables on their old masters, by constituting themselves the main channel of communication between the Abors and the British Authorities, and the source from which the former draw most of their supplies.

During the last ten years, the relations of the British Government with the Abors have been not altogether satisfactory. In January 1858 the Bor Meyong Abors living far up the Dehing massacred a Beeah* village on the north of the Brahmaputra, only six miles from Debrooghur. An expedition was presently despatched to follow up the raiders, but owing to the extremely inaccessible nature of the country and some mistakes on the part of the Officers conducting the force, it did not succeed in reaching the offending village, and retired not without difficulty, and with some loss of credit. The Bor Meyongs becoming bold by impunity took up a more advanced position towards the plains, and it became absolutely necessary to devise some means of punishing their insolence and protecting British Districts from future attack. Proposals for establishing a line of posts with a connecting road were submitted to Government, and it was determined to organize an expedition into the hills on such a scale as should infallibly command success. Meantime the Meybo Abors, a friendly clan, had offered to become the medium of communication between us and the Meyongs. Nothing however came of this, as it was impossible for Government to overlook the events of the past, or to accept anything but a complete submission to such terms as it might dictate. In November 1858 the Secretary of State forbade any expedition into

* The Beeahs or Beheehs are a peculiar section of Hindu Assamese who were driven from the Dwaars by the Miri and Abor advance.

the Abor Hills "save upon trustworthy information and with an adequate force." This very same instruction was not held to interfere with the course of action already determined upon, and in February 1859, the expedition marched into the Hills, destroyed completely the Abor Stockade, and carried every thing before it. In such a country however no comprehensive scheme of operations was feasible, and having routed the only enemy that waited its advance, the force retired. Later in the year a strong reconnoitring party surveyed the whole Abor Frontier between Leesa and Lallee Soota, and for a year or two we had little or no further trouble.

Towards the close of 1861, the Meyong Abors again massacred a Beeah village on the south side of the Brahmaputra, fifteen miles from Debroogurh. Enquiry seemed to show that certain Miri Colonies had aided and abetted the Abors in these attacks. These Beeahs were part of a body of ryots who had deserted the north side of the river in 1858 after the former Abor outrage, and the raid now under notice appears to have been designed partly to show them that they were not beyond reach and partly to take vengeance for aid rendered to the British Troops in the Campaign of 1859. The Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore proposed to deport the Miris who had settled under the Abor Hills on the line of country of the Booree Dibing, to the south side of the Brahmaputra, and thus to deprive the Abors of the intelligence and the covert assistance rendered them by these facile allies. It was further suggested to complete the line of road and the fortified posts already alluded to, and by means of a Military expedition to occupy the Abor Hills for a season. The wisdom of the first proposal is not very apparent, for the very Miris whom it was intended to deport were the only laborers on whom Government could depend to make the forts and roads required. The forts had been already sanctioned by the Bengal Government, but their erection were stopped on financial considerations by the Public Works Department of the Government of India. Now, however, the proposals of the Local Officers were cordially taken up by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Public Works Department was ordered to complete the forts at once by convict labor. The road was to be maintained and improved, and complete proposals were laid before the Supreme Government for retaining by means of troops, forts, and roads, the Military command of the whole Abor frontier. The importance of this step to the Tea interests in the Suddyn and Muttuck Divisions can be seen at once by a glance at the map.

The bustle of preparation did not fail to attract the notice of the Abors, and overtures of reconciliation were speedily made by them. The Lieutenant-Governor directed that these advances should be not ungraciously received, and an attempt was ordered to be made to effect such a binding agreement with the chiefs as should secure the peace of the frontier for the future. Small stipends were to be allowed to those who undertook to prevent hostile aggression by their own or kindred clans, to keep up a Police for the prevention of marauding, and to surrender criminal refugees. An annual meeting with the British Officers was to be arranged. No relaxation was however permitted in the Military preparations already begun. We could only afford to conciliate by being at the same time strong. Accordingly in November 1862 Major Bivar, Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, met the Meyong Abor Chiefs at Lallee Mookh, and after prolonged negotiation extending over seven days, an agreement was concluded between the British Government and the Chiefs of eight communities of Meyongs, to which other clans subsequently gave in their assent. The agreement is not

among Aitchison's Treaties, so we reproduce it in a foot note.* It will be observed that in lieu of money stipends to Chiefs, Major Bivar arranged for payments in kind to the whole community. The democratic nature of their management made this advisable, and the plan gave each member of the village a personal interest in keeping the peace. In 1863 the leading tribe of Abors (Kebong) came and begged to be allowed to enter into similar relations.

At the annual meeting in April 1865, several of the Meyong Abor Clans failed to attend, alleging as their excuse the prevalence of small-pox and cholera, of which they

* Whereas it is expedient to adopt measures for maintaining the integrity of the British Territory in the District of Lushai, Upper Assam, on the Meyong Abor Frontier, and for preserving peace and tranquillity; and whereas, by virtue of a letter, No. 11 of 11th October 1862, from the Officiating Commissioner of Assam, transmitting orders from the Government of Bengal, conveyed in a letter, No. 256T, dated the 8th August 1862, from the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, the Deputy Commissioner of Lushai has been authorized to proceed in this matter, and an engagement to the following effect has been entered into with the Meyong Abors this 5th day of November A. D. 1862, at Camp Lalee Mookh:

FIRST.—Offences committed by the Meyong Abors in a time of hostility towards the British Government, and for which the assembled heads of villages have sued for pardon, are overlooked, and peace is re-established.

SECOND.—The limit of the British Territory which extends to the foot of the hills is recognized by the Meyong Abors, who hereby engage to respect it.

THIRD.—The British Government will take up positions on the Frontier in the plains, will establish stations, post guards, or construct forts, or open roads, as may be deemed expedient, and the Meyong Abors will not take umbrage at such arrangements or have any voice in such matters.

FOURTH.—The Meyong Abors recognize all persons residing in the plains in the vicinity of the Meyong Hills as British subjects.

FIFTH.—The Meyong Abors engage not to molest or to cross the Frontier for the purpose of molesting residents in the British Territory.

SIXTH.—The communication across the Frontier will be free both for the Meyong Abor and for any persons, British subjects, going to the Meyong villages for the purpose of trading or other friendly dealings.

SEVENTH.—The Meyong Abors shall have access to markets and places of trade which they may think fit to resort to, and on such occasions they engage not to come armed with their spears and bows and arrows, but merely to carry their dhâos.

EIGHTH.—Any Meyong Abors desiring to settle in, or occupy lands in the British Territory, engage to pay such revenue to Government as may be fixed upon by the Deputy Commissioner, the demand, in the first instance, to be light.

NINTH.—The Meyong Abors engage not to cultivate opium in the British Territory or to import it.

TENTH.—In event of any grievance arising or any dispute taking place between the Meyong Abors and British subjects, the Abors will refrain from taking the law into their own hands, but they will appeal to the Deputy Commissioner for redress and abide by his decision.

ELEVENTH.—To enable the Meyong Abors of the eight khels or communities who submit to this engagement, to keep up a Police for preventing any marauders from resorting to the plains for sinister purposes, and to enable them to take measures for arresting any offenders, the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the British Government, agrees that the communities referred to shall receive yearly the following articles:—

100 Iron-hoes, one hundred.

80 Maunds of Salt, thirty.

80 Bottles of Rum, eighty.

2 Seers of Abkaree Opium, two.

2 Maunds of Tobacco, two.

TWELFTH.—The articles referred to above, which will be delivered for the first year on the signing of this engagement, will hereafter be delivered from year to year to the representatives of the eight khels or communities of the Meyong Abors, as aforesaid, on their meeting the Deputy Commissioner at Lalee Mookh, or at any other convenient place on the Meyong Dwar side.

THIRTEENTH.—On the occasion of meeting the Deputy Commissioner the Meyong Abors, in earnest of their continued friendly feeling, engage to make a tribute offering of a pig and fowls, in exchange for which they will obtain usual suitable acknowledgments.

have an intense dread. At this meeting it transpired that the increased price of salt at Suddya had caused much discontent among the tribes, and that in a fit of ill humour the Meybo Abors had *ratified* the agreement entered into with Major Bivar. Those however who attended took their allowances, and expressed their intention of remaining friendly. The meeting of 1866 passed off quietly, and was only marked by the coming in of the Bor Abors, a very influential clan who had hitherto held aloof. The Meyongs were again absent, but sent in a demand that the posts at Pobah Mookh should be abandoned. This of course was refused, and the guards along the frontier were strengthened in case this clan should attempt any hostile action. Nothing however followed, and up to date the Abor tribes have been perfectly well behaved, frequenting our markets, and meeting our Officers without suspicion and with the greatest cordiality.

That these people are amenable to kindly influences is proved by the fact that in 1855-56, the Revd. Mr. Higgs, a Clergyman at Debrooghur, obtained much influence over them, and to their villages he paid annual visits under the escort of the young men of the tribe. He also settled some Abor emigrants near Debrooghur.

The hills which close the north-east corner of the Assam Valley are inhabited by various tribes of Mishmees. Between the foot of the hills and the British Out-posts stretches a broad and deadly belt of jungle some twenty miles deep, and through this run the paths by which the Mishmees come to purchase salt and cloth at our established marts. We have no formal agreements with any of these tribes, and our information regarding them is comparatively scanty. They occupy the almost inaccessible country lying between Assam and Lama or Thibet. Any who are curious to know more about their habitat, must refer to No. XXIII. of the published selections from the records of the Bengal Government, and to volume XVII. of the Asiatic Society's Researches. We are acquainted with three great branches of this tribe. The Chulkatta or crop-haired Mishmees, the Tain or Digaroo Mishmees, and the still more remote Mezhoos or Midhi Mishmees. We are told that in 1836, the Mezhoos, aided by a Lama force, attacked the Tain Mishmees, and devastated their villages. Of other tribal movements in the interior hills we know little or nothing.

In 1854, two French Missionaries, M. M. Krick and Bourry, endeavoured to penetrate *via* the Mezhoos Mishmee country to Thibet. They were escorted safely to the border by some Mezhoos Chiefs, but were pursued and barbarously murdered by an independent party of Mishmees, under one Kai-ee-sha, who overtook the unfortunate gentlemen in a Thibetan

FOURTEENTH.—In event of Meyong Abors infringing, or failing to act up to any of the provisions of this engagement, it will be considered void and will no longer have effect.

FIFTEENTH.—The original of this engagement, which is drawn up in English, will remain with the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Upper Assam, and a counterpart or copy will be furnished to the subscribing Meyong Abors.

SIXTEENTH.—In ratification of the above engagement contained in 15th paragraph, the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Assam, on behalf of the British Government, puts his hand and seal, and the recognized Headmen or Chiefs of the eight khels or communities of the Meyong Abors affix their signatures or marks this 5th day of November in A. D. 1862.

(Sd.) H. S. BIVAR, Major.

Deputy Commr., First Class, Luckimpore, Upper Assam,
and Agent, Governor General, N. E. Frontier.

[Here follow signatures of 34 Chiefs on account of 8 different Khels.]

village, where they were awaiting permission to proceed further. The motive of this murder was simply a desire for plunder, as the Missionaries were known to have with them much valuable baggage. The news reached Assam in November. It seemed almost hopeless to attempt to punish the murderers. But both the Local Officers and Government felt that to overlook such a deed, committed though it was in Thibet itself, would injure our prestige with all the border tribes. The neighbouring Mishmees themselves urged us to retribution, and the call was not disregarded. Accordingly in the latter end of February 1855 a little body of twenty Assam Light Infantry with forty Khamptee Volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant Eden, entered the hills. For eight days they pressed on and up, swinging themselves across dangerous torrents on bridges of single canes, climbing for hours at a time in bitter cold, and without water; until at length about four o'clock one morning they arrived at Kai-ee-sha's village. To carry it in face of a flight of poisoned arrows was the work of five minutes. Kai-ee-sha was taken alive; his sons fell fighting; his daughters surrendered; his village fled; and the triumphant little band retired more slowly to the plains, cutting away the bridges behind them as they passed. This brilliant exploit has not yet been forgotten in the North-Eastern Hills by the Tam and Mezho Mishmees. The Chulkattas, however, have now and then given trouble. They seem indeed more hopelessly savage than any other tribe, and for years they perpetrated a series of outrages upon the Suddya villages.

In April 1855 three servants of Lieutenant Eden's were carried off by the Chulkattas, but were recovered through the agency of a friendly Chief. Towards the close of 1855, the same tribe made a sudden attack upon a village near Suddya, killing two and kidnapping others of the inhabitants. Again friendly Mishmees came forward to recover the captives and punish the aggressors. The Chulkattas were common foes to all. In January 1857, another daring foray was made by them, and a village cut up within hearing of the Sepoy guard at Suddya, who made no effort to drive them off. While measures were being concerted for a punitive expedition, the mutiny broke out, and all such undertakings were postponed. In October 1857, the Chulkattas rendered bold by impunity again sacked an outlying house. The month after they massacred the Khamptee village of Chowkeng Gohain, while most of the males were away with the Assistant Commissioner establishing outposts to check their attacks. Stealing through the jungles and watching their opportunity, these wretches, who have naturally the greatest dread of fire-arms, murdered women and children and disappeared before our guards could reach the scene of the atrocity. Enquiry showed that this attack on the Khampteas was designed as revenge for the death by cholera of some of the Chulkatta clan when on a friendly visit to Chowkeng Gohain. This last outrage roused the Khamptee ryots in their own defence, and shortly afterwards the Mishmees were more than once driven back with loss when advancing down the jungle paths towards the villages.

Again, in the beginning of 1866, the Chulkatta Mishmees attacked the village of Chowkeng Gohain, and though beaten off with loss, yet left their mark behind them. Arms had been supplied to these Khamptee villagers by Government, and they were as a rule well able to defend themselves. Government now, however, approved of a more extended scheme of village defence. A good Frontier Militia was better fitted to keep these savages in check than any number of regular posts, and a Khamptee Colony was forthwith settled at an advanced spot towards the Dikrang, a certain number of its members being fully armed for its defence. Since this was done, the Chulkatta Mishmees have given no trouble.

This seems a good place to review generally the policy of Government towards the tribes on the northern boundary of Assam. We have seen that as regards those tribes who had long established claims upon the plains, that policy has been one of fair and equitable dealing. While maintaining a force strong enough to punish any wanton aggressor, we have refrained from creating unnecessary foes, and have scrupulously made good to the hillmen all that of which we deprived them by assuming the government of Assam. We have, however, made them clearly to know that the payment of their dues is contingent on their good behaviour, and that the strong arm of British power is for ever interposed between them and the ryots they once oppressed. At the same time we have welcomed them as cultivators in the plains, and we have seen whole communities of border bandits settle down into peaceful tillers of the soil. Not a trace of a policy of "extermination and repression" can be found by the most bitter enemy of the English in India. The sound sense on which these arrangements are based is stamped, moreover, with the seal of perfect success. Kamroop and Durrung have for years been as undisturbed as the 24-Pergunnahs. Nor is the case much altered when we come to the wilder tribes living near Luckimpore. We have said nothing of the Singphos and Khamptees, who are settled in large numbers on the fertile plains of that District. We need only now mention the Miris who seem destined to hold all the District north of the Brahmaputra. But even as regards the Abors, a fierce and uncouth race with whom we have been brought into sharp conflict, we find little to carp at in the policy pursued. We freely admit that we may any day see ourselves involved in war with the Abors and perhaps the Mishmees. It is the work of time to make such savages understand a policy of conciliation, and the time has hitherto been short. In dealing with them the first necessity is to ensure that they should not despise us. Hence the punishment for any outrage must be and usually has been summary and severe. But our aim as a whole has been conciliatory. Some are disposed to scoff at the concomitants of this policy, and to deride the Government for endeavouring to conceal what these critics call a weak system of bribery under the name and pretence of payments for Police service. Now, it will be remembered that the payments to the Abors at any rate are not money payments to the Chiefs, but payments in kind to the whole community. Where the constitution of a tribe is patriarchal or aristocratical, payments to the Chiefs suffice. There is no difference in principle, but the variation in the expression shows what the principle really is. It may be, and no doubt is, true that with the sums or for the sums so paid no organized Police Establishment is kept up by the Abors. It was never expected that they would appoint Chowkeedars in red turbans and locate them in well found station-houses. But what was expected was, that they would adopt their own rude means of securing a quiet frontier, and would take such steps as were in their judgment necessary, and in accordance with their tribal organization to prevent the evil disposed among the tribes from doing any act which, in conformity with the understanding under which the payment is made, they are bound to prevent. As a matter of fact, we have evidence from the mouths of the Abors themselves, that the desired effect was produced in the very first year of the agreements, and an attack on Suddya proposed by some tribes was prevented by the rest. The following passages show how the policy of thus dealing with these tribes was put by Government in 1865.

"The essential difference between "black mail" and the annual allowances paid to the Abors is this: that in the one case the forbearance of the savage tribe is made by them conditional on payment of the stipulated allowance, and in the other the payment of the

allowance is made by us conditional on the good conduct of the tribe. The one is initiated in an aggressive spirit, the other in a spirit of conciliation.

"It is an arrangement of this kind which was made in the last century with the aborigines of the Rajmehal Hills, who had previously been the terror of the surrounding country, whom successive Military expeditions had failed to subdue, but who, under the operation of an annual payment conditional on good conduct, have remained perfectly quiet and peaceable ever since. It is true that the amount of the allowance paid to the Rajmehal Hill Chiefs is considerably greater than the value of the presents made to the Abors, but the principle is the same, and is as certain to be efficacious in one case as it is in the other, provided the allowance be sufficient to compensate the tribe in their own estimation for the advantage they might gain by the occasional plunder of a border village,—an advantage which they well know is materially qualified by the risk of reprisals.

"It is very desirable that the younger men of the tribe should be induced, if possible, to take service in the Police, and that the hill tribes generally should be employed in this manner, for after a certain degree of training and education, not only are they by their physique better qualified than the people of the plains for most of the duties required of the Police in frontier Districts, but their employment sets free the labor of others accustomed to industrial occupations.

"What is of the utmost importance in dealing with uncivilized tribes is patience. No one supposes that their civilization is to be effected in a few years, and no one expects that in endeavouring to conciliate them the Government will not meet with occasional disappointment, but the policy is none the less on this account sound and intelligible."

With the majority of the Mishmee tribes we have had none but casual trading intercourse. They are too remote to interest us directly, and they do not in any way molest us. The Chuikattas appear to be at feud with all the other tribes, and owing to the difficult nature of their country, we must trust to a good system of village defence and to the good offices of the other tribes to prevent or punish their occasional inroads. They are too distant to conciliate, too inaccessible to coerce. Our policy must, as regards them, be defensive.

It is not open to us on the Abor frontier to have recourse to the policy of permanent occupation and direct management, which we shall find so successfully carried out in the Naga, Garrow, Cossyah, Jynteah, and Chittagong Hill Tracts. To annex the Abor Hills would only bring us into contact with tribes still wilder and less known, nor should we find a resting place for the foot of annexation till we planted it on the plateau of High Asia. And then?

Our immediate border we might do much to secure by running roads along the river lines into the interior, but the cost would be enormous, and while there is such a demand for communications within our settled Districts, we should not be warranted in carrying even one *cul-de-sac* into the Abor or Mishmee Hills.

We have said enough to show that on this frontier our policy has been from the beginning not a policy of coercion and "contemptuous devastation," but a firm and kindly policy of defence and conciliation.

It does not form part of our purpose to describe the Shan tribes of Suddya, the Singphos and Khamptis, or the part played by them in the history of Assam. They cannot be described as hillmen—their relations with the British Authorities are now-a-days mainly fiscal. For similar reasons we pass over altogether the Moamarias of Muttuck, and other tribes who dwell in peaceful settlements on the plains.

Turning our steps westward along the southern side of the valley, we come to the numerous tribes of Nagas who inhabit that great tract of hills extending from Longitude 97° east to the Kopili on the west, including on the south-east and south the whole northern face of the central range lying between Assam and Burmah, and embracing in its circle North Manipore and North Cachar.

The Naga tribes living immediately on the borders of the Sibsagar District have been generally well behaved since they entered into agreements with Captain Brodie in 1841-44. They frequent the plain markets regularly and combine to exclude therefrom the Abor Nagas of the upper hills. The charms of trade appear indeed to have taken so strong a hold on the clans in this quarter, that it is almost the only frontier on which the policy of closing the hâths on occasion of a murder or outrage by hillmen is speedily followed by surrender of the guilty parties. In April 1861 the Dwars were closed to Naga traders by order of the Commissioner of Assam, in consequence of the murder of one Tonoo Cachari in the Gelaki Dwar. In February following, the Nangota Nagas, who were not known to us to be the guilty tribe, surrendered five of their number as those who had committed the murder. This, it appeared, they did under pressure brought to bear on them by the Nagas of Tabloong, Jaktoong, Kamsang, and Namsang, who being much distressed by the closure of the Dwars, threatened to attack the Nangotas if they did not give up the offenders. In March 1863, a murder was committed in Mouzah Oboipore of Sibsagar by Banfera Nagas; and at the close of the same month the guard-house in Gelaki Dwar was burnt down by a raiding party belonging apparently to some of the interior tribes. It was never, however, distinctly brought home to any of them, and the Lieutenant-Governor forbade the closing of the Dwars.

Some alarm was felt at these disturbances on a usually tranquil part of the frontier; and when in 1866, it was reported that Naga trading parties were wandering about Sibsagar armed, contrary to custom, with spears and dâos, stringent orders were given for disarming temporarily all Nagas who passed the Police out-posts. In November 1867, the Gelaki guard-house was again attacked at night, and some of the constables killed. This outrage created much excitement among the European settlers of the neighbourhood, which was not certainly lessened by a subsequent attack upon a village not far off. Every possible motive was suggested to account for the outbreak. Every known clan was suspected in turn. One Officer thought the prohibition to carry spears to market had something to do with the raid. Another was convinced that the encroachments of Tea Planters in the hills were unsettling all the frontier tribes. A third thought the survey operations had excited their suspicion. The Dwars were at any rate closed to trade; the out-posts strengthened, and neglected stockades hastily repaired. The stoppage of trade again proved a successful policy. The Tabloong, Namsang, and other Nagas who were now carrying on a most profitable traffic with the Tea Gardens, which they could not afford to lose, speedily combined, and in a few

months time they succeeded in tracing out the raiders, and arresting by force or strategy two of their leaders, who were delivered over to the British Authorities for their due punishment. The men proved to belong to the Yungia Aber Nagas, a remote clan in the upper hills, who actuated by a love of plunder and a craving for skulls, had led a stealthy war party through trackless jungles to the plains below: and had, as they said, attacked the Police Post under the notion that it was a settlement of ryots,—a mistake not very creditable to the discipline of the place. Notwithstanding, however, these casual disturbances, we can yet say that on the whole, Sibsagar has had for many years less trouble from its barbarous neighbours than any other District on this side of Assam.

Each Naga clan near this District has living on the plains one or more Kotokies or representatives, usually Assamese, who enjoy, in virtue of these offices, certain rent-free lands or remission of revenue. If a theft or murder is committed beyond the Naga bund, a notice is served on the Kotokies, who communicate with their constituents in the hills. As a rule the guilty person is given up, and punished by our District Courts without more ado. These *proceeds* seem to be an institution dating back to the time of the Ahom Kings.

When we cross the border to Nowgong, we come upon a very different state of things, and though the last few years have inaugurated an era of happy change, yet still the management of the Angami Nagas is an anxious problem on which much thought has been spent and many official hopes been staked. "The country occupied by the Angami Nagas is bounded on the north by the Dhunsiri River, on the south by a high range of mountains, forming the boundary of Manipore. The western boundary extends as far as Hosang Rajoo. The limit of the eastern boundary is undefined, but the Doying River on the north-east separates the Lota Nagas in Sibsagar from the Angamis."—(Butler).^{*} We first visited their country in 1832, when Captains Pemberton and Jenkins endeavoured to open a communication through these hills between Manipore and Assam. They met with a most determined resistance, and had literally to fight their way through to Nowgong. Later on, in the same year, Lieutenant Gordon, accompanied by a powerful force under Rajah Gumbheer Sing, explored a second route through the hills, and the Rajah entertained designs of subjugating all the wild tribes between Assam and Manipore, that there might be a free path for commerce into his secluded little kingdom. The attention of the British Government was first *directly* drawn to the Angami Nagas in 1835, when certain inroads upon villages in North Cachar were traced to a warlike tribe so called living beyond the Dhunsiri. So little was known of their position, that the first person we called upon to control them was Tularam Senaputty, who protested feebly that he was more afraid of them than we were. We then applied to Manipore, and the Pony Cavalry of that State were only too ready to execute brilliant little sallies into the hills and cut up villages here and there: but unfortunately the more the Manipuris worried the Nagas, the more the Nagas worried North Cachar.

Three times in 1836, again in 1837, and yet again in 1838, the Angamis attacked us. An expedition was at length ordered to enter the hills and stop these raids. But the imminence of war with Burmah caused its postponement, and the only step taken was the transfer of North Cachar to Assam; the local authorities of which province were supposed to be better able to get at the Nagas than the Superintendent of Cachar.

^{*} An interesting sketch of the Angami Nagas will be found in Butler's Travels and Adventures in Assam.

In January 1839 the Sub-Assistant to the Commissioner, Mr. Grange, led a small force from Nowgong into the Angami hills. The difficulties he encountered were such that no attempt at punishing the Naga villages could be made by him, but he marched right through the hills and obtained much curious information as to the habits of the people and their intertribal relations. He ascertained that the communities of Konemah and Mozemah had been the leaders in the late raids. He induced the Chief of Mozemah to meet him, and undertake for himself and Konemah not to molest British territory again. On the whole the result was thought so encouraging, that the local Officers proposed to constitute there and then a separate Hill District, to embrace North Cachar and the adjoining tract. The Government, however, thought this too expensive and too risky. The tribes were best, it said, left alone. They should be encouraged to trade, and Mr. Grange might visit their hills again in the cold season of 1839-40: and endeavour to establish order among the clans, and put an end to their internecine feuds. The second Military expedition had a hard time of it. Disappointed of its Manipuri auxiliaries, it was persistently and constantly attacked, and had to read the savages many a severe lesson ere it succeeded in regaining the plains. For some time after this no raids were made. The Nagas for the first time saw that a British force could march through and through their hills in spite of their utmost efforts to prevent it.

✓ In April 1840, a Missionary, the Revd. Mr. Bronson, brought forward a scheme for civilising the Angamis by means of Tea cultivation and Mission Schools, to which he asked Government support. The Government of the day was not well affected to Mission Schools, but it authorized the Governor General's Agent to spend 100 Rupees a month in "furthering objects of practical utility in the Naga country." It would be interesting to see the accounts of this trust. Proposals for constructing a great road across the hills to Manipore were about this time rejected on the score of expense. Lieutenant Biggs, Principal Assistant, was however authorized to enter the hills and make a leisurely and, if possible, friendly progress from village to village, conciliating the Chiefs by personal intercourse and bringing to bear on the people that nameless attraction that the English always think they exercise over less civilized races. In 1841 Lieutenant Biggs carried out his tour. He met with no opposition, and concluded friendly agreements with most of the leading communities. A depôt for salt was at their request opened at Dhemapore. The Dhunsiri was fixed as the boundary between the British Districts and the Angami tract. The Government directed that a repetition of these friendly visits should be made from time to time, mainly with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic carried on by the Nagas with the Bengalis of Sylhet. The boundary between the Angamis and Manipore was to be settled to prevent irritation on that side, and a road was to be opened to Samoogoodting from the plains. A nominal tribute was to be taken from the Nagas as soon as they could be brought to consent to its payment. To arrange the boundary Lieutenant Biggs marched across the hills in the cold weather of 1841-42. It was agreed with the representatives of Manipore that "commencing from the upper part of the Jeerie River, the western frontier of Manipore, the line of boundary formed (1) by the Dootighur Mountain, or that range of hills in which the Mookroo River takes its rise, east on to the Barak River, (2) by the Barak River up to where it is joined by the Tayphani River, which flows along the eastern line of the Papolongmai Hill, (3) by the Tayphani River up to its source on the Burrail range of Mountains, and (4) by the summit or waterpent of the Burrail range on to the source of the Mow River flowing north

from that point towards Assam, was the best boundary between Manipore and the Angami country.* *1stly.*—Because the Angami Nagas and all the inferior tribes subject to their influence, occupy the mountainous part north of the boundary here given, and have together been the perpetrators of all the acts of aggression which have been committed of late years both in Cachar and Manipore. *2ndly.*—Because along the western portion of the boundary here proposed, the whole of the villages south of it, which were before near this frontier, having been, from time to time, destroyed by the tribes from the north, and their inhabitants obliged for protection to locate themselves further south, a considerable tract of mountainous country in this direction is completely deserted. *3rdly.*—Because along the portion of the boundary here proposed to the east of Papolongmai the Angami tribes are separated from the Nagas of Manipore by a lofty range of mountains, across which little, if any, communication takes place. *4thly.*—Because the Manipore Government not having at present any control or authority over the villages to the north, and the Angamis not possessing any influence over those to the south of this proposed boundary throughout its whole extent, its adoption would not disjoin connected tribes or separate any village from a jurisdiction to which it has been long attached, as would be the case were any portion of the country north of the line suggested made over to the Manipore Government."

A proposal to establish a British out-post on the Papolongmai hill was negatived. The attempt to make a road to Samoogoodting failed.

The Angamis, however, seemed anxious at this time to cultivate friendly relations with the authorities at Nowgong. They came down to the station and entered into agreements to obey Government, to pay yearly tribute, and to abstain from internecine feuds. The chiefs of Konemah and Mozemah made up an old quarrel in the presence of our Officers, and all seemed as peaceful and promising as Government could wish.

In April 1844, however, when an Assistant was sent up to collect the first year's tribute, the chiefs defied him and absolutely refused to pay. They followed this up by a series of daring raids, in one of which they overpowered a Shan out-post and killed most of the sepoys. Retribution was speedily had by the local troops for these outrages, but so little discrimination was shown in the mode of its exaction, that Government was compelled to censure the local Officers for burning villages that might well have been spared. The necessity of occupying the hills with a strong force as a permanent measure was again at this time discussed, and again a middle course was adopted; and in April 1846, Captain Butler was deputed on one of those armed conciliatory expeditions which had become the usual way of approaching these tribes. He succeeded in inducing the Chiefs to come in to meet him, and they even paid up their tribute in ivory, cloth, and spears. But the Chiefs told Captain Butler that they had no real control over their people, and had absolute authority only on the war-path. The different villages eagerly sought our protection, but it was only to induce us to exterminate their neighbours. As soon as our expedition left the hills, the tribes recommenced their raids on the plains and on one another. In 1847 Captain Butler again visited the Angamis, and the same farce of agreements, oaths, and presents was gone through. On this occasion, however, a permanent post was established at Samoogoodting under a native Darogah called Bhogchand, and under shelter of the post a school was opened. For

* From later reports, however, it would appear that the Manipuris have never considered themselves really limited by this boundary.

a year after this no raid took place, and the Angamis resorted freely to Nowgong to trade. In 1848-49 raiding recommenced, and at last the culminating point was reached in the murder of the Darogah Bhogchand.

This man appears to have had much personal bravery, but little discretion. He had been constantly urging the establishment of advanced posts, and at length he succeeded in getting leave to place a guard in one of the villages that was apprehensive of an attack from a neighbouring community. The policy of meddling in village feuds once inaugurated, Bhogchand must needs go in person to settle a quarrel in Mozemah itself. Brave to rashness he arrested the ringleaders, and was forthwith assailed by both sides. His men fled, leaving him to his fate, and he fell pierced by spears, a victim to his own folly and belief in the prestige of a British Policeman. The Governor General's Agent now reported to Government that if we wished to recover our influence in the hills, we must systematically burn all the granaries and crops to enforce our demands for surrender of offenders. This was the Muniपुरi plan, and the Nagas thought much better of them than of us. We marched up the hills, held big talks, and marched back again. No one could stand against us, it is true, but we never did much damage, all the same.

An expedition was now despatched to avenge poor Bhogchand's death, and plenary powers of granary burning, in case of armed resistance, were confided to it. In December 1849 it set out, but the Officer in command fell ill. A friendly village which it occupied was burnt while the troops were attacking another not far off, and the detachment had to make a hurried retreat. The Nagas celebrated the occasion by a series of raids all round the border. Indications were not wanting that other tribes were becoming uneasy, and that vague feeling of trouble in the air well known to Frontier Officers began to make itself felt. Muniपुर was said to be fomenting disturbance by underhand intrigue. Shans of various septs were said to be busy in the hills. Government, however, was equal to the occasion. A strong force was assembled on the Assam Frontier. The Governor General's Agent was ordered to the spot. The troops were of course absolutely triumphant. They stormed the stockades, burnt the villages, scattered the Nagas like leaves wherever they faced them. And then came the question, what next? What policy was to be adopted towards these mountaineers for the future?

The Supreme Government decided that the policy should be one of absolute non-interference. All troops were to be withdrawn. We were to "confine ourselves to our own frontier, to protect it as it could and ought to be protected, never to meddle in the fights and feuds of savages, to encourage trade with them so long as they were peaceful towards us, and rigidly to exclude them from all communication either to sell or buy on their becoming turbulent or troublesome."

In March 1851 our troops were withdrawn from the hills, and in that year no fewer than 22 Naga raids were reported, in which 55 persons were killed, 10 wounded, and 113 taken captive. It is true only 3 of these raids were traced to Angamis, but they were most of them committed in North Cachar by Naga tribes, who would have been easily controlled by an Officer in the hills, and any way the policy of non-interference was not very successfully inaugurated.*

* See Note A.

In 1853 the Government consented to appoint a European Officer to the charge of North Cachar, to protect our villages there from the inroads of the wilder tribes.

In 1854 a Manipore force invaded the Angami Hills, and twenty-two villages sent deputies to beg our interference and protection. The Governor General upon this decided that we were not justified in calling upon Manipore to abstain from working its will among these tribes, as they were not under our protection.

The repeated efforts of the local Officers to induce Government to take once more a direct part in hill management were sternly repressed. The line of outposts which it had been proposed to occupy was contracted. Punitive expeditions for recent outrages were disallowed. Nothing that occurred beyond the outskirts of our inhabited villages was to receive any attention. Dhemapore was abandoned. Borputhar became our most advanced guard. The Officer stationed at North Cachar was strictly charged to look upon the Angamis "as persons living beyond the jurisdiction of the British Government." For years raids went on, which our frontier posts proved quite unable to check. North Cachar suffered most from the effects of this policy; where the frontier line was always matter of doubt, and the presumption was, that any village attacked lay beyond the boundary. In fact at one time it was proposed by the local Officers almost despairingly to abandon North Cachar itself.

At length in 1862 the Commissioner was constrained to say, "It is not creditable to our Government that such atrocities should recur annually with unvarying certainty, and that we should be powerless alike to protect our subjects or to punish the aggressors. It is quite certain that our relations with the Nagas could not possibly be on a worse footing than they are now. The non-interference policy is excellent in theory, but Government will probably be inclined to think that it must be abandoned."

The Lieutenant-Governor, (Sir Cecil Beadon,) who had then succeeded to office, reviewed afresh the whole question of the treatment of these tribes. He dissented from the policy of interdicting them from trade, which had of late years been usual. It was, he said, not only unsound in itself, but it was a policy which, in regard to a country situated as is that of the Angami Nagas, it is impossible to carry out. He directed that an Officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Nowgong should be placed in immediate communication with the Nagas. The Chiefs on the border were to be informed that Government looked to them to be responsible for the good behaviour of the villages, and annual stipends for this Police duty would be paid to them so long as they performed it well. Written agreements were to be taken to this effect and annual presents interchanged. The Officer to be appointed to this duty was further ordered to decide any disputes voluntarily referred to him, but not to interfere in internal affairs, at any rate for the present. Some delay occurred in bringing this policy into actual operation, owing to official changes among the local Officers and the successive representations of conflicting views. There were now the following three distinct lines of policy open, and each had its defenders.

(1.) We might abandon North Cachar and all the hill tracts inhabited by Nagas, and strictly enforce the non-interference policy of 1851. This was Colonel Hopkinson's view.

(2.) We might advance into the hills, place special Officers in charge, and maintain them there by force of arms. These were the proposals supported by Colonel Haughton and Major Agnew.

(3.) We might, while confining ourselves to the plains, cultivate political relations with the neighbouring clans and bring their Chiefs into stipendiary police relations to ourselves. This was Sir Cecil Beadon's original scheme.

It was unfortunate that at this time the Commissioner of Assam was a somewhat ardent supporter of the first of these courses, and although a more aggressive policy was advocated by the Officers who from time to time acted for him, nothing decisive was done for over two years. Further raids, however, in March and April 1865 forced upon Government a definite settlement of the question. Lieutenant Gregory was at that time in charge of North Cachar, and he reported that unless he were allowed to adopt more vigorous measures than were permitted to his predecessors he could not guarantee the safety of his Sub-Division. Still the Commissioner was for abandoning the whole hill tract to its fate: or at least for closing the Dwards to all Naga trade. It was necessary now for the Lieutenant-Governor peremptorily to over-rule his representative on the frontier. Sir Cecil Beadon insisted accordingly on a fair trial being given to the policy sketched out by him in 1862, remarking:

"If the policy indicated in 1862 had been carried out in the spirit in which it was conceived, there is every reason to suppose these outrages would not have occurred. Two years and a half have been allowed to elapse, and nothing has yet been done to give effect to the orders of Government, and though these orders were peremptorily repeated in a subsequent letter, dated 30th July 1863, they have apparently received from you no attention whatever. The proposal to recede before these wild tribes and fall back from their neighbourhood whenever they choose to annoy us, is one which the Lieutenant-Governor cannot for a moment entertain. The practical effect of such a measure would be that in the course of a few years Assam would be divided amongst the Bhutias, Abors, Nagas, Garos, Mishmis, and other wild tribes; for exposed as Assam is on every side, if petty outrages are to be followed by withdrawal of our frontier, we should very speedily find ourselves driven out of the province."

In reply to this the Commissioner entered into an elaborate review of our position in regard to North Cachar and the Nagas, denying that he was himself decidedly averse to taking a more direct control of their country. He, however, pointed out that the democratic nature of the tribal arrangements among the Angamis, the infinite divisions and disputes existing even in a single village, rendered it impossible to hope for success from the policy of conciliation *ab extra* proposed by the Government. He admitted that no system of frontier defence that could be devised would secure perfect immunity from raids. "A country void of roads, void of supplies,—a country of interminable hills, of vast swamps covered with dense forest save where here and there a speck in the ocean of wilderness reveals a miserable Meekir or Cachari clearance, cannot possibly be defended at every point against a foe for whom hill and swamp and forest are resources rather than obstacles." From 1854 to 1865 there had been nineteen Angami raids, in which 232 British subjects had been killed, wounded, or carried off. Ninety-two of these unfortunates had been so lost during three years (1854-6), when a chain of out-posts was in existence from Borpathar to Assaloo connected by roads which were regularly patrolled. "At most we should be able to keep the raids of such savages below a certain maximum, and prevent

their extension to settled districts." The establishment of a trade blockade, the Commissioner maintained, was advantageous when it could be made practically complete, and so far as it was complete; but none of these schemes would secure the peace of the frontier. They had all been tried and found wanting. If Government were prepared to consider a more advanced policy he was ready to show how it could best be carried out. This policy had been sketched by Colonel Haughton in 1864 as follows:—He would depute a specially qualified Officer to proceed with a force of not less than 200 men, and effect a permanent lodgment in the country at a point most convenient for keeping open communication and procuring supplies. This Officer would then invite the Chiefs to submit themselves to us. Those who agreed would, as a token of submission, pay an annual tribute, and in return receive our aid and protection; while those who refused would be told that we would leave them to themselves so long as they kept the peace towards us and those who submitted themselves to us.

Colonel Hopkinson now suggested that Lieutenant Gregory should occupy Samoo-goodting again in the way above described. The following was Lieutenant Gregory's own idea of how his operations should be conducted:—

"I am totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country. It could only be done at great expense, and would require a strong force to hold it. It would be further embarking on an unknown sea, for we know nothing of the tribes beyond the Angamis except that they are fierce and warlike; so that it would be well our acquaintance with them should be made gradually and peacefully, which it is most certain would not be the case if we began by annexing the Angami country *vi et armis*.

"I would advance step by step, yearly opening out a good road as I went, never getting in advance of the road, and never in advance of ground I was not sure of, until I reached the very centre of the most thickly populated part of the country. There—clear of any village but that of my own hewers of wood and drawers of water, on the slopes of what is described as a most beautiful country, fertile to a degree, finely wooded with oak and beech and fir, and well watered, I would build the permanent station."

The way in which the Lieutenant-Governor received these proposals will be best seen by the following extract from the letter to the Government of India in regard to them:—

"In regard to the policy to be pursued towards the Angami Nagas, the Lieutenant-Governor is clearly of opinion that the abandonment of the position we held previously to 1854, and the withdrawal of our line of frontier posts to the left bank of the Dhruisiri is proved, by the events which have since occurred, to have been a grave mistake, and that the only course left us consistently with the duty we owe to the inhabitants of the adjoining frontier districts as well as to the Angami Nagas themselves, who are torn by intestine feuds for want of a government, and unable to exercise any general self-control, or to restrain independent action on the part of any village or even of a section of any of the numerous villages inhabited by the tribe, is to re-assert our authority over them, and bring them under a system of administration suited to their circumstances, and gradually to reclaim them from habits of lawlessness to those of order and civilization.

"These Angami Nagas are frequently mentioned in the correspondence of late years as independent Nagas, and a distinction is made between the tract they inhabit and British

territory, as if the former were not included in the latter. But for this distinction there is no real ground. The treaties with Burmah and Manipore recognize the Patkoi and Buraill ranges of hills running in a continuous line from the sources of the Dehing in the extreme east of Assam to those of the Dhunsiri in North Cachar as the boundary between those countries and British India. There is no intermediate independent territory, and while the wild tribes who inhabit the southern slopes of those ranges are subject to Burmah and Manipore, those who inhabit the northern slopes are subject to the British Government. These latter, including the Angami Nagas, are independent only in the sense that the British Government has refrained from reducing them to practical subjection, and has left them, except at occasional intervals, entirely to themselves; but they have never enjoyed or acquired political or territorial independence; and it is clearly open to the British Government in point of right, as it is incumbent on it in good policy, to exercise its sovereign power by giving them the benefit of a settled administration.

This is the course advocated by all the local authorities, and it is the one which the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommends as the only means of establishing peace in this part of the frontier, and of putting an end to the atrocities which have prevailed more or less for the last thirty years, and which a policy of non-interference and purely defensive action is now found to be wholly inadequate to prevent. Even if the right of the British Government were less clear than it is, the existence on its border of a savage and turbulent tribe, unable to restrain its members from the commission of outrages, given up to anarchy, and existing only as a pest and nuisance to its neighbours, would justify the Government in the adoption of any measures for bringing it under subjection and control.

The Lieutenant-Governor therefore desires entirely to support the recommendation contained in paragraphs 39 to 44 of Colonel Hopkinson's letter, and proposes to direct Lieutenant Gregory to remove his head-quarters from Assaloo to Samoogoodting, to abolish Assaloo as a Sub-Division, apportioning a part among the districts of South Cachar, the Cossyah and Jynteah Hills, and Nowgong, and constituting the remainder lying on the right bank of the Dhunsiri, together with the Angami Naga Hills and the country on both banks of the River Doyeng (a tributary of the Dhunsiri) a separate district, to be administered by Lieutenant Gregory as Deputy Commissioner, under the direct orders of the Commissioner, and no longer dependent on the District of Nowgong."

The orders of the Government of India thereon were as follows:—

Lieutenant Gregory may take up the proposed position at Samoogoodting, and do his best by tact and good management, supported by a moderate display of physical force, to bring that portion of the hill tract adjacent to the plains into order. He will remember that our main object in having any dealings with the hill people is to protect the low lands from their incursions. Instead, therefore, of exerting himself to extend our rule into the interior, he will rather refrain from such a course. Subject to this general principle, his line of action may advantageously be left in great measure to his own good judgment. A conciliatory demeanour will of course be indispensable, and perhaps the expenditure of a little money to leading men will be useful. When conciliation fails, punitive measures will not be shrunk from. In some instances a blockade of the passes, so as to exclude the offending tribe or village from our bazars, may be attended with good results. But in all cases the great point will be to select a penalty suitable to the circumstances of the particular

" affair. Where roads are necessary, they must be constructed in a simple and inexpensive manner, just sufficient for the opening of the country to the extent actually required.

" Should the plan thus sketched succeed, and the hill men be gradually reclaimed to our rule and civilised, without much cost to the British Treasury in the process, it will be a good work well accomplished. But His Excellency in Council cannot admit that we are bound to attempt more in their behalf than the resources of the empire can reasonably afford."

The Secretary of State cordially approved of all that had been done.

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed statement of the mode in which the arrangements thus approved were carried out. Lieutenant Gregory was ordered to establish himself at Samoogoodting. Assaloo, in North Cachar, was abandoned, save by a small Police guard. A road was opened from Dhemapore to the new station. A compact force of 150 Police, all hillmen and well-armed, was placed at Lieutenant Gregory's disposal. Large discretionary powers were entrusted to him of proceeding summarily against villages concerned in any gross outrage, and a rough system of judicial procedure was laid down. The Manipuris were not to be allowed any longer to make retaliatory expeditions into the Naga Hills. Measures to redress any outrages committed by Angamis in Manipore were to be taken in concert with Lieutenant Gregory. This was not, of course, to prevent Manipuri troops from following up and punishing any marauding party they fell in with in their own territory. All Angami Nagas visiting the plains of Assam were to be furnished with passes, by Lieutenant Gregory, as they passed through Samoogoodting, where they were also to leave their spears.

As if to give emphasis to the change of policy so happily inaugurated, the Nagas of the village of Razepehah, in January 1866, cut up a Mekir village in North Cachar, and in March Lieutenant Gregory made a dash with a little force of Police and burnt Razepehah to the ground. In June the Razepehah men, to retrieve their honor, made a raid and butchered twenty-six Mekirs in the village of Sergamcha,—a practical proof that a policy of coercion does not always succeed. The rains prevented any immediate steps being taken to avenge this outrage. But it was determined that, as soon as Lieutenant Gregory had fairly established himself in the hills, a salutary lesson should be given to the Razepehah community, while an amnesty for the past was extended to all others. This was accordingly done. The village was raised to the ground; its lands declared barren and desolate for ever; and its people, on their making complete submission, were distributed throughout other communities.

Since Lieutenant Gregory took up his position permanently in the hills their history has been uneventful, because it has been perfectly peaceful. The only measure of importance has been the sanction accorded to a proposal of Lieutenant Gregory's to receive at Samoogoodting residentiary delegates from the various communities, to whom small stipends will be allowed for acting as interpreters and messengers to their respective Clans.

Before leaving the District of Nowgong, we must very briefly mention the other Hill Tracts within its borders. The Rengma Nagas, living in the jungly hills between the Kullianee and the Dhunsiri, were first discovered in 1839, when Mr. Grange came across them on his way to the Angami Hills.

In 1847 a revenue settlement was effected with thirty-two of their villages, and a house tax imposed with the consent of the Chiefs. These Bengma Nagas are fast becoming indistinguishable from the people of the plains. There is nothing to remark upon in their political history.

The Mekirs inhabit the low ranges of hills extending from the Kulliance on the east to the Jumoona west of Dubboka. They were originally tributary to the princes of Cachar, Jynteeah and Assam. The Assam Rajahs gave them grants of land under the hills. They are, ordinarily, an inoffensive people, paying house tax to the British Authorities of Nowgong and much devoted to the rearing of pigs.

In May 1863 a party of Mekirs, from a village on the confines of Jynteeah, attacked another Mekir village at Hurlock Purbut and killed some of the inhabitants. When pursued by the Police they resisted. This was just the time of the Jynteeah disturbances, and enquiry seemed to show that the Jynteeah insurgents had instigated the Mekirs to this attack, to which they were the more predisposed by certain oppressive proceedings on the part of the native Mouzadar. This is the only outrage traceable to Mekirs.

North Cachar has been already incidentally noticed when we were treating of the Angami Nagas, and since its partition among the three Districts of the Naga Hills, Nowgong and Cachar Proper, it has lost that distinctive importance which it once possessed as a frontier district. As originally defined, its boundaries were the River Jumoona and Nowgong on the north, the Burrail Range and Cachar on the south, on the east the Dhunsiri and the Kutcha and Angami Nagas, and on the west the Kopili and Oompoong rivers, and the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills. In 1839 it was annexed to Nowgong, and in 1852 it was placed in charge of a separate Officer, whose business it was to keep order among the Kookies and Nagas dwelling about Assaloo, and to protect them from the raids of the Angami Nagas. In 1854 Tooleram Senaputty's territory was annexed to North Cachar, the surviving members of the Senaputty's family being pensioned off. The inhabitants of the tract are these:

(1) Hill Cacharies, (2) Hozai Cacharies, (3) Mekirs, (4) Old Kookies, (5) New Kookies, and (6) Aroong Nagas; who pay, some a house tax, others a hoe tax, and others again a land tax to Government.

The Kookies in North Cachar are all immigrants from the south. The old Kookies say they came north 70 years ago, in the time of Kishen Chunder, Rajah of Cachar. In 1832-3 a body of these Kookies, whom the Cachar Rajah had employed in his contest with Tooleram Senaputty, were found by Colonel Jenkins to have settled in these hills, in a compact well armed community, fearing neither Nagas nor any one else. They were followed from time to time by others. In the years 1851-2 about 8,000 entered the district. This Kookie migration from the south was undoubtedly a sign of movements in the hills towards Burmah, of which we know little, but which is still going on. The tribes from the south are still pushing up by slow degrees, and along the border of our Chittagong Hill Tracts a watchful eye can see, every now and then, signs of the changes that are taking place, and which are destined perhaps some day to attract more of our attention than we at present think.

Before the establishment of the Naga Hills District, proposals were occasionally made to utilise these Kookies as a screen from Angami raids. In 1856-7 an experiment of this kind was made, and lands were assigned rent free for 10 years, and afterwards for 25, to those Kookies who would settle on the east side of North Cachar. Arms and ammunition were also given them.

In 1860 the Langting Colony, as this settlement was called, contained 1,356 inhabitants in seven villages. The Angamis never ventured to touch any of these villages, and they did, to a very marked extent, serve to protect the less warlike communities in their direct rear; but it would have taken years to establish an effectual cordon of Kookies along the frontier. At the census of 1867 the total number of souls in the Colony amounted to 1,967, but a body of 500 new immigrants had arrived from Manipore, who were settled in North Cachar, on their specifically acknowledging their subserviency to the British Authorities. Arms, however, were not supplied to these new comers. The establishment of the Naga Hills District has deprived this experiment of much of the political interest it once possessed.

We shall return presently to the District of Cachar itself, and the tribes which dwell upon its southern border. But meantime we shall find it more convenient to complete our review of the hills of which the Angami tract is but a continuation, and describe, briefly, the relations of our Government to the tribes of the Cossyah, Jynteah, and Garrow Hills.

The Cossyah* Hills were first visited by Europeans in 1826. Up to that time these mountaineers had been known principally through their Cossyah and Jynteah Hills. encroachments and raids on the plains of Assam, and their collisions with the British troops on the side of Sylhet. In the year 1826 Tecrut Sing, Rajah of Nungklow, applied to Mr. Scott, the great Pro-Consul of the North-East, for permission to rent certain lands formerly held by him in Assam. Mr. Scott agreed to grant this if the Rajah would induce the Cossyabs to consent to a road being made through their hills to unite Assam and Sylhet, and a Sanatorium being established at Nungklow. This was at length arranged, and for nearly two years the most friendly relations prevailed between the British Authorities and the hill Chiefs. This good understanding was, however, speedily undermined by the insolent speeches and behaviour of the Bengali underlings whom we employed in various capacities along the line of road. The simple hillmen were told they would soon be subjected to taxes and be unable to call their huts their own. A general conspiracy was formed among them to exterminate the new comers, and on the 4th of April 1829 the Cossyabs massacred Lieutenants Bedingfield and Burlton, the only two British Officers at Nungklow, with all their followers. A long and harassing hill warfare commenced, varied occasionally by daring irruptions of the Cossyabs into the plains both of Assam and Sylhet. Although all the petty chieftains of the hills were not ostensibly mixed up in these protracted hostilities, yet most of them secretly abetted the Nungklow Rajah and supplied him with the means of resistance. The Chief of Khyrim was the only one who seemed really anxious to assist the settlement of affairs. It was not till January 1833 that the Nungklow Chief surrendered. Fines were

* For a fully detailed account of our early relations with the Cossyabs and Jynteahs, see Pemberton's Report on the Eastern Frontier.

imposed by the Governor General's Agent on all the States that had involved themselves in conflict with the British Government.

As reported by the Agent in 1832, the following was the position held by each of the seven principal Cossyah Chiefs:—

1. Sing Manik of Khyrim, the most powerful of the Chiefs, had also been the most friendly. He ruled over seventy villages, had 3,000 armed followers and paid no tribute to Government.

2. Within the geographical limits of Khyrim lay the villages of Bur Manik, now known as Moleem. This Chief was hostile from the first, and some of his territory was taken over absolutely by Government. He was fined Rupees 5,000, for which he compounded by paying Rupees 1,000 down, and constructing a good road from Cherra *via* Moleem to Myrung. Bur Manik ruled over twenty-eight villages, had a little army of 400 or 500 men, and paid no regular tribute.

3. Cherra contained twenty-five villages, the population of which could send out 2,000 fighting men. The Rajah had since 1829 been practically subservient to Government, and had given the Sylhet Authorities ground for a Sanatarium at Cherrapoonji. He paid no tribute.

4. Omeer Sing of Nurtung held, besides his hill villages, lands towards Gawalpara, part of which was confiscated for a raid made by him in 1831. Nurtung itself was little known in 1832.

5. The Kala Rajah of Nuspung, ruling over twenty-five villages;—

6. The Oolar Rajah of Murrow, also holding twenty-five;

7. And the Omrap Rajah of Murran, holding twenty-four villages, complete the list of leading Cossyah Chiefs as then known to us.

The various States were really little oligarchical republics, each subject, in some ill-defined way, to the control of the rest, and it was matter of doubt whether the Naugkhlow massacre was not partly due to the jealousy of the other Chiefs that Teerut Sing had concluded a Treaty with the British Government for himself, from which they were excluded.

The Cossyah States are now-a-days grouped in two classes:

(1.) The semi-independent, five in number, who have always been friendly or have never been actually coerced by a British Force;

(2.) The Dependent States, twenty in all, many of them very petty, who are theoretically more subject to the control of the Deputy Commissioner. Practically, however, there is little distinction made in the manner of treating these two classes. The tendency has of late years been to curtail materially the powers of the Chiefs, the people resorting freely to our Courts. There is, however, very little crime of any kind in the Cossyah Hills.

On the conclusion of the war Captain Lister was (in February 1835) appointed "Political Agent of the Cossyah Hills, with the charge of our relations with the Jynteeah Rajah." Those relations were, however, destined to undergo a very speedy change, for in March of the same year the plains of Jynteeah were annexed to the British Territories, and

the Rajah thereupon relinquished his possessions in the hills. Jynteeah had been attacked by British troops so long ago as 1774, probably to punish some aggressions in Sylhet; but for many years after that we hear nothing of it. In 1821 the Rajah's people were detected carrying off British subjects from Sylhet to offer up as sacrifices at the shrine of Kali. At that time a solemn warning was given him that any repetition of the outrage would lead to confiscation of his territory. The Burmese war broke out soon after, and the State of Jynteeah was taken under our protection as a measure necessary to secure Sylhet from the Burmese troops. After these troubles were over, in 1832 four British subjects were carried off by the express order of the Rajah's heir. Three of them were sacrificed to Kali, the fourth escaping to tell the tale. For two years we vainly endeavoured to procure the extradition of the culprits, and at length Government as a supreme mark of its displeasure annexed the territories of Jynteeah in the plains. The Rajah, as has already been noted, refused to retain the hills which were a comparatively unproductive heritage, and retired to Sylhet as a British pensioner.

In 1858 the results of our occupation of the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills were thus summarized. The simple character of the Cossyhs had to some extent become corrupted by civilization and increased wealth; civil wars which continually distracted the country in old times had been put down; trade had been augmented; an increasing demand for hill products had set in; the condition of the people, materially, had vastly improved; education had taken a start; while "we had also reaped the benefits of our position in having obtained an entire cessation of the murderous inroads which these mountaineers constantly made into the plains, murdering our subjects and pillaging our villages."

In the Cossyah Hills the constant presence of troops at the Sanatorium, but still more the extraordinary development of trade in the natural productions of the district, have prevented any renewal of these incursions. The Cossyhs are keen traders, and when it is stated that in 1859 the value of the exports of their hills aggregated seven lakhs of Rupees, we can see how strong are the ties that bind them to good order and peace. It is not necessary to sketch the relations subsisting between the British Officer in the hills and the various semi-independent and dependent Cossyah Chiefs. The questions that have arisen between them refer generally to judicial procedure and internal administration. To control the European population attracted to the hills by commerce or other causes, to regulate the relations between the different Chiefs, to check their proceedings in heinous cases, and to act as a Court of Appeal to the various indigenous tribunals,—these are the main duties of the Deputy Commissioner.

It will be remembered that when the Rajah of Jynteeah was deprived of his possessions on the plains, he preferred to give up entirely the tract in the hills which was nominally subject to him, and to become a pensioner of Government. This Hill Tract contained nineteen petty districts, fifteen of which were each under a Dolloie or Headman elected by the villagers; the other four being managed by thirteen hereditary Sirdars.

The only tribute derived by the Jynteeah Rajah from the hills was one he-goat from each village, with a few seers of parched rice, and firewood for his annual poojahs. The villages were also bound to cultivate by turns the Raj lands. It is possible that dues levied on Hill produce imported to the plains formed a further source of income. On the resumption of the

hills by the British Government, from 1835 to 1855, the Sintengs, as the Jynteeahs are called, were left almost entirely to their own devices. The Dolloies heard all civil cases, at first without exception, and after 1841 up to a certain limit; and all criminal complaints not of a heinous character in which only people of their own villages were concerned. Their administration was, however, flagrantly corrupt: and they managed to secure for themselves most of the Raj lands of which no accurate accounts had been taken by Government. No taxes of any kind were imposed by us in the Jynteeah Hills for many years. The tribute of he-goats continued to be annually paid, and in 1853 credit was given to the Officers at Chierra for effecting a slightly more favorable sale of these offerings than had been usual theretofore. In that year Mr. Mills, who had been deputed to enquire into certain abuses in the Cossyah Hills' judicial administration, drew attention to the state of the Jynteeah Hills. He pointed out that in 1849 Colonel Lister had suggested the imposition of a house-tax "in consequence of the disposition evinced by some of the people to assert their independence." This had, however, been negatived by Government. Mr. Mills strongly urged that the error should be repaired, and a more intimate knowledge of the people acquired by the English Officers. He also advocated the establishment of a Police Thannah to check the lawless proceedings of the Dolloies. Lord Dalhousie quite concurred in these views. In neighbouring Hill Tracts house-tax was paid, and we were acting unwisely and inequitably in exempting Jynteeah. The Agent was directed to proceed into the Jynteeah Hills and prepare a full report on Revenue, Civil, and Criminal Justice, and all other matters connected with the Jynteeah Territory. A thannah was established at Jowai, but not much else was actually at this time carried out, so far as we can discover.

In 1858 Mr. Allen submitted another elaborate report upon the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills. After the fullest consideration he came to the conclusion that the Sintengs should be required to contribute something in acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Government. He said—"I am of opinion that a light and judicious taxation would contribute to the preservation of tranquillity and good order in the Jynteeah Hills. A moderate taxation had a very beneficial effect upon the savagery of the Lurka Coles of the Singbbhoom district of the south-west frontier agency. It was found to make them less turbulent and aggressive, and more thrifty, diligent, and submissive to the authorities; and I am disposed to think that a very moderate taxation, fixed for a term of years, would improve the condition and strengthen the peaceful and industrious inclinations of these wild mountaineers also." He proposed a moderate house tax, to be collected through the village authorities. Enquiry was also suggested into the condition of the Raj lands, and the allotment of waste to European settlers was discussed. But Mr. Allen insisted strongly on the necessity of stationing a European Civil Officer in the centre of the tract to administer justice to the people, and be to them a visible representative of that Government of which they then knew almost nothing. Unfortunately, the proposal to levy a house-tax was adopted, while the Sintengs were left as before to the management of their Dolloies.

In 1860 the house tax was imposed, and, within a few months, the people were in open rebellion. Fortunately, a large force of troops was close at hand, and before the revolt could make any head, it was stamped out, and the villages awed into apparent submission. It was supposed at the time that the ex-Rajah had been in some way mixed up with this movement in the hills, but to this idea little weight should be attached. For five and twenty

years the Sintengs had been content to pay their tribute of he-goats to the British Officers. They never respected the Rajah while he did rule over them; and they had openly affronted his family more than once since his abdication. On the suppression of this partial rising measures were taken for the improvement of the administration. The Civil Officer at Cherra was empowered to remove the Dolloies for misconduct, while at the same time the powers of those functionaries were increased. All crimes were to be reported by them to the Police, who were not, however, to interfere vexatiously in village affairs.

Scarcely had the agitation of this disturbance had time to settle, when the necessities of Imperial Finance imposed the income tax throughout British India. The local Officers applied to Government to know whether this new impost was to be levied in the Cossyah and Jynteeah Hills: and if the last named tract was to be affected by it, whether the house-tax was also to be maintained. It was ruled that the house tax was not to be given up on account of the income tax, the incidence of the two being not the same, and that the income tax "was to be introduced only in those parts of the hills where taxes had been previously levied, *i. e.*, in the Jynteeah Territory, and those other villages near the station of Cherrapoonjee which belong to the British Government." It seems to have been the belief at Calcutta that, practically, the tax would be inoperative in the hills. Fortunately, the whole of the Cossyah States escaped it, and the loyalty of the Chiefs was not tried by this severe and practical test.

In the Jynteeah Hills 310 persons were taxed, on whom the whole amount assessed was Rupees 1,259. The highest rate levied, and that only in one case, was Rupees 9. One person paid Rupees 5. Twenty-seven paid Rupees 4-8 each; and the rest were taxed the minimum amount, Rupees 4 each per annum. The tax for 1860-61 was paid without a murmur. The Deputy Commissioner travelled through the hills in 1860-61, and again in November 1861 without detecting a sign of disaffection. But the material was all there. The mass of the people had been subjected to the house tax in 1860. The leaders were further brought under the income tax in 1861. There were rumours of pan and trade taxes in the air. What spark actually began the conflagration it is hard to tell. Whether it was the rash talk of some bullying Policeman, or an injudiciously executed order against the use of arms, we do not clearly know. The small number of troops then available gave an opportunity which had been wanting in 1860; and on the 20th of January 1862 the Sintengs rose in fierce rebellion. "A people who had neither been left to their own guidance, nor yet fairly brought under ours; upon whom our yoke had pressed with just sufficient force to galling, but not to break into order; who had been denied the boon of having our rule represented among them by an English Officer, and of all our institutions, who had known only our system of Police as illustrated by a thannah on the Bengali model, and our latest experiments in taxation; who, just after they had been taught the lesson that they could only be compelled to pay an obnoxious tax by the application of Military Force, are straightway further taxed, the means of compulsion being at the same time withdrawn, when such a people rise in rebellion (said the Commissioner *ex-post facto*) it may not be difficult to explain its origin and object, without searching after recondite causes."

Into the history and progress of the rebellion we have no need to enter. Crushed apparently in four months after its outbreak, it again almost immediately burst out afresh,

and it was not till November 1863, when every glen and jungle had been searched out by our Troops and Police, that the last of the rebel leaders surrendered, and the pacification of Jynteeah could be said to be complete.

The general line which the policy of Government was now to take in regard to the Sintengs was thus laid down.

"A main principle to be adopted in dealing with these people, when they have been made to understand and feel the power of the Government, and have submitted to its authority, is not to leave them in their old state, but, while adopting a simple plan of Government suitable to their present condition and circumstances, and interfering as little as possible with existing institutions, to extend our intercourse with them, and endeavor to introduce among them civilization and order."

An English Officer, with full powers, was accordingly posted to the Jynteeah Hills, where he was personally to reside. He was to visit every village in his jurisdiction at least once a year, and, with his subordinates, was to be required to qualify in the Cossyah language sufficiently to dispense with all interpreters. The village Dolloies were to be chosen by the people, subject to the Civil Officer's approval, and to hold office during good behaviour. With other village Officers they were to form panchayets, by whom specified civil and criminal powers were to be exercised, subject to the revision of the British Officer in important or heinous cases. The Dolloies and Sirdars were to be responsible for the Police of their respective jurisdictions, and the Regular Police were only to interfere to repress disturbance or support the authority of the Dolloies. Proceedings were to be *viâ voce* as far as possible. Education was to be liberally encouraged; the Welsh Mission already established in the hills being made the instrument of its extension. The country was to be thoroughly opened up by eight lines of road, aggregating in length 218 miles. The income tax had been virtually withdrawn by the Act repealing it on all incomes below Rupees 500 a year. The house tax was of course to be retained, due care being taken that no inequality or injustice was allowed in its assessment.

On these general principles the administration of the Jynteeah Hills has been reformed, and the policy of direct management, by resident European Officers, has, here, as in the Naga Hills, proved successful. Cossyah and Jynteeah are probably now the most secure of all our Hill Districts.

West of the Cossyah are the Garrow Hills. There appears, however, to be little or no intercourse between their inhabitants. Our communications with the Garrows have been entirely from the sides of Gawalparah and Mymensing, and they are the first of the Assam mountain tribes with whom we came in contact. Our knowledge of them dates from our occupation of Rungpore and Mymensing.

The chief earlier sources of authentic information in regard to the Garrow Hill are—

- (1.) A paper by Mr. Elliot in the 3rd Volume of the Asiatic Researches.
- (2.) Reports on the Bahdari duties of Sherepore and Shoosung by the same gentleman, dated 1789.

- (3.) An account by Dr. Buchanan, the substance of which appears in Volume 3 of Martin's Eastern India.
- (4.) A Report by Mr. Sisson in 1815.
- (5.) A Report by Mr. Scott in 1816.

Under the Moguls the whole of the north-east parts of Bengal were divided into great estates, held for the most part by their original owners, who, while paying a small tribute to the Muhummadan Foujdar of Rungamatty as acknowledgment of fealty, were, to all intents and purposes, independent. They were bound, in fact, merely to supply a certain number of elephants, or a small quantity of aghur, a precious wood, to support certain petty garrisons, and to contribute to the maintenance of the Dacca Artillery Park. Their estates were never subjected to a land revenue assessment. They paid what they did pay from 'Sayer' and not from 'Mal.' The Foujdar generally made advances on account of cotton to these great *Choudries*, as the Zemindars were called, and received from them yearly consignments of that article; but as no account was ever taken of the Foujdar's collections so long as he paid the stipulated assignment at Dacca, these transactions were carried on solely for the benefit of himself and the *Choudries*.

The *Choudries* of Kurribari, Kaloomalooopara, and Meeaspara, (or Mechpara) in that part of Rungpore now called Gowalparah, were the chief landholders of this kind at the time of our accession to the Dewani. They held all the low country under the Garrow Hills on that side, and it was their principal duty to repress the incursions of the savage tribes of the uplands, who even then were a source of terror to the cultivators of the plains. As all the cotton, then the staple of the internal eastern trade, came from these hills, the *Choudries* had established at all the principal passes *hâts* or markets guarded by their *Burkundazes*, to which the low country merchants, with their permission, resorted; and at which they extorted from merchants and Garrows, alike, dues either in kind or cash, which formed one of the main sources of their income. It would appear that at this early period the *Choudries* had not attempted to secure any footing in the hills, save perhaps on those outlying and lower spurs which intersected their own estates.

After our accession to the Dewani, things continued in this neighbourhood on much the same footing as before. A *Sezawal* was annually appointed, who contracted to pay the Government demand, making his own arrangement with the *Choudries*. This left them as independent as before, and up to the year 1194 (B. S.) i. e., A. D. 1787-88, we find that their revenue was always paid in cotton.

In 1182-83 (1775-76) the *Choudries* of Meeaspara and Kurribari, to avenge some Garrow raids of more than usual severity, invaded the hills bordering on their respective estates and entered on a career of conquest. They remained two or three years in the hills, and brought the tribes of a large tract entirely under their control. The great chief of the southern part of the hills (*Renghta*) became in course of time subject to Kurribari. This brought the *Choudrie* of Kurribari into conflict with the *Choudrie* of Sherepore in Mymensing, for *Renghta*'s people had been in the habit of trading at the *hâts* of Sherepore and Shoosung. The Zemindar of Kurribari, Mohendronarain *Choudrie*, was not the man to brook Sherepore interference. He built forts in the passes, on the Mymensing side, to stop

the Garrow trade, and arrested Renghta himself when on his way back from a visit to the Sherepore hâts. Mr. Elliot, who was at that time (1789) on the Mymensing frontier, got Renghta released, and he and all his people offered to become Government ryots, provided they were protected from the Kurribari Zemindar. Mr. Elliot, eager to avail himself of the great trade advantages promised by such an arrangement, strongly supported the proposal. The Commissioner of Cooch Behar reported that the Kurribari Zemindar had no rights in the hills save those he maintained by force. The Government in 1790 accordingly directed that Renghta should be made a Zemindar under the Company, and that the Kurribari Choudrie should be forbidden to molest him, but be offered a remission of revenue should he be unable, in consequence, to pay the Government demand. This interesting negotiation fell through, owing to the unparalleled audacity of the Kurribari Choudrie who simply arrested the messengers sent to Renghta to conclude the arrangements. He occupied all the passes leading to Mymensing and defied the Company's Officers to their face. In 1805 he even invaded Sherepore itself. All attempts at this time to define the boundaries of his Zemindari were defeated by him. At last it was sold, by the Board's orders, for arrears of revenue, but the auction purchaser was ruined in the attempt to get possession. Mohindronarain threw himself into the hills, and set up a lakheraj claim to the greater part of his pergunnah in the plains. It was some years before Government succeeded in arresting him. The estate had to be attached, as the purchaser could do nothing with it.

Meantime the Garrows had not ceased to make incursions into the plains, to avenge themselves on the Rungpore Choudries for the extortion and oppression suffered at their hands, and in 1816, after a particularly atrocious raid, Mr. Scott was deputed by Government to visit the frontier. That gentleman gives the following account of the position of the Zemindars and Garrows at the time of his visit:—

1. *Kurribari*—The Choudrie of this estate having been the most vigorous and least under control had reduced nearly all the Garrows on his estate to the condition of ordinary ryots, but a few of the frontier Chiefs still remained merely tributary, subject to the provision of cotton on terms highly favorable to the Zemindars, and paying sums of money on the occasions of Hindu festivals. Of these the chief was Renghta, who had been prevented as before shewn from emancipating himself from the Choudrie's supremacy.

2. *Kuloomaloo para* had been in feeble hands. The Garrows on its borders were virtually independent, though some paid a nominal cotton tribute.

3. The *Mechpara* Choudrie had in 1776-7 effected large conquests, but was succeeded soon after by a minor, and now only a few outlying Garrow villages in the plains remained in the condition of ordinary ryots' villages, and in these the Regulations of Government were current. But in the Hill Tracts the Garrow Chiefs were merely tributary, paying cotton on terms favorable to the Zemindar, and occasionally admitting him as their criminal Judge.

4. *Hubraghat*.—Here the Garrows on the first ranges of hills had been reduced to unconditional submission, but had been liberally treated, and their Sirdars transformed into Jaghirdars, charged with the defence of the passes against the tribes of the interior. They were quite under the Regulations of Government.

The problem Mr. Scott had before him was to make arrangements for bringing to reason the Tributary Garrows, who had committed all the late raids. He found that the cause of the raids had been the fact, that, in spite of the orders of Government repressing all internal duties levied by Zemindars and Sayer of all kinds, the Zemindars on this side had continued to exact them from Garrows frequenting their hats. A system of exacting cotton in return for advances forced on the Garrows also prevailed, and was attempted to be defended on the ground that it was a sort of rent, although none of these Tributary Garrow villages appeared in the Collectorate Registers of the estates. These pretensions were shown to be groundless, and it was urged that the Zemindars, now no longer Government Officers, had no claim, on the grounds of proprietary right, to exercise any interference with the Hill Garrows. Mr. Scott accordingly proposed to separate all these Tributary Garrows from the Zemindars' control, compensating the Zemindars if they could show any claim to consideration, but bringing the Garrow tract under Government management; the chiefs to pay a slight tribute as acknowledgment of our supremacy. The hats were also to be brought under Government control, and the Garrows were to be permitted to trade there, only on entering into engagements to keep the peace. Those Garrow Chiefs who had received a black mail from persons on the plains, as a bribe not to attack them, were to get annual presents instead. Light duties were to be collected at the hats from *independent* Garrows, not from tributaries. Other custom duties, then levied by Government, were to be managed by Government Collectors.

The Governor General in Council accepted Mr. Scott's suggestions, on the grounds of the 'absolute necessity of effectually preventing the recurrence of the oppressive practices on the part of the Zemindars which had led to the most violent acts of revenge and bloodshed,' and appointed him to carry them out. The Government said the Zemindars had already received liberal compensation for loss of Sayer, and as the Tributary Garrow villages were not among the assets on which their land revenue had been settled, they were entitled to nothing more now. The Government was clearly of opinion that the only relation between the Zemindars and Tributary Garrows was the payment and reception of Sayer, which was abolished in those estates in 1818, and for which (including all taken from Garrows) compensation had been given in that year.

All the arrangements with the Tributary Garrows were carried out by Government without any hint of legislative sanction being necessary. The arrangements were political and affected only a tract of country in which the Regulations were not current. The first hint of legislation is found in a letter of 9th September 1817, where the Government directed Mr. Scott not to scruple to separate from the estate of Kurribari, and treat exactly as the Tributary Garrows were being treated, any Garrow villages nominally under the existing Laws and Regulations. "It will of course" (ran the letter) "be ultimately necessary, formally to recognise arrangements of the latter description (affecting villages within the permanently-settled estates) by a legislative enactment," but before this could be done, a survey and settlement of boundary was absolutely required. Legislation was also said to be necessary to frame a procedure for judicial trials of the Tributary Garrows. Mr. Scott, in reply, urged that the whole Garrow Frontier should be treated on the same plan. He said "the Regulations are evidently inapplicable to the existing state of society amongst them, a people in general entirely ignorant of the Bengal language or any other dialect understood in our

Courts. If the plan of separation from Zemindars (he urged) prove acceptable to the Garrows, in the tracts, where on account of the raids* it is necessary to introduce it, we shall have, if any exceptions are made, the Garrows of the excluded parts committing similar atrocities to bring themselves within the pale."

Accordingly paragraph 24 in the Draft Regulation framed by Mr. Scott ran as follows —

"The authority of the Special Commissioner shall extend from the Berhampooter eastward over all lands occupied by Garrows or other hill tribes formerly considered as tributary to, or dependent upon, the Zemindars of Hubraghat, Mechpara, Kaloomaloo para, and Kurribari. The Governor General in Council will, however, exercise his discretion in releasing the inhabitants of any of the above villages from the control of the British Government. He will also exercise similar discretion in extending its authority over other Garrow communities which may be at present independent. A proclamation to that effect by order of Government shall suffice without any further special enactment."

After the passing of that Regulation, Mr. Scott proceeded to conclude engagements with the independent Chiefs, and no fewer than 121 of those living west of the Soomashri are said to have entered into terms with him.

The breaking out of the Burmese war stopped Mr. Scott's work, as he had to take a prominent position in the affairs of Assam Proper. We know little or nothing of what went on in the hills for many years. Raids appear to have been frequent. Between 1855 and 1859 we read of ten cases of Garrow outrage on the Mymensing side alone.

Some little influence was occasionally brought to bear upon the Tributary Garrows through visits paid to them by the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Gawalparah. Any intermission in these annual tours was always followed by an increase in the number of raids. Between July and October 1852 seven such outrages took place on the Gawalparah frontier, in which forty-four persons were killed. The local authorities proposed an expedition to demand the surrender of the principal offenders, to levy a fine on their village, or burn it in default of payment, to exact hostages and written engagements from the Chiefs, and to survey the hills. They also urged the construction of a road through the hills, and the

	Villages burnt.	Persons killed.
1807	3	27
1810	...	2
1811	...	8
1812	...	5
1813	2	24
1814	...	3
1815	2	15
1816	150	94
1818	...	3

We extract here a statement of Garrow raids between 1807 and 1819.

education of Garrow children.* The Government of India approved generally of these proposals with the exception of that in regard to taking written engagements. An expedition was accordingly despatched which burnt a village, but the road was never made and the survey was not begun. As no overtures were made by the Garrows for the surrender of the raiders, the Commissioner proposed to Government the closing of the frontier markets. The objection to this plan in the case of the Garrows was, that no blockade however rigid could prevent them from getting supplies from Mymensing, while the innocent inhabitants of the plains, who depended for their livelihood on the cotton trade carried on with the Garrows, were the principal sufferers. Still, if the blockade could be made tolerably severe, it might have some effect on the hillmen, and it was determined to try it. Lord Dalhousie recorded at this time the following Minute on the subject:—

"I have already said that I deprecate these extreme measures, while anything else remained untried. But as these savages will neither treat, submit, nor rest, it is due to our own subjects, whose lives and property are in jeopardy, that we should have recourse to punishment, which though severe, is the only thing that they comprehend or feel. I consider that further Military operations would be a waste of life uselessly.

"It is probable that the exclusion of the Garrows from the plains will be effectual. It has been so when tried on the hill people on the opposite frontier to the north-west.

"I request, therefore, that they may be rigidly excluded from the plains, and that the Chiefs may be informed that the exclusion will be continued till satisfaction is made by the delivery of the murderers. They are at the same time to be informed that, if they are found in the plains while thus in resistance to the Government, they will be seized and disposed of as the Government may think fit.

"I am aware that these measures will probably inflict injury on the innocent while punishing the guilty. I regret it, but individual interests must yield to the public interests, when there is, as in this case, no alternative."

The measure did to some extent prove successful. It was found that the trade in cotton had become so material a source of profit to the Garrows, that the closure of the hats was really felt as a severe punishment. They gave up some of the offenders and promised to arrest and deliver over the others.

Colonel Jenkins, the Commissioner, was, however, strongly of opinion that our only hope of securing permanent tranquillity lay in our taking Military possession of the hills. Mr. Mills, then on tour in Assam, remarked on this, that—"unless a European functionary could reside in the interior and superintend the administration, which it was known he could not do, we should not attempt to extend our rule over unprofitable hills. All past experience showed that we cannot trust to native agency in the management of wild tribes." The climate was supposed to be deadly and such as no European could survive. Mr. Mills advocated severe treatment of villages concerned in raids; the opening of a road as had

* The education of Garrow children had been carried on at Government expense for many years, not with any great success; an attempt to secure upland Garrows for the Frontier Police had also failed.

been before proposed; and the maintenance of more frequent intercourse with the Garrows by the European Officers of Gowalparah. Nothing, however, was done on his report (1853). Up to the close of 1856 there seems to have been a break in the story of Garrow outrages. In that year, however, they again re-commenced, and were numerous and atrocious on both the Gowalparah and Mymensing frontiers. It is not necessary to enter into details. On each occasion attempts more or less futile were made to procure the surrender of the offenders, but no comprehensive policy was laid down, nor was any vigorous effort made to change the nature of our relations with the hillmen. The post of Garrow Serbarakar, an Officer through whom our communications with the Garrows had for many years been managed, was abolished, and various changes effected in the establishments kept up at the Garrow hâts and in the Garrow Frontier Police: but no radical reform of policy, such as the circumstances called for, was undertaken.

In 1859 the Commissioner of Assam reported that Garrow raids were on the increase, and the old policy of closing the hâts had proved ineffectual, inasmuch as it was never followed up by a Military expedition to demand the surrender of offenders as had in the old days been usual. The Commissioner strongly recommended a return to the old policy, which had been abandoned with no good result, and urged the re-appointment of a Garrow Serbarakar. Pending the sanction of Government, a small expedition was sent into the hills, and though it did not succeed in arresting the offenders in the late raids, its advance was said to have had a good effect. Government approved of the re-appointment of the Serbarakar, but took no further steps and laid down no definite policy for the future. Further raids in Mymensing followed close upon this. The Commissioner of Assam was called upon to suggest a remedy. It was at length determined to send a strong expedition into the hills in the cold weather of 1860-61 to re-open communications with the upland Garrows by annual visits of the Principal Assistant at Gowalparah, and to increase the establishment of the Serbarakar.

In the beginning of 1861 the following proposals were laid before Government by the Commissioner of Assam intended further to secure the peace of the Garrow frontier:—
 (1.) It was found that the Mymensing zemindars had by encroachments on the hills irritated the independent Garrows and led to many raids and murders. It was therefore proposed to bring the hill villages over which they claimed jurisdiction under direct management of Government, as had been done on the Gowalparah side, by Regulation X. of 1822.
 (2.) A good road connecting the hâts all along the frontier was suggested. (3.) The raising of a frontier Militia was advocated. (4.) It was proposed that a special Officer should be put in charge of the Garrow Hills and Frontier, who should, however, reside on the plains. (5.) The re-imposition of the old duty on cotton at the Garrow hâts was to provide funds to meet the cost of these measures. Government approved only of the first proposal (which by the way has never legally been carried out) and negatived or postponed all the rest. The appointment of a special Officer to the Garrow Hills "could not," it was said, "be entertained."

The expedition to the hills in the early part of 1861 was made from both Mymensing and Gowalparah, and was very successful. The troops remained a month in the hills, during which time they succeeded in reaching and punishing almost all the offending villages, in

realising revenue from many of the dependent Chiefs who had withheld it for years, and in obtaining the submission and fealty of such of the independent Chiefs as were disposed to be friendly. The offenders in the Mymensing raids were arrested. In submitting the report of this expedition the Commissioner again urged the appointment of a special Officer, and the construction of two roads, one round the base of the hills, and the other right across them. This road, the Commissioner said, would do for the Garrows what the road from Gowhatty to Cherra had done for the Cossyabs, reclaim the country. The proposal was referred to the Public Works Department. The Secretary of State recorded the following remarks on these proceedings:—

“However necessary it may be to teach the inhabitants of these wild districts that they are not inaccessible to the power of Government, it is very clear that we cannot hope to reclaim them from their savage habits, or to induce amongst them a higher state of civilization by the mere display of Military strength.

“These objects can only be effected by peaceful means and by gradually increasing our intercourse with them, and I have therefore read with regret the statement of Colonel Jenkins that, ‘although the Garrows have been nearly a century under our jurisdiction, it is not on record that we have ever had a single Officer who could converse with them in their own language.’ This unfavorable state of things will not, I trust, be of longer continuance, and I shall be glad to learn that the proposed annual visits of the Principal Assistant Commissioner, of which I fully approve, and of which a report should, from time to time, be submitted, have established the desired influence with the Chiefs. Should this not be the case, it will be for you to consider whether the permanent location in this territory of a special and carefully selected Officer will not be necessary.

“I shall await with interest the decision of the Public Works Department as to the expediency of opening the two roads recommended by Captain Hopkinson. Should the funds necessary for the purpose be available, it should not be forgotten that, independently of the importance of lending every possible aid to the cultivation of cotton in a district favorable to its growth, there is nothing which will tend more to the general improvement and civilization of the country than the increase of its commerce.”

The Garrows are, as has been already indicated, of three classes:—(1.) Zemindari Garrows, those living within the acknowledged boundaries of the great Zemindaris and treated by Government under Regulation X of 1822. (2.) Tributary Garrows, who admitting our supremacy pay a small yearly tribute. (3.) Bemulwa or Independent Garrows, over whom we exercise no control. The collections made from the Garrows of the first two classes were realized through the Luskar or Headman of each village; and so long ago as 1824 Mr. Scott, the Commissioner for the north-eastern parts of Rungpore, had disbursed annual money rewards to certain of the principal Luskars who had maintained the peace in their respective jurisdictions. In 1865 proposals for extending and modifying this system were laid before Government. The raids and murders by which our frontier had been harassed were as often as not the work of so-called Tributary Garrows; and the want of any adequate Police machinery made it very desirable to adopt some means of securing delivery of offenders. It was proposed therefore to appoint Zimmadars for villages and groups of villages who should for an annual stipend be responsible for the arrest of offenders in their several jurisdictions.

and should be vested with powers similar to those of the Dolloies in the Jynteah Hills. This was all approved by Government and settled at a meeting of the Chiefs.

These arrangements did not, however, extend to the Mymensing side of the hills, and early in 1866 a most murderous raid was made by Garrows, supposed by us to be Independent, on the plains of that district. An expedition entered the hills and burnt the offending villages. But enquiry showed that the main cause of the raid had been an attempt on the part of the Shoosung Rajah, a Mymensing Zemindar, to levy rents in the hills. This Rajah claims about 500 square miles of hill territory, and a suit brought by him is now pending to set aside the survey boundary of his estate and extend its limits up to the Toora range.

The existence of this chronic irritant on the southern border of the hills, and the fact that a dread of creating blood feuds prevented the Zimmadars from acting of their own authority against independent villages, made it clear to Government that something more was required. The Lieutenant-Governor accordingly in April 1866 proposed to the Government of India the appointment of a special Officer to the charge of the Garrow Hills. Sanction being accorded to this, Lieutenant Williamson, who had shown special aptitude for dealing with these tribes, was established on the Toora Mountain as Lieutenant Gregory had been established at Samoogoodting. Similar arrangements were made for roads, buildings, and Police as in the Naga Hills. The offices of Luskar and Zimmadar were at the same time amalgamated, and a rough judicial system inaugurated under Lieutenant Williamson's control.

The success with which this experiment has been attended has been almost more marked in the Garrow than in the Naga Hills. The hearty aid given by the Garrows to Lieutenant Williamson has been very satisfactory. Believed by the presence of a strong body of armed Police from the dread of retaliatory feuds, the Headmen are more ready to discharge their duty. Raids have ceased, and numerous villages hitherto independent have voluntarily become tributary. It is a standing order in both the Naga and Garrow Hills that no attempt is to be made to coerce a neutral independent clan, but all voluntary submission is to be frankly accepted. This policy is bearing its own good fruits. The only thing likely to interfere with the reclamation of these tribes is the encroachment of Bengali Zemindars and the intrigues and oppression of their Amlah. If the Rajah of Shoosung wins his case, legislation similar to that of 1822 must undoubtedly take place to save the Mymensing frontier from a renewal of raids.

Here we must leave the hills bordering the Assam valley and pass on to take a rapid review of certain other groups which form a distinct part of our north-eastern frontier line.

The tribes dwelling on the north of Cachar have been already described. It remains very briefly to notice those inhabiting the hills south of Cachar and Sylhet.

Cachar was annexed to the British dominions in August 1832, on the death of its legitimate Rajah, Govind Chandra. During the years preceding that event, it had been the field on which the conflicting branches of the Mumpuri royal family had fought out their never-ending quarrels. It had been, moreover, ravaged north and south by savage tribes, and its boundaries were settled and

defined only on the west. The south-eastern and southern boundaries were thus given by Pemberton in 1835:—

“From the sources of the Jeeree River along the western bank, to its confluence with the Borak; thence south on the western bank of the latter river to the mouth of the Chikoo (or Tooyace) nullah,* which marks the triple boundary of Manipore, Cachar, and Tripurah. On the south the limits have never been accurately defined, and we only know that on this side the line is formed by the northern foot of lofty mountains inhabited by the Poitoo Kookies and by wild and unexplored tracts of territory subject to Tripurah. This densely wooded and mountainous region appears to commence at a distance of between 40 and 50 miles from the southern bank of the Soermah.”

The southern extremity of the Suddashir Hills was the south-east corner of Cachar. It would appear from this that the narrow hilly tract running down between Hill Tipperah and Manipore, and represented in our most recent maps as part of Cachar, was in Pemberton's time considered to be part of Hill Tipperah.

The following extracts from a report of the Superintendent of Cachar in 1853 will show the nature of our relations with the inhabitants of that tract:—

Looshais:

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“I have the honor to state first, with inference to the southern portion of the district, that for many years back, and long before we obtained possession of the province, the inhabitants of the plains to the south were in constant alarm and dread of the tribes of Kookies who resided both within our boundaries and without to the south and south-east, in the independent Tipperah Hills and in the Manipore territories. They used to come down and attack the villages in the plains, massacre the inhabitants, take their heads, *log* and burn their houses. These aggressions used principally to be made after the death of one of the Kookie Rajahs, when the having human heads to bury with him is in the idea of the Kookie a matter of great consideration.

The principal tribes then known were the Cheeloo, Rankul, Tangune, Chansen, Tadoé or Tewtangs and the Poitoo Kookies, and in consequence of the aggressions made by some of them at different times, some of the inhabitants towards the south deserted their villages, left their lands and homes, and settled in some of the more northern pergunnahs of the district, and the lands which they deserted have not in some places up to the present time been resumed, they being now jungle.

“It would appear that the tribes to the south have been gradually driving one another in a northerly direction; for first, some Nagas that were located in the Boobun Hills and in southern Cachar were obliged by the Tangune Kookies to flit and to take up their abode in the hills north of the Borak, when the Tangunes took possession of their ground, and they having in their turn been driven up by the Chansen and Tadoé tribes, the Tangunes were also afterwards obliged to vacate and to move on into the northern hills, and

* This nullah, says Pemberton, rising in lofty ranges bordering on the Tripurah country, falls into the Borak at the southern extremity of a range of mountains, three sides of which are embraced by the tortuous course of this river.

after them the Chansens were obliged to do so likewise; and the Tadoés, who had been driven up by the Luchyes, a very powerful tribe, first settled about seven years since within eight and ten miles south of this station, and became Company's ryots, and made themselves useful by cutting timber, bamboos, cane, &c., which they used to bring to market, but after having been located there for some four years, the Luchye Kookies in November 1849 attacked them, burnt three of their villages, killed several of the inhabitants, and took away several of them into slavery, and then the whole of the Tadoé tribe flitted, left the south and settled down in the northern hills.

"About the same time that the Luchye Kookies attacked the villages in Cachar, they committed other atrocities in Sylhet and in Manipore. It was the first that had ever been heard here of the Luchyes, and from the inquiries I made, it appeared that they were a very powerful, warlike, set of people, consisting of Luchyes, Chillings, and Gattaes, and who were said to be also well armed and independent, and residing from eight to ten days' journey south of this. And to the south of them again there are the Poe Kookies, who are said to be still more powerful than the Luchyes, and who it is said exact a kind of tribute from them.

"The Poitoo Kookies who are located towards the south-west used also to be very troublesome, and made many descents in the southern portion of pergunnah Hylakandy, and they too drove the inhabitants away from thence, and caused lands that were under cultivation to run to jungle.

"After the British Government obtained possession of the district, in order to protect the natives to the south, there were two small out-posts established, one at Cazeedur, in Pergunnah Bundraj, and the other to the south of Hylakandy, with a detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry at each, posted in a guard, surrounded by a stockade, but these out-posts used to be occasionally withdrawn and again replaced when necessary.

"About the years 1834 and 1835 a Manipuri Prince, "Tribowanjee," who was unsettled and inclined to be troublesome, got a considerable grant of land at Jafferbund, in south Hylakandy, and tagavie advances were with the sanction of Government made to him to the extent of Rupees 2,636, with a view to causing him to settle down, and he undertook with his Manipuri ryots to keep the Poitoo Kookies in check, and for which purpose twelve muskets were made over to him, and he on one or two occasions attacked the Kookies in their own villages, and during his time no attacks were made on that part of the district; but in 1841 he and his brother, Ram Sing, made arrangements with some of their countrymen and attacked the Rajah of Manipur, and in his endeavour to obtain possession of the guddee of that country he lost his life, and so did also his brother.

"In order that he should be remunerated for the protection he afforded the people, he was permitted to levy a toll on all timber, bamboos, &c., coming down the Dullesur River, and his estate having after his death fallen into the hands of two of his other brothers, they continue still to levy a toll, as they say, from those only who agree beforehand to pay them, for giving them protection during the period they are cutting the timber in the hills, but I consider the system objectionable and no longer necessary.

"After the attack made by the Luchyes in November 1849, the Government determined if possible to put a stop to future aggressions, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lister,

Political Agent, Cossyah Hills, was entrusted with the management, and he was directed to proceed with such force as he considered necessary, and to punish them; and in January 1850 he proceeded from this towards the Luchye country, and there he destroyed the village of Moolla, one of their Chiefs; but it appearing to him that the Luchyes were a much more powerful tribe than he expected to have found them, he deemed it advisable to retire, which he did, and he then returned to Cherra Poonjee, and requested I would establish some outposts along the southern frontier, as it was thought very possible that the Luchyes, in order to retaliate, might make a descent on some part of the district. I accordingly caused stockades to be erected at Cazeedur, Soonabarpe Ghaut, Sydpoor, Meerpoor, and Jafferband, in each of which a party of the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion was posted. The inhabitants of the district were alarmed, and in some places the women and children were being sent to the northern side of the Borak, so as to be out of the way of danger should aggressions be made. A few scouts were allowed to be entertained by me, and were kept constantly in the southern jungles to give warning in case the Luchyes should be approaching.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Lister was then of opinion that, in order to protect the southern portion of the district from any future invasions of the Luchyes, it would be advisable to raise a Levy to be employed in the southern jungles; he recommended the measure to Government, and he was authorized to raise the present Kookie Levy, which consists of a Commandant, two Soobadars, two Jemadars, ten Havildars, and two hundred Sepoys.

"In April 1850 the Kookies of Cachar appearing disinclined to take service as Sepoys, and as I did not consider them at that time much to be trusted, I suggested to the Political Agent, Cossyah Hills, that instead of entertaining Kookies, a couple or three Police Companies, composed of Cacharees and Bengalees, might be found more useful; they could be employed to the south to keep the Luchyes in check, and also to the north should the Angami or other Naga tribes prove troublesome, and which at the time I thought it very probable they would be.

"The Kookie Levy was raised in June 1850 under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lister and E. Baker, Esq., who was appointed Commandant, and it was then I believe composed principally of Kookies, but it was afterwards ordered by Government that the proportion of Kookies to others in the Levy should be one-half, as it was thought unsafe to place arms in the hands of so many savages without having some check over them, and the proportion at present is 109 Kookies to 105 of other castes and nations.

"In October 1850 some of the Luchye Chiefs caused it to be intimated to me that they wished to come in, and in order to open a communication I sent down a party to meet some of the Luchyes at a rendezvous named Paunch Peer; which party returned with the Muntrie of Suckpoolah Rajah, one of the great Chiefs, and some Luchyes, and he said he was deputed by five of the Chiefs who were anxious to be on friendly terms with us, and that if permitted to do so they would also come in.

"On the Muntries returning I sent down a party with him to the Luchye country to inform the Chiefs that they need not be afraid, for that if they wished to come in here

they would not be injured nor detained. In December 1850 the party I sent down returned, accompanied by Suckpoolall Rajah and some of his followers, who said that he and the other Luchye Chiefs all wished to be friends with us, and he, after a few days' residence here, returned to his own country, and since then the Natives of pergunnah Hylakandy have been constantly in the habit of going down towards the Luchye country for the purpose of trading, and I trust nothing will occur to disturb the friendly intercourse which now exists.

"Towards the south, in order to protect the inhabitants from any aggressions of

Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion.

	Seobadar.	Havildar.	Naik.	Sepoy.
Cazeedhar	1	1	1	20
Jafferbund	1	1	1	20
Soonabaroe,	0	1	1	10

foreign Kookies or others, there are at present three out-posts furnished by the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion at Cazeedur, Jafferbund, and Soonabaroe of the strength noted in the margin, and during the dry weather there is another at Sydpoor, and a party of the Kookie

Levy in the Chatra Hawar, besides which there is a small establishment of scouts constantly exploring the southern jungles."

Considerable interest attaches at the present time to the almost unknown tract, the inhabitants of which have been above described: and it is proposed to examine in some detail the notices of it that are to be found among the records of Government.

In September 1826, a party of wood-cutters had gone from Sylhet into the hills over the Simla River (a stream ten miles to the west of the Dulleshur), where they were attacked by a party of Kookies, and most of them barbarously killed. The Magistrate of Sylhet, under instructions from the Court of Circuit, called upon the "Rajah of Tipperah" to exert himself to ascertain and arrest the offenders. The Magistrate remarked however: "The Rajah, I know, claims authority as paramount lord or superior over all the Kookie tribes to the eastward: but this authority is entirely nominal over those tribes at a distance from his capital. Many attempts have been made by the Rajah to establish his authority on some firmer footing, particularly among the Tanghum and Pytoo Kookies, but hitherto without success. The range of hills bordering the Simla River is the same with that inhabited by the Pytoo Kookies." Three spies or messengers sent by the Magistrate into the hills reported that the raid had actually been committed by the Chief of a tribe called "Buntye,"* whose village was said to be eleven days' journey by water up the "Langae" River. The "Linden", and "Laroo" Kookies lived beyond him. The Government ordered a party of troops to take up a position on the frontier, and directed the exclusion of all Kookies from the marts in Company's territory. An expedition was to be sent against "Buntye," if the route proved practicable; but it does not appear that it was ever despatched, and the matter was probably allowed quietly to drop.

The next outrage we find reported was in May 1844, and this also took place in Sylhet. A Mumpuri village, called Kochobari, Pergunnah Pertabghur, Thannah Latoo, was

* It has been thought best throughout to re-produce the spelling of the names given in the documents of this particular period under notice.

attacked at night, and twenty human heads carried off, with six live captives. The raiders were believed to be under the leadership of Lal Chokla, son, and Botai, nephew of "Laroo,"* "a Pytoo Kookie Chief of importance in the hills." Laroo had died some months before, and it was supposed heads were wanted to bury with his smoke-dried body. The Rajah of Tipperah was again called upon to help in recovering the captives. The Magistrate said, "Inability on the part of the Rajah to control his subjects becomes a crime when the lives and property of the Company's subjects are, by that inability, left exposed to such dangers." In reply the Government impressed upon the Magistrate the necessity of not relying wholly upon anything the Rajah could do to recover the captives. A panic was caused by this raid along the border, and a Government Khas estate was being fast deserted by its ryots, when a body of Sylhet Infantry was by the Magistrate ordered to the front. Government, however, thought a Police patrol would be more likely to secure the frontier, and directed the withdrawal of the troops.

The reply of the Tipperah Rajah to the call made upon him for co-operation was very unsatisfactory. He said he had deputed a *Darogah* and ten *Burkundazes* to discover and apprehend the marauders, in itself an obvious farce. But he added that the land on which Kochobari stood was his, and had been taken away from him:—a remark which led to a suspicion, that he was not altogether displeased at the raid. Fortunately, however, the Rajah's zemindaree in the District of Tipperah was at this time under the management of Mr. J. P. Wise, to whom the local authorities applied to influence the Rajah. Mr. Wise pledged himself to have the murderers delivered over, dead or alive, by December (1844). From his letter it appeared that Lal Chokla had applied to the Rajah to get him out of the scrape, a clear indication that there was some relation subsisting between them. Lal Chokla was reported to be Chief of 4,000 Kookie ryots, and to possess 100 muskets. Mr. Wise said, the raid was, he believed, made, not to get heads to bury with Laroo, but to avenge unfair dealing of Bengalis at the frontier marts. Upon this Government allowed the Rajah to the 1st December to fulfil his promise of arresting the murderers. He was informed that should he fail to do so by that date, troops would enter the hills and attack Lal Chokla's villages, while the Rajah would be held responsible for securing the passes and preventing that Chief's escape into the unknown tracts beyond. In November the Rajah sent in to Sylhet four defendants and twenty-seven witnesses as concerned in the Kochobari raid. These had apparently confessed freely before the Rajah, but one and all, witnesses included, denied all knowledge of the affair before the Magistrate. "Botai" was one of those sent in by the Rajah.

On the 1st December, as Lal Chokla had not been given up, a party of troops, under Captain Blackwood, entered the hills *via* Koilashur. The Rajah's native servants and troops gave little or no aid, but Mr. Wise's Assistant, Mr. Watt, did what he could for the party, and a Kookie Chief, Lal Mee Sing, also attended them. Captain Blackwood's men surrounded Lal Chokla's village, and by removing all the stored grain they could find in the country round about reduced the enemy to speedy submission. On the evening of the 4th, Lal Chokla surrendered. He confessed freely that he had despatched the

* Laroo, it will be observed, was named in 1826.

expedition against Kochobari, and said Botai had nothing to do with it. The motives which he gave as those that led him to do this, were however not those hitherto supposed to have influenced him. He said, he did not know that the Manipuris attacked were Company's ryots: and he had determined to avenge on them injuries done by the refugee Manipuri Chiefs, Ram Sing and Tribonjeet, to his father Laroo. Tribonjeet, it was known, had tried to penetrate to Manipore through these hills in 1841, but had to return to Cachar, where he and his party were dispersed by the Sylhet Infantry in April of that year. Lal Chokla now alleged that while in the hills, the Manipuris had beaten his father so that he died, and had killed 60 of his people. The truth of Lal Chokla's declaration, that he did not know the Manipuris of Kochobari were Company's ryots, was held to be very doubtful, and he was eventually transported for life.

In these papers we find the following facts as to the connection of these Kookie Chiefs *inter se*. "Sheeb Boot, a Chief, subordinate to Tipperah, declared himself independent and took away 25,000 house-holders. He was succeeded by his son, Chung Polun, and his grandson, Lal Koleem. The latter had two sons: one Kojasir, the father of Botai, to whom Lal Koleem gave 4,000 households as dependants: the other, Lal Pooee May, who took the rest of the 25,000 houses. Lal Pooee May had three sons, Lindoo, father of Lal Holun, Laroo, father of Lal Chokla, and Bontai (the raider of 1826), father of Lal Mee Sing, who assisted materially Captain Blackwood's force."

The next inroad on British territories by Kookie tribes was in November 1849. Almost at the same time reports were received from Sylhet of a massacre of wood-cutters on the Simla River, the burning and massacre of a village of Tipperahs, and the plunder of another village; while in Cachar, about ten miles from the Station, the Looshai Kookies, under a Chief, Lahingbhoon, or Lal Pooee, had burnt three villages and massacred a fourth. The Sylhet raiders were at first said to be Kochaks, subjects of the Khojawal Chief, a dependant of the Rajah of Hill Tipperah. The Rajah, however, denied their dependence. The conduct of the operations consequent on these attacks was entrusted to Colonel Lister, Political Agent in the Cossyah Hills, and Commandant of the Sylhet Light Infantry. At the same time an urgent demand was made upon the Tipperah Rajah, whose nominal subjects the raiders were said to be, to arrest them or co-operate in punishing them. In reply, the Rajah said he was willing to do so, but added that if the murderers turned out to be Looshais they were not his subjects.

After gathering together what little information was available, all of which pointed to the Looshais as the guilty tribe, Colonel Lister determined on marching into their country and punishing their villages. He started from Cachar on the 4th January 1850—and on the 14th surprised and destroyed the large village of Mullah, which he calculated lay about 100* miles south of Cachar. Considering his force too small to attempt any thing further, Colonel Lister at this point turned back and reached Cachar again on the 23rd. It was established by proof discovered in Mullah, that that village had perpetrated the massacres in Sylhet.

Colonel Lister describes the Looshais as composed (1) of Looshais proper, a cross between Kookies and Burmese; (2) of a number of true Burmese entertained for purposes of warfare; (3) of refugees and outlaws from Manipore and British territory. The head of the

* An over estimate

tribes was called Barmooceelin,* and they could raise 7,000 fighting men. The stability of their villages seemed to indicate that they were not a wandering race. Upwards of 400 captives, who had been employed on the joom cultivation of the Looshais, were released by Colonel Lister's force. Colonel Lister said a force of 3,000 men would be required to make any permanent impression on the tribes, and to command their villages a road would have to be carried into the heart of the country along one of the ridges of hills which here run north and south. As a protective measure, the establishment of armed out-posts of friendly Kookies along the frontier was advocated. Government approved of all Colonel Lister's proceedings, placed him in charge of our relations with all the tribes in that quarter, and suggested opening up negotiations with "the great Chief of the Looshais," in order to secure peace for the future. A Kookie Levy was raised to protect the frontier villages.

The moral effect of this expedition must have been considerable, for in October 1850 deputies arrived at Cachar from five Looshai Chiefs, Barmoilene, Boottai, Langroor, Lallpow, and Suckpoilal, to make overtures of friendship to the British Authorities. They said a tribe to the south-east called Poe was pressing on them and they wished to be friends with us. They offered to pay tribute and become Company's ryots. The Government declined to enter into any engagements with these Chiefs, but accepted their offer of friendship, ordered "the boundary to be pointed out to them,"† and assurance to be given that they would not be molested so long as they made no raids to the north of it. The result of these negotiations is shown in the concluding paragraphs of the Superintendent's Report already quoted.

In 1855 Suckpoilal sent in to claim assistance from the Superintendent against some neighbouring Chiefs who had attacked him. He grounded his claim on his being a tributary to Government by having sent elephant's teeth as presents to Cachar. He was told Government could not interfere in the internal quarrels of tribes living "beyond British territory." The Chief of Mullah also about this time sent in a deputation, and at the request of the Superintendent, and to prove his sincerity, released the son of a Tadoë Kookie Chief he had taken prisoner in 1849. He begged the Superintendent to procure the release of an uncle of Barmoilene who was a prisoner in Manipore. The Looshais had, it appeared, been making constant inroads on the Manipuri Nagas, and negotiations were on foot for an exchange of prisoners. These we of course were ready to advance.

There is a break in the history at this point. Sylhet and Cachar seem to have been tolerably free from disturbance up to the beginning of 1862. In January of that year a series of three outrages by Kookies was reported from Sylhet. The first reports received were by no means very precise, and as usual some said the Tipperah Rajah's people were concerned, while the Rajah alleged that they were his villages that had suffered. The facts as ascertained by careful local enquiry appeared to be these. Three villages (1) Ramdulal's Bari, (2) Rammohun's Bari, and (3) Chandraipara in the jurisdiction of Thannah Rajnugger, Sylhet, were, on the 22nd January, plundered and burnt, and a large number of the inhabitants massacred or carried off. These villages lie close together, about eight miles from Adampore.

* Colonel Raban thinks this was the Chief of the Howlong Sept of Looshais, whom we meet on the Chittagong side. His conjectures about "Nonpilal" or "Vonpilal" are probably incorrect. He identifies him with Lall Pitang, enemy of the Mullah Chief, or with the Chief of the Howlong's. We know that Vonpilal was Chief of Mullah.

† It is not shown what this boundary was supposed to be.

and this has come to be known as the Adumapore massacre. About the same time a village called Lungaibaree had been destroyed, and an attack made on a party of men about half a mile east of Kolingat. The Chundraipará group was shown to be in British territory, the other two localities in Hill Tipperah. A suspicious circumstance in connection with the affair was, that the people of Chundraipará were emigrants from Hill Tipperah who had settled on the estate of a Zemindar with whom the Tipperah Rajah had a standing feud. On the other hand the Rajah's own villages had suffered, but he had made no enquiry in the case. The evidence taken on the spot went to show that the Kookies who committed the raids were dependents of Murchoiloo (or Murchoi Looee), a son of that Lal Chokla whom we made prisoner in 1844. It was stated that Murchoiloo was an actual subject of the Rajah of Tipperah and on good terms with him. Government ordered (in November 1862) a strong post of armed Police to be established somewhere on the Sylhet Frontier,* and at the same time warned the Tipperah Rajah that these outrages on villages situated in the neighbourhood of his territory could not be any longer tolerated; that Government looked to him at once to organise such a Police in those places as would prevent the occurrence in future of similar aggressions, and that in the event of his not reporting without delay the completion of satisfactory arrangements for that purpose, he would be himself held personally responsible for the acts of the people of his estates, who appeared to take advantage of the consideration with which he was treated by Government to commit outrages such as those complained of.

The Commissioner of Dacca was, however, strongly of opinion that the real raiders were Looshais, not subject to the Rajah at all, and for some time nothing more was done.

In April 1864 four women who had been carried away from Chundraipará made their escape to Cachar and were forwarded to Sylhet. From their statements it appeared that the raid had been led by four Chiefs, (1) Mischoey Lall (= Murchoiloo), (2) Lookpilal (= Sookpailal), (3) Rungbhoom, (4) Lal Hoolien. The first was, as before shown, the son of Lal Chokla, and undoubtedly to some extent under the Tipperah Rajah; the second was said to live on the banks of the Dulleshur among the Seedashun Hills, some days' journey to south of Cachar, and to be virtually independent; the other two were related in some way to Mischoey Looee.

A new Rajah had at this time been installed in Tipperah, and he was called upon to give all the information and assistance he could with a view to recovering the captives, of whom there were said to be many in the villages of the abovenamed Chiefs. The Sylhet Authorities urged the sending of an expedition against them in the cold weather of 1863, but Government did not at once consent to this for the following reasons: It was incidentally mentioned, in a survey report of Cachar, that Lookpilal had ever since 1849 maintained friendly communications with the Cachar Authorities, sending in frequent deputations with presents, &c. This being the case, the Lieutenant-Governor, before attempting force, directed the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to endeavour to induce Lookpilal to give up the captives in his possession, and to undertake the protection of the Frontier by restraining his own people from committing raids, and by refusing countenance and encouragement to other Chiefs in any like attempt. An annual money payment for this service was to be offered to him and the other Chiefs on the Sonai and Tipai, and return annual presents were to be taken

* Fifty men of the Kanroop Regiment were actually sent to Adumapore.

from them as acknowledgment of allegiance. It was feared that a hostile expedition might bring down the Kookies on the Tea Gardens which were now spreading fast into the Hills.

Captain Stewart, the Deputy Commissioner, upon this opened communication with "Sookpoyeloll" (= Lookpailal,) taking advantage of the scarcity then prevailing in the Hills to conciliate him by a present of rice. In October 1864 Sookpailal (as we shall henceforth call him) sent a Muntri and his half brother to meet Captain Stewart. After some fencing the Muntri admitted the facts of the Adum-pore Massacre, but said some of the captives had been sold to the Pois in the south. Captain Stewart said, if Sookpailal would come and meet him and bring the captives, and swear friendship, he should receive Rupees 50 a month, subject only to an annual nuzzur to Government. The Muntri promised that Sookpailal would send his heir, Lalongoon, to Cachar, as he was too ill to move himself, and agreed to all the other conditions. He said, he did not know the other Rajah concerned in the raid as Murchoilol, (or Mischoeey Looce,) but called him Guoor-shai-lon (clearly the same name). Guoor-shai-lon had married Sookpailal's sister, and on the occasion of the marriage the Adum-pore raid was made. "They did not know the village belonged to the Sirkar, and wanted to make up the price of the bride." Sookpailal and Guoor-shai-lon had since quarrelled.

At this time the Rajah of Tipperah, whose succession was threatened in the Courts, volunteered to try and arrest Murchoilol (= Mischoeey Looce=Guoor-shai-lon,) and also said he would make an effort to seize Sookpailal who was, however, not so easily got at. These offers were rejected as the negotiations with Sookpailal promised fairly, and any attack upon Mischoeey Looce apart from him would excite his suspicions.

Soon after his communications with Sookpailal, Captain Stewart received a deputation from Vangpilol, Chief of Mullah, and made similar arrangements with him. Vangpilol's messengers expressed great dread of the advance of Tea Gardens up the Sonai, which Captain Stewart endeavored to allay by showing how advantageous to the Hill Tribes the vicinity of a garden would prove. On this being reported to Government, Captain Stewart was asked to explain how the country of the Looshais could be considered open to British enterprise in the way indicated. He replied—"The Looshais have always been looked upon as an independent people, but it is not certain that they occupy independent territory. The southern boundary of Cachar is indefinite, and may be pushed as far as it is thought proper. The natural boundary is the water-part of the hills between this and the sea, and this the Chutta Choor, a peak which is sometimes talked of as the boundary, is supposed to be. If this be the case, all the Looshais, that we have any communication with, are within the district, as they all drink from waters that flow into the Barak."

In December 1865, the Deputy Commissioner reported that Sookpailal had not sent in the captives, and had, in reply to messengers sent by Captain Stewart, alleged as his reason, that three of his tribe had been murdered a year before by a Kookie Settlement in Cachar. It was doubtful whether this was a fact or a mere subterfuge on the part of Sookpailal.

It was determined to send an expedition to compel him to give up the captives, and Police were got together in Cachar for that purpose, but before they set out the rains began and operations were postponed. While they were waiting orders a deputation from Vagnoilen, a Looshai Chief to the south of Munnipore, came in and had a friendly interview.

During the rains of 1866 Captain Stewart was occupied in finding out as much as was known about Sookpilal's position and its accessibility. It was found that no communication could be opened with him from Chittagong; and that the smallest force that it was advisable to send from Cachar would be 100 fighting men. In view of these facts, the idea of an expedition was given up and negotiations re-commenced.

Before, however, any messengers had left Cachar an embassy arrived from Sookpilal himself bringing the annual presents originally settled, but no captives. Captain Stewart insisted on these being brought in, and sent a messenger back with the Looshai party. After much trouble four boys were given up, and it was said that Guoor-shai-lon had prevented Sookpilal from sending the others. He and Sookpilal were now friends, and Guoor-shai-lon kept his brother-in-law supplied with muskets through Hill Tipperah. Many of the captives, it was also stated, were married to Looshais, and unwilling to leave them. The identity of Guoor-shai-lon and Mischoey Looce appears now to have been lost sight of, for the Rajah of Tipperah was applied to for information in regard to him and his denial of all knowledge of him was tacitly accepted.

Here matters rested in 1867, and it was hoped that Sookpilal would at any rate remain friendly for the future.

It does not enter into the plan of this memorandum to discuss the British relations with Manipore. It is, however, necessary very briefly to allude to facts, without a knowledge of which it will be difficult to estimate aright the events which have recently occurred on the Looshai Frontier. It was essential to the security of Cachar and Sylhet to maintain in Manipore a settled Government, to be a barrier to Burmese aggression and a check upon the tribes to the eastward. For these reasons Rajah Chunder Kirtee Sing was taken under British protection, and warning was given to the numerous exiled branches of his family that any attempt against his Government would be punished by us as though made against ourselves. This warning has, however, been frequently disregarded, and the exiled Rajputras, who lurked about in Cachar and Sylhet could always raise from the numerous Manipuri villages in those districts levies, with which from time to time they made desperate attempts to reach the valley of Manipore and stir the people up to rebellion against their Rajah. Our Troops and Police have frequently been engaged in dispersing these bands or preventing their advance, and numbers of these Manipuri adventurers have been deported to Dacca and elsewhere. Of late years the attempts at invasion have been rather numerous. In 1862 there was one. The invading force was led by two Manipuri princes, Maipak and Khaifa Sing, and though pursued and vigorously attacked by a party of sepoy sent from Cachar in pursuit, yet managed to penetrate to the capital of Manipore, and were only finally dispersed at the very gates of the Raja's palace. Maipak, it was reported, had been in hiding among the Looshais before this enterprise of his.

Again in 1865, a band of 150 Manipuris, under Kanhai Sing, Rajputra, was attacked among the Hoorung Hills by a body of British Troops and Police and dispersed with loss. Police guards to prevent such inroads were regularly during the dry season stationed at the principal Passes into Manipore. In November 1866 another Chief, called Gokul Sing, invaded Manipore with a party collected in Cachar, but they were again followed, overtaken, and dispersed. Gokul Sing is a nephew of Nursing and a son of Debendro Sing, in whose

time Chunder Kirtee Sing had been himself an exile. Vigorous steps were taken on the failure of Gokul Sing's expedition to prevent such attempts in future. All the Manipuri Rajputras concerned, or suspected to have been concerned in late raids, were deported to Dacca, and all others who had taken part in them were sent to Hazareebagh. A reward of Rupees 1,000 was offered for the capture of Gokul Sing. He has recently been caught and is at present in Dacca Jail. Kanhai Sing is still at large.

In November 1868, the Governor General's Agent at Manipore reported that the Looshais had attacked certain Naga villages belonging to that State. This did not appear intimately to affect us. But towards the close of December the Magistrate of Sylhet reported that a village near Adumpore had been attacked by Kookies, and the Commissioner thought this movement might be connected with that on the side of Manipore. A few days later further reports came to hand, from which it appeared that Sookpilal (called Chupkoilal) had attacked villages in the Hill Tipperah State, and that a Chief called Rungbhoom had taken refuge in Sylhet. Sookpilal was said to have been in pursuit of Rungbhoom, but it was very doubtful whether he had knowingly followed him into British territory. Almost simultaneously it appeared that a large party of Manipuris had assembled near the east frontier of Cachar to make a raid into Manipore, while the Looshais were threatening the Tea Gardens in the south. Kanhai Sing was reported to have considerable influence over the Kookies on the Tipperah side, as was indeed not unlikely, for most of the villages near Adumpore and that frontier were colonised by Manipuris, and in them Kanhai Sing raised the force with which he made his former raid. On the 15th January the Looshais burnt the Tea Garden of Loharbund in Cachar, and next attacked Monairkhal. After which they were said to be in full march for Manipore. Kanhai Sing was seen with the Looshais, and the local Officers were strongly of opinion that the attacks upon Sylhet and Cachar were intended to draw off our attention, while a vigorous attempt was made to enter Manipore. Sookpilal and Vompilal (of Mullah?) were supposed to be the Chiefs implicated in the Cachar raids.

Vigorous steps were at once taken to prevent further aggression and punish these tribes; and to this end it has been determined to send two forces of Military and Police, one up the Sonai to reach the villages of Vompilal, and the other up the Dulleshur towards Sookpilal's position. A feint will, at the same time, be made from Sylhet towards Rungbhoom's village, while the Rajah of Manipore will co-operate from his side. This is the most extensive Military demonstration ever made on that frontier, and its results may tend to raise important issues.

We have spoken frequently of the Rajah of Hill or Independent Tipperah, and the authority he has been supposed to exercise over the hill tribes to the south of Cachar and Sylhet. The records of Government contain very little that throws any light upon the extent of his State or its relations towards the paramount power. The only notice of this little principality to be found in Aitchison's Treaties is as follows:—"The British Government has no treaty with Tipperah. The Rajah of Tipperah stands in a peculiar position, inasmuch as in addition to the Hill Territory, known as "Independent [now 'Hill'] Tipperah," he is the holder of a very considerable Zemindari in the District of Tipperah

in the plains; he receives his investiture from the British Government, and is required to pay the usual Nuzzerana. The succession has usually been determined by the appointment of a Joobraj or heir apparent, whom the Rajah is considered incompetent to appoint until he has, himself, been invested by the British Government. Independent Tipperah is not held by gift from the British Government or its predecessors, or under any title derived from it or them, never having been subjected by the Mogul."

The statement in the last paragraph of this extract is, however, open to dispute.*

The peculiar feature about the Tipperah Rajah's position is, that, inasmuch as the Independent Hill Tract forms, with the Zemindari on the plains, an inpartible Raj, the succession is always, when disputed, settled by our ordinary Courts of Law, the decision given *quoad* the Zemindari really carrying with it the right to the *guddi*. (See Macnaghten's *Sudder Dewanny Adawlut Decisions*, Vol. I. page 361, March 24th, 1809.)

It will be convenient to consider the question of what policy it is desirable to adopt, for the future, in regard to Hill Tipperah and the Tract beyond, when we have completed our review of the hill tribes under Bengal by a rapid notice of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The Hill Tracts of Chittagong are bounded on the west by the District of Chittagong, on the south and east as far as the Blue Mountain by the Province of Arracan, on the north-west by the Fenny River separating it from Hill Tipperah, while on the north and north-east the boundary is really undefined.

* The following notes by Mr. Geoghagan, late Under Secretary to Government of Bengal, bear on this point:—

"The only source of information which I have been able to trace out is an article in the nineteenth volume of the *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, containing an analysis of a Bengalee Poem or Metrical History of the Hindu Kingdom of Tripura, or, as it is commonly called, Tipperah.

From so early a date as 1250 A. D. or thereabouts, the Mussalmans would seem to have had a hankering after Tipperah, and in subsequent years the Tipperah Rajahs came into frequent collision with the Moguls of Gaur both in Chittagong (to which the former had extended their dominions) and on the borders of Tipperah Proper. But the Rajahs would seem to have held their ground bravely for upwards of three centuries.

About 1620 A. D., however, in the reign of Jahangir, a Mogul force, ostensibly with the object of procuring horses and elephants, invaded Tripura under the command of Nawab Fath Jang. The capital (Oodypore) was taken and the Rajah sent prisoner to Delhi. He was offered his throne again on condition of paying tribute, but refused. Meanwhile the Mogul troops continued to hold the country, in Military occupation of the most cruel kind, until, after two and half years, they were forced by an epidemic to leave the country. The Emperor of Delhi reiterated his claim to tribute, when Kalyan Manik was raised to the throne in 1625, and attempted to enforce his claim through the Nawab of Moorshedabad, who again invaded Tipperah. He was however defeated. The Moguls still continued to intrigue with the discontented spirits in Tipperah, and their influence is shown by the fact that when, in the reign of Rajah Ratna Manik, the heir (Jubraj) became obnoxious from his cruelty, Shaista Khan, Nawab of Bengal, took him prisoner and sent him off to Delhi. Again two usurpers successively owed the throne to the changing favour of the Moguls, and on the succession of Dharma Manik the Nawab of Moorshedabad seized on a large portion of the territory in the plains and parcelled it out to Mussulman nobles.

In 1739 A. D. the Nawab of Dacca placed Jagat Rama on the throne of Tipperah, a large body of Mussulman troops were posted in the country, and the name of the capital changed to Roshansbad. (Throughout the country for Mussulman names of places are common.) The next few years produced several changes of rulers, but the Mussulman at Moorshedabad seems always to have remained the motive power. At last when Bijaya Manik was appointed Rajah, still by the Nawab, he was only allowed a monthly stipend, and compelled to send all the revenue of the Raj to Moorshedabad; and falling into arrears was sent prisoner to Delhi, where he died. Thus Tipperah

For an account of the various tribes inhabiting these regions, and our early intercourse with them, reference must be made to Captain Lewin's work, *The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the Dwellers therein*. A report on the forays of the wild tribes on this frontier will be found in No. XI. of the Selections from the Records of the Bengal Government; and the following extracts from a letter to the Government of India, written in July 1859, will serve to bring our information up to the date of the formation of the Hill Tracts District. —

"This tract of country is known both as the Kupas (Cotton) Mehal, owing to Cotton being its chief agricultural produce, and also as the Joom Tract (so called from the inhabitants being Joomeas or cultivators by the hand.) Its inhabitants are Mughhs and other cognate tribes. Those nearest to the plains are, for the most part, Joomea Mughhs. Behind them are the Koomees, Kookies, Morungs and others.

"The Joomeas or Mughhs seldom cultivate the table lands. They select a spot on a Hill cut down and burn the jungles, and then throw their five kinds of Seed, Cotton, Rice, &c., into a hole made with a Dao. All lands cultivated in this manner belong to the Kupas, Mehal. But whenever any land is brought under the plough, it forms part of our Exchequer lands.

became really a Mogul province, and Shamsheer Jang (a Mussulman) was appointed governor. The people, however, refused to obey him and to conciliate them he set up a puppet Rajah of the old royal family. He failed in his object and had to employ coercion. He kept the people down with the strong hand, till his oppression grew so crying that the Nawab had him blown from the mouth of a gun. Krishna Manik succeeded, but, apparently, did not prove submissive enough, for the Moguls had again to enforce their supremacy by Military power. On the death of Krishna anarchy prevailed for five years, the Kookies being called in by one of the parties contending for the guddle.

Ultimately in 1808, the English Government recognized Durga Manik as Rajah, and since then every successive Rajah has received investiture from the British Government, and is required to pay the usual nuzzur on his accession.

From this sketch it is clear that the Mussulmans, from a date little subsequent to 1600 A. D., consistently put forth a claim to tribute from the Rajah of Tipperah, as a conquered Prince, and that they were actual masters of the plain country for years. How the present distinction between the Rajah's zemindari and Independent Tipperah arose, the article I have borrowed from does not show, but it seems to me clear that the only thing which prevented the Mussulmans occupying Hilly Tipperah was the absence of any inducement to do so, in the nature or products of the country.

28-10-1863.

J. G.

I have since gone through with considerable care the correspondence relating to the various disputes between this Government and the Rajah of Tipperah, about the boundaries of the so-called independent territory, and the arbitrations to fix the same.

But I can find nothing to throw any light on the subject. I only discover, what is also clear from the Bengalee history above quoted, that the Rajah's dominions once extended beyond their present limits far into the plains, but that he was gradually dispossessed by the Mussulmans of all the low country. The utter vagueness of the boundary, between Dependent and Independent Tipperah, seems to me to favour the theory that the Rajah was really a tributary of the Mahomedans, and that the only thing that prevented the latter from reducing the hill country to the same condition as the plains, was the unremunerative character of such an undertaking. Mr. Long in his analysis, I may add, mentions the Mussulman occupation of the capital of Tipperah. Now it is not clearly stated what the capital then was, and there appears to have been changes of residence on the part of the royal family, but if it was Oodypore (which was at one time the capital), this fact would be an argument against the inviolate independence of the hill territory, for it lies east of the range and of the boundary between Tipperah and our territory as now laid down.

U. L.

J. G.

"When Chittagong was first taken possession of, the tax formerly paid by the Hill Chiefs, in the shape of Cotton, was commuted to an Annual Revenue in money, then amounting to Rupees 5,703. This tax was not fixed in perpetuity, it being understood that with increased population, from whom the Mugh Chiefs draw a Capitation Tax, increased Revenue might be demanded; and in 1846-47 it had reached Rupees 11,805.

"Though the tribes wander, in search of fresh ground, every two or three years, the Chiefs have fixed places of residence. There are two principal families, one whose seat is North of the Chittagong River at Runga Mattee, (now the Kalindee Rancee;) and the other and more important family, (the Phroos otherwise called the Peangs,) South of that River at Brindabun. The authority of this latter family is considered to extend over the whole country South of the Kurnafoollee or Chittagong River, as far as the Arracan border.

"For several years this tract of country has been the scene of murderous raids by the wild border tribes. The tribe mainly concerned in these outrages is stated to be the Shendoos, a numerous and powerful race in the South-East of the Chittagong District, carrying their raids as far as Munipore, on the one side, and Arracan on the other. Little seems to have been ascertained as to the causes which induce these people to come, so far from their homes, to attack the Mugs within our Frontier.

"In 1847 Mr. Ricketts, then Commissioner of the Division, submitted a full report on the subject, and he strongly recommended the policy of managing this tract solely through the Phroo family, on the ground that none of the people of Bengal could live in these Hills, so fatal are they to all but indigenous tribes. He at the same time stated that it was very important that the dissensions which had arisen, among the Phroos themselves, should be adjusted, as these weakened the tribe and thereby afforded additional inducement to the attacks of the frontier tribes, and it was even suspected that some of these forays had been instigated by one member of the family against another. Mr. Ricketts therefore recommended that an agreement should be made with the Phroos, that if they would terminate their dissensions, resume their family seat at Brindabun, and lastly, if they would undertake to defend the Frontier against all marauders by keeping up their stockades, the Government would make a remission of Rupees 1,645-15-9 in their Revenue, to enable them to meet the increased expense of carrying out the latter object, and that these conditions being kept, the reduction in assessment should hold good for twenty years. To the above was subsequently added the condition that they should not purchase slaves, Major Bogle, the Commissioner of Arracan, having been of opinion that, in some of the attacks committed by the same tribes on the Northern Frontier of Arracan, the persons carried off were sold as slaves to the Phroos.

"These measures were approved by Government and forthwith carried out, the Phroos adjusting their differences and making Brindabun again their state residence.

"It was at the same time intimated to the Phroos that while they were allowed, as heretofore, to collect tax from the Joomcas or forest Mughs, no right to the land, on their part, was recognized, or any right to demand rent from any persons who may settle in or clear any portion of the forest, or cultivate on any other system than that followed by the Joomcas.

"As a penalty for non-observance of the above conditions, it was stipulated that should forays again take place,—or family feuds, such as to disturb tranquillity, occur, the Government would make such arrangements for the management of the Kupas Mehal, and the defence of the Frontier, as might be considered necessary, even to bringing the family to the Plains and establishing other authority in the Hills."

"Mr. Ricketts further took the opportunity of remarking on the inconvenience, arising out of the fact that these wild tracts were considered to be under the jurisdiction of the Regular Civil and Criminal Courts, and that he considered Regulation Law was altogether unsuited to the state of things existing there, and that if any interference should again become necessary, an Act ought to be passed excluding these forests from the regular jurisdiction of the Chittagong District."

"The late Mr. J. R. Colvin, on the occasion of his deputation to Chittagong, expressed an opinion similar to that of Mr. Ricketts, as have also other Officers who had occasion to report on the subject."

"The same measure has, recently, been strongly recommended by Mr. Steer, the present Commissioner of the Division. As the arrangement concluded with the Phroos has not been attended with the desired success, and as the interference of Government has become necessary, with a view to protect our Hill subjects from the aggressions of the Frontier tribes, the Lieutenant-Governor would recommend that the whole Country East of the cultivated Plain Country of Chittagong should be removed from the operation of the General Regulations, and that an Officer, to be called the Superintendent of the Joom Tract, should be appointed, as suggested by the Commissioner."

"The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that, at present, it is out of the question to attempt really to administer the government of these Hills. The administration should be left wholly to the Hill Chiefs, the only object of the measures now proposed being to prevent such raids as the Commissioner complains of, and to do so through the Chiefs. For this purpose the single Officer proposed will, it is hoped, suffice."

"Any such complete system of administration as has been established in the Sonthal Country is not at present to be thought of for the tract in question. The excessive expense of that system, as compared with the wealth and population of the tracts administered, would, in itself, be a bar to such a scheme in regard to the Chittagong Hills; for the expense of the Sonthal system, in proportion to the population and the fiscal value of the Country, is enormous, though the Sonthals pay a Revenue which is more than nominal. The Chittagong Joomeas, pay only a nominal Revenue, and nothing is known of the Hills at any distance from the Plain Country."

"The Lieutenant-Governor is further of opinion that any middle course between the thorough administration of the affairs of a Country, in a way suitable to the circumstances of the people, and the leaving of the administration to its own Native Chiefs, is most objectionable. Such middle courses, as was the case with the Sonthals, are sure, sooner or later, to end in disaster."

"It may be necessary, though no such necessity has been shown to exist, not to leave wholly in the hands of the Chiefs, some portions of the Hills bordering the Plain Country."

"In that case such portion, if taken in hand, should be thoroughly administered, somewhat after the Sonthal system; but the heavy expense of that system will be a reason for doing this to as small an extent as possible. The administration of the rest of the Country may be left entirely in the hands of the Hill Chiefs, under the general supervision of a Superintendent, who should interfere as little as possible, except to insist upon the people near the Plains, who are practically our subjects, being defended from the inroads of more distant savages, and being prevented from making raids or committing other great atrocities themselves. Whatever is resolved upon, the first step must be the taking of the Hill Tracts of the Chittagong District from the operation of the General Regulations, which are intended only for people in a high state of civilization. Such discordance between theory and practice as appears when a Country inhabited by semi-barbarians, ignorant of all laws, and without a semblance of Courts of Justice among them, is represented as subject to and influenced by a refined system of Judicial administration, is hardly creditable to the Government of the Country."

Act XXII. of 1860 was accordingly passed, which enabled the Government to give to the Hill Tracts the administration suited to its condition.

Before, however, the appointment of a Hill Superintendent was actually made there took place that very extended series of raids, which is known as the 'great Kookie invasion' of 1860. In December 1859, rumours had reached the local Officers of the Tipperah District, that the interior of Hill Tipperah was in a very disturbed state. The Rajah's affairs were generally known to be greatly involved. He had been compelled to dispense with the little armed force he formerly kept up, while his family and kingdom were distracted by the intrigues of the various candidates for the succession, or of discontented exiles beyond the border. The Rajah, besides, either could not or would not meet the expense consequent on the nomination of a Jubraj, or heir apparent, while he left all his affairs in the hands of a Bengali Gooroo. Early in January 1860, reports were received, at Chittagong, of the assembling of a body of 400 or 500 Kookies at the head of the River Fenny, and soon the tale of burning villages and slaughtered men gave token of the work they had on hand. On the 31st January, before any intimation of their purpose could reach us, the Kookies, after sweeping down the course of the Fenny, burst into the plains of Tipperah at Chagulneyah, burnt or plundered 15 villages, butchered 185 British subjects, and carried off about 100 captives. Troops and Police were at once hurried to the spot, but the Kookies had only remained a day or two on the plains, retiring to the Hills and jungles by the way they came. It was at first supposed that this extended movement, on the part of these tribes, was directed by certain near relatives of the Tipperah Rajah, and was intended to involve that Chief in trouble with the English Government. But it was afterwards ascertained, with considerable certainty,* that the main instigators of the invasion were three or four Hill Tipperah refugees, Thakurs who had lived for some time among the

* The following extracts from a Report, by Mr. J. D. Gordon, will show the state of affairs in Hill Tipperah, and the causes of the raid.—"I wrote at length concerning an attack made by the Rajah's people upon the Dooptung Kookies. I am still of opinion that that occurrence led to the disturbances in the Hills which terminated in the massacres at Ranghul and Khundul. The Thakurs no doubt used their endeavors to extend the disturbances, and many disaffected Reangs, subjects of the Rajah, joined the Kookies. A good number of these men, Reangs, left the Rajah's Territory two or

Kookies, and who took advantage of the ill-feeling caused by an attack made by the Rajah's subjects upon some Dúptang Kookies to excite a rising that unfortunately became diverted to British Territory. Driven by the Rajah from his dominions, these men had formed alliances among the various Kookie tribes of the interior, and, year by year, villages, supposed to be friendly to the Rajah, had been attacked and plundered, vague rumours of which disturbances had reached our ears. Some of the Rajah's own subjects, moreover, exasperated by his constant exactions, were believed to have invited the Kookies to ravage his territories.

three years ago with the Thakoors. They, it is believed, returned with them to plunder at Khundul. But, independent of these, there were numbers of the Tipperah Rajah's subjects, men I mean who are avowedly his people, paying him rent, who secretly joined the marauders. Mr. Steer has ably described the disorganized state of the Hills. The fact is, that there are few of the Hillmen who do not suffer much from the Rajah's misgovernment. Their rent, of late years, has been enormously raised, and they are, at all times, liable to oppression of some kind. They were in a state, then, ready to join in any expedition that had plunder in the foreground and possible release from the Rajah in the distance.

"I must mention that it seems to have been a very general belief that the Government would at once make 'Khas' the Hill Territories, if outrages were committed on its people. It has created much surprise that this has not been the result of the massacre at Khundul, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Hillmen felt a hope that it might turn out so. They are, many of them, in constant communication with our subjects, and the security and comfort which the latter enjoy can hardly have failed to appear in advantageous contrast with their own position.

"Many of the Hillmen, too, owed money to our subjects, and so they too would have an incentive to join in robbing and destroying them. It is an exceedingly difficult matter to write positively of doings in the Hills, which are indeed veiled to even our Native subjects. The best informed can give, or will give, but little valuable information, whilst the Hillmen, to Bengallees, are cunningly close as to affairs relating to themselves. Under these circumstances I can hardly give a very decided or valuable opinion. But I think that to revenge the raid on the Dooptungs by the Rajah's people was the object of the rising of the Kookies; that the disaffected Reangs and Chukmas (the Kalindee Rancee's people,) headed by the Thakoors, caught up the spirit, and caused plunder and murder on all sides.

"I would, in concluding this Report, add a few remarks upon a subject bearing directly upon the future state of our Frontier.

"The state of Independent Tipperah calls for our interference. I do not mean with a view to annexation, for that would be opposed to our present policy. I allude to the disorganized state, in consequence of the *unfitness* of those in power in Tipperah.

"If internal disorganization exists to the detriment only of those residing within an Independent State, we are not *bound* to exercise interference, though this has repeatedly been the *sole* ground for such interference by civilized nations with barbarians; but if that disorganization *directly* affect the lives and property of our subjects, interference, on our part, rests no longer on a question of policy—it becomes a necessity.

Such is the case with the internal state of Tipperah.

"During the time of the late Rajah a semblance of order existed. The present Rajah does nothing himself, but has for the last seven or eight years given the whole and sole management of every matter in his Territory to his Gooroo.* This man once had but one aim, the restoration of the Rajah's finances. The Rajah was much in debt to the Mohajuns, and the Gooroo was determined to wipe away these debts. This he has in a great measure done, but not in the legitimate way of curtailing extravagance, and putting a stop to unnecessary expenditure, but by sweeping away also Establishments absolutely necessary. Now that the Rajah's debts are nearly cleared off, and he has gained entire influence over his master, and unlimited control in money matters, the Gooroo does not hesitate, I learn, to spend large sums on his own account.

"Independent Tipperah will not become settled so long as he remains in power. He is a Bengallee, and gives offence, at every turn, to the Princes and Chiefs of the Hillmen. He respects no one, and seems to study to estrange the Hill people from him. He is faithless, incompetent to rule, and utterly unscrupulous.

"I would urge the Lieutenant-Governor as strongly as I can, consistently with respect, to insist that that man shall no longer be Rajah of Tipperah, for such he is in all but name. His name or title is even upon the *seal*, and our Officials here have constantly the mortification of knowing that they are in reality conducting business with this Bengallee, (not with a worthy Officer of the Rajah,) of whose want of faith they have constant proof. Our Government should demand, not only that he be removed from office, but from the Rajah's dominions, for a time at any rate."

The hillmen who had perpetrated this attack in the Tipperah District were reported from the first to be the followers of Rutton Poa, whose clan was known to live far up between the upper sources of the Fenny and Kurnafoulee.

In July (1860,) the newly appointed Superintendent of Hill Tracts was told that his first duty would be to gain as much information as possible to facilitate the advance of a Military expedition to punish the offending tribes. Government was determined to teach them at once a severe and salutary lesson. In January 1861, a large body of Military Police, under Captain Raban, marched against Rutton Poa's village. No sooner had they appeared in sight than the Kookies themselves set fire to the place and fled to the jungles. A good deal of damage was done to them in various ways, but, beyond proving to the savages that their fastnesses were not inaccessible, it could not be said that much else was effected. At the very time that this expedition was on its march, a large body of Kookies made a fierce attack upon Hill Tipperah near a Thannah of the Rajah's called Oodoy pore. The few miserable Burkundazes there stationed fled forthwith, and after burning and destroying three populous villages and a wealthy mart, the invaders retired eastwards. The same party, on their return journey, burned several villages on the Kalindee Rance's Estate, and attacked one of our Police Posts (Kurkurea,) from which, however they were beaten off. They also suffered considerable loss from a bold attack made upon them by a small body of Military Police under a Native Officer.

The establishment of strongly fortified posts served to secure, for a time, the northern frontier of the Hill Tracts; but in March we find the Kookies attacking the Poang Rajah's villages to the south, and advancing to within eight miles of Brindabun itself. The Poang Rajah, to whom the defence of this part had been for years entrusted, was called upon to strengthen his posts. But anything that he could do was lamentably insufficient. During the whole year the frontier was in a state of constant panic: large tracts of country were deserted by the Joomea cultivators, and it seemed as if nothing that our Police and Troops could effect would secure them from attack. The wild and unknown country from which the savages came, the trackless jungles and rockstrewn torrent beds from which they would suddenly emerge, and into which they would, on the first symptom of attack, re-plunge, rendered helpless the best efforts of our men to pursue them, as it was also impossible to foresee their advance.

At length in September, Rutton Poa, who had more than once made overtures of friendship, came in and tendered a complete submission. Dreading probably the advance of a formidable force in the approaching cold season, this wily individual attached himself to our interests and offered his aid to us in any attempt we might make to reach the tribes beyond him. Advantage was taken of his overtures to open friendly communications with the Syloo and Howlong tribes, of which at this time we knew nothing.

Rutton Poa's Clan, and the other two just named, are all described as Looshais. The Syloos were said to be under three Chiefs: "Lootpore" (father of Bandoolah,) and Kosai, and Vangsang. The Howlongs were also under three Chiefs: Saboong (father of Lal Moorah,) and Lal Poitang, and Sungboonja. All these names are, however, of very uncertain orthography.

At first it seemed as if the negotiations with these remote clans would be successful. Scarcity was pressing them close, and it was essential to them to get supplies from the British Territory of Chittagong. They have apparently no communication with Cachar.

The out-turn of a good crop however rendered them insolent and boastful. And in September (1862) they sent to say that though they had no intention of attacking Europeans, they considered they had a right to cut up other tribes, such as Bengalees, Chuckmas, Tipperahs, and Mughs, and we had no right to interfere. Our troops, they said, were merely paid by money obtained from Mahajuns, and that sort of thing could not last. On the withdrawal of our troops they would lay waste the country. To a further message, they replied that we must be content with their promise not to attack us—but that they would not come in to see the Superintendent.

On the 20th January 1863, Sir Cecil Beadon took up the question of our frontier policy in this quarter, in the same spirit in which he had approached it elsewhere. It was said:—

“This correspondence has convinced His Honor that our relations with the Hill Tribes on the Chittagong Frontier are carried on upon a wrong principle, and that so long as our policy rests upon the assumption that the Kookies of certain tribes cannot be trusted until they have been made to feel our power, we shall be in danger of embroiling ourselves with them in another unsatisfactory and profitless contest.

“Every endeavor should be made to induce the Chiefs of the unfriendly tribes not to come in, as it is called, that is, to present themselves before the Superintendent, either at Chittagong or at any other place at a distance from the frontier, but to consent that he should meet them at some spot equally convenient to both parties, and then to enter into written engagements for the future maintenance of peace on the border.

“If a meeting of this kind could be arranged in such a manner as not to wound the natural savage pride of these Chieftains and their followers, and if they could once be made to feel confidence in our pacific intentions, the Lieutenant-Governor has no doubt that they would willingly enter into any reasonable engagements we might dictate, that all hostile incursions and the apprehension of these would cease, and that the tribes instead of being a source of terror to those who live under our immediate protection would become the reverse.

“One of the best means of conciliating the good will of tribes, like the Kookies, is to arrange an annual gathering of Chiefs at some convenient place in the hills, on which occasion the Superintendent, representing the British Government, should receive trifling offerings from each Chief, and bestow on him a present in return, and take the opportunity of hearing and redressing all complaints and grievances, and of encouraging free and friendly communication between the different tribes, and between them and the people of the plains. To attend at such meetings, and to receive a token of friendly disposition from the Superintendent, would soon come to be regarded as a privilege, and the general good feeling of the tribes would be enlisted against any one of them who held aloof.

“A small Police allowance, either in money or in kind, might be given to each Chief to enable him to keep the peace within his own limits, and to prevent his people from attacking their neighbours, and this would also serve as a security for his own fidelity and allegiance.

"To enable you to see what may be effected by a policy of this kind, I am desired to forward to you the accompanying copy of a Report from Major Bivar, Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, in Assam, detailing his negotiations with the Abors, a wild tribe who had for a long time given us much trouble on that frontier, and of the engagement he has concluded with them. The Lieutenant-Governor desires that the policy which has apparently been so successful in Assam, may be followed out in respect to the tribes on the frontier of your Division. If this be done, it will most probably remove all ground of complaint as to the insufficiency of the means at your disposal for coercing these people; and the utmost cost of subsidizing them, and making them serve as their own Police, will be far more than covered by the reduction which will thus become practicable in our own Military and Police Establishments."

In accordance with these instructions, Captain Graham, the Superintendent of Hill Tracts, proceeded to Rutton Poea's village, and that Chief, with nine other leading Chiefs of the Lenchew Range, entered into binding engagements to keep the peace. Messengers sent thence to the Howlongs, brought back a document signed by their principal Chief (now called "Vandoolah"), his brother 'Sayah,' and three other Chiefs, in which they agreed to keep quiet and to meet the Superintendent at Kassalong in January. Vandoolah sent in an elephant's tusk in token of amity. Vanoah, one of the Sylo Chiefs, also offered friendly presents. It was found that many British subjects were held captive by the Howlongs, and the Lieutenant-Governor directed that no payments of Police subsidies were to be made to any tribe so long as it retained such captives. The agreement signed by Rutton Poea and others is reproduced in a foot note.*

The following payments, half in money half in kind, were sanctioned:—

Rutton Poea's tribe	Rs.	400
Sylo Kookies (if they agreed to terms)	"	800
Howlongs (" " ")	"	800

At the close of 1863, the Commissioner had a very satisfactory interview with most of these Chiefs at Kassalong, when presents were interchanged and feasts given.

In February 1864 an attack was made upon the Poang's country by armed Kookies. Rutton Poea had previously sent in to warn our post at Kassalong that a band of Banjogi Kookies had passed southward. This seemed to be the same band. The attack was beyond our posts. The party passed away and nothing more seems to have been heard of them.

* "The Kookies hereby acknowledge all persons of the following descriptions living in the Hills and Plains to be British subjects, namely, Mughls, Bengalees, Tipperahs, Chuckmas, and such other classes as the Superintendent may from time to time point out.

"The Kookies engage to take measures for preventing any parties from amongst their clansmen from molesting residents in the British Territory, or trading, cultivating, or travelling in the Hills.

"All traders shall have access to the Kookie villages, and shall be carefully protected from all injury.

"The Kookies shall have access to the markets of Kassalong and Rangamuttee at present, and to such other places as the Government may hereafter approve, and their trading parties shall only carry daos.

"Any Kookies settling in British Territory shall pay the same revenue to Government as the other Hill Tribes residing there.

In December 1864 the Annual Meeting was held, but none of the great Chiefs came down. Representatives from Button Poca and the Sylos attended. Under these circumstances presents were sent, but money payments not made. It appeared that December was too early in the cold season for them to leave their cultivation. Instructions were upon this given by Government to the effect, that as the payments were for Police service and for keeping a quiet frontier, a fixed and convenient pay day should be agreed upon, and the money given to any deputation of relatives the Chiefs might send, if they could not come themselves.

In April 1865 another meeting was accordingly arranged, at which deputations from the three great clans attended—and as they had preserved peace for a year and given information of the marauding Bonjogis, the payments were made in due course.

In August 1865 the unhappy state of the tract of country which the Poang was supposed to protect, was brought to the notice of Government. When introducing a few months previously the new police into the hills, we had added four Government posts to the five kept up by the Poang, but it was now resolved to extend the system of connected posts which already encircled the northern part of the hills, and to take, if possible, effective steps to secure the whole of the frontier line. From November to May bands of Shindoos, Kumis, Arrungs, and other tribes east of the Kolodyne and Sungoo annually came down from the interior hills and ravaged the villages of our subjects. No attempt was ever made at self-defence. The appearance of these marauders was the signal for instant flight to the jungles.

In January 1866 the Shindoos attacked a Mrung village on this frontier half-a-day's journey from our furthest post (Chima). It was found that the Poang's guards had not gone out that season for want of arms! The Lieutenant-Governor ordered arms to be at once supplied, and sanctioned a force of 130 extra police with officers to take up the new Government posts to be established to the south.

Just at this time the Lieutenant-Governor received an account of an adventurous journey undertaken in the south-east hills by Lieutenant Lewin, the District Superintendent

"In event of the Kookies having any grievance, or in case of any dispute arising between them and the British subjects, the Kookies will refrain from taking the law into their own hands, but they will in all cases appeal to the Superintendent and abide by his decision.

"That annually, about the time of the full moon of the month of January, a meeting of the Chiefs and the Superintendent shall be held at Kassalong, at which the Chiefs shall receive such presents in money or kind as may be determined on by Government, in return for which the Kookies agree to prevent all marauding in the Hills and Plains, and to use every effort to capture offenders and maintain the peace.

"In event of the Kookies failing to act up to the provisions of this engagement it will be null and void.

"The original of this engagement, which is drawn up in English, will remain with the Superintendent, and a counterpart or copy will be furnished to the Representatives of the Kookie communities aforesaid.

"That the Kookies of the Tribe be allowed to purchase annually lbs. powder flints lbs. lead and muskets in presence of the Superintendent, or such persons as he may appoint, and in return for this the Kookies will abstain from purchasing ammunition or arms from unauthorized persons, and will give any information which may come to their knowledge concerning such illicit trade.

In ratification of the above engagement, contained in ten paragraphs, the Superintendent puts his hand and seal, and the Representatives of the Kookies communities affix their marks or signature this day of 18 .

of Chittagong. A clear idea of the extent and results of this tour will best be gained by a perusal of the Government orders thereupon which are here reproduced :—

“From this report it appears that Lieutenant Lewin, after penetrating to the sources of the Sungoo and Matamoree, crossed the boundary between Chittagong and Akyab at Modho Tong on the crest or water-shed of the dividing range of hills, and thence descended into the valley of the Peekyong, a tributary of the Koladyne, and that all his subsequent adventures occurred in the Akyab District, where, latterly, he appears to have acted with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah. The Lieutenant-Governor does not, therefore, feel called upon to notice this part of Lieutenant Lewin's proceedings ; but His Honor remarks that in this direction and for some 60 or 70 miles north of the Modho Tong Pass the Chittagong Hill Tracts are bounded by the Akyab District, and that protection from Shindoo raids must be sought for in this quarter rather from the action of the authorities in British Burmah than from any measures which can be taken by this Government.

“It is stated by Lieutenant Lewin that Colonel Phayre contemplates the appointment of a Superintendent of the Hill Tracts in Akyab, and it seems probable that this measure, if adopted, would have a salutary effect.

“A copy of Lieutenant Lewin's report and diary will be sent to the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah for his information ; and Colonel Phayre will be asked to favor the Lieutenant-Governor with an expression of his opinion as to the measures he would propose to adopt with a view to bringing into subjection the Shindoo tribes in the upper valleys of the Koladyne and its tributaries, and preventing them as well as the kindred tribes on the north and north-east of the Akyab District from penetrating into the Chittagong Hills and committing outrages on the villages among those hills.

“The police arrangements in this part of the frontier must, therefore, be regarded only as temporary and provisional, until effectual measures are adopted by the administration of British Burmah to prevent the upper valleys of the Koladyne in the Akyab District from becoming the resort of lawless Shindoos, and a base from which they can carry on their predatory operations into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Vigorous action should be taken for putting a stop to a state of things, under which an adjoining British District has come to be regarded and watched by this Government as a hostile territory. At present it is necessary to maintain establishments for the protection of the Chittagong hillmen against the attacks of other tribes, who ought rather to be, and could more effectually be, coerced and kept in order on the other side of the Arracan boundary. When proper measures have been taken to relieve the frontier police of this duty, Lieutenant Lewin's plan of substituting a local watch for the present organized police may, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be fitly considered.

“In regard to the hill tribes who inhabit the mountainous country to the north of the Akyab District and north-east of Chittagong, it should be the endeavour of the Superintendent of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to induce them to refrain from predatory habits. If with this object some understanding could be arrived at with recognized chieftains, who would undertake in return for a small annual pecuniary allowance to keep the peace on the border, to restrain their own people from making incursions into British territory, and to prevent the more distant tribes from traversing the intermediate country for such a purpose, the arrangement is one, which, if recommended by you, the Lieutenant-Governor would be disposed to adopt.

"The Superintendent should be directed to make every endeavour to ascertain the tribe to which the people concerned in the raid* on Yong Thong Roajah's village belong, the place whence they came, and the route they followed both in coming and going. It is quite clear to the Lieutenant-Governor that they must have crossed over the boundary ridge dividing the waters of the Koladyne from those of the Sungoo, and that it is only by the action of the Akyab authorities that they can be effectually reached.

"The Chief Commissioner of British Burmah will be asked to take such action as he may think practicable and proper, with a view to the punishment of the offenders and the rescue of the captives; and the Superintendent of the Hill Tracts should be desired to co-operate for this purpose with the officers of the Akyab District in any measures that may be taken under the direction of the Chief Commissioner.

"It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be established by the correspondence in this case that, under the peculiar circumstances of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the officer, who superintends the civil administration of the District, ought himself to have direct charge of the police, and that the present arrangement under which the police of the Chittagong District and of the Hill Tracts is under one District Superintendent of Police subordinate both to the Magistrate of Chittagong and to the Civil Superintendent of the Hill Tracts is essentially faulty. His Honor is, therefore, inclined to think that the best plan would be to put Lieutenant Lewin in charge of the Hill Tracts with full administrative and police powers, having his head-quarters at Chundergon, and with an Assistant exercising similar powers, whose head-quarters should be at some convenient and suitable spot on the Sungoo, more accessible to the hillmen than the sub-divisional head-quarters at Cox's Bazar."

These proposals were approved by the Government of India.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, however, reported that nothing could be done during the present season to reach the Shindoos, and indeed he deprecated any hostile movement against them in our present ignorance of their country, but stated that he had recommended the appointment of a Superintendent of Hill Tracts and the establishment of additional Police Posts †

* That mentioned above.

† The following extracts from a letter from Colonel Phayre to the Government of India will show what the Authorities of British Burmah know of the Shindoos and other tribes:—

"The subject of our relations with the various hill tribes inhabiting the country on the north and north-east of Arracan, being the District of Akyab, has for years been one of great difficulty. Those tribes are very numerous. Though all are found in the same general social condition, and all apparently of the Indo-Chinese race, their languages differ so much that they can only communicate with each other by means of a foreign tongue. The one used for that purpose is Burmese, which a few of the men in each tribe generally understand. They, for the most part, may be said to live in a state of constant warfare. A very considerable portion of the Akyab District is inhabited by these races. The principal are the Khyengs, Koomes, Kamees, Khons, and Shindoos. There are others, as Myocs, Mroongs, and Khyans, which have now lost their former position and power, so entirely that they may in this communication be disregarded.

"Of the Khyengs, Koomes, and Kamees, some clans or communities who live in the lower hills are in every respect subject to British rule. Others, though within the nominal boundary of the Akyab District, are practically independent. Among these latter are the Shindoos, regarding whom I have now more particularly to speak.

On the 9th July 1866 a raid was committed close to Khokheong, where the Poang should have had a guard but had not, in which three villages were cut up and eighty captives taken. This was an event unprecedented in the rains, and was supposed to be the work of Looshai Howlongs. Two minor raids by sections of apparently the same band were at the same time reported; one from Kwasa Khung, a village to the south-east; and the other from the Kaptai valley on the north-west. An attempt was made to intercept the raiders on their return home, but it was unsuccessful. It was at first believed that these attacks were perpetrated by, or at the instance of, Bunjogi refugees from the Poang's villages who had fled to the Looshai country of Rutton Poca to avoid the exactions of the Poang. A messenger was sent up to Rutton Poca's village and brought back information, which made it clear that the Howlongs had been the actual raiders; and that Rutton Poca was much disturbed.

"I have known all the tribes personally, except the Shindoos, for many years. The Shindoo tribe has always been spoken of as powerful, and as being much feared. They seem to extend not only for some distance within the nominal British Territory, but far beyond it. Their attacks upon the lower tribes, that is upon those residing nearer the plains, have of late years been more frequent, more bold, and more destructive than formerly. They have also been directed more against the tribes within the Chittagong District, and not against those in Arracan. I am unable to account for this change. I am not aware of any Shindoo clans who either pay tribute, or are, in the slightest degree, controlled by any British authority.

"The reason of this extraordinary state of affairs of the existence of tribes, virtually independent at our very doors, is partly the physical difficulty of travelling in the hilly country inhabited by these tribes, and partly the unhealthiness of the country, during all but about four months of the year, for all races except the hill people themselves.

"In former years I have myself been a good deal among all the hill tribes except the Shindoos. With continued intercourse, personal influence among them is readily acquired. But this intercourse must be constant, and it must be personal. If from any cause it be interrupted, the wild and fickle people soon forget their promises, and a chief of whom one may have formed good hopes, will perhaps next be heard of as heading a raid on a neighbouring tribe and killing all who are not fit to be sold as captives.

"It must be acknowledged that it is, in some measure, a reproach to the local administration that so little has been accomplished in repressing disorder and inspiring these tribes with confidence, so that outside tribes might be awed into quietude, and inside tribes be forced to respect law and order. But the fact is, that a district officer generally has not time; even if he possessed the special aptitude necessary for gaining the confidence of wild savage tribes, he has not the time necessary to be devoted to acquire the knowledge, which is absolutely necessary, before his personal influence can be brought to bear upon such people. The changes also which occur in the charge of a district necessarily increase the difficulty. In my late tour up the Koladyne River of the Akyab District in the conferences, I had been with the hill chiefs as noticed by Lieutenant Lewin in his journal. I discovered from their statements many circumstances which shewed that a separate administration for these people was essentially needful. It is also necessary to shew the chiefs and tribes who profess to acknowledge British supremacy that they are closely watched, and that while their grievances will be redressed, their faults and crimes will not be overlooked. It is likewise necessary to overawe those, principally Shindoos, who are now practically beyond the arm of authority, and who require to be impressed with the danger of provoking vengeance by their predatory incursions.

"Before proceeding to state distinctly the measures which I propose in order to carry out the above-mentioned objects, it will be proper to mention my views in regard to the punishment of the offending tribe in the case now immediately referred by the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The case is that of a Mroo village, in the hilly portion of the Chittagong District, attacked by a party of Shindoos, in which four persons were killed and thirty-four were carried away. It is with much regret that I report that, until some special agency has been provided, I see no possibility of effecting either the punishment of the offending tribe, or the rescue of the captives. The Shindoo tribe appears to be more numerous as a people than any other Indo-Chinese hill race which I know. It extends over a large tract of country. The clans are independent of each other as long as they have power to maintain independence. Their predatory expeditions appear to be organized, as indeed they frequently are, among the Koomes and Khyongs, by persons of influence, whether Chiefs or not, who collect individuals among several clans into a war party. We have not the means for gaining sufficient information to fix responsibility in the present case on any particular clan or village among the Shindoos; and to gain that information, as well as to take really effectual measures to rescue the

between his wish to keep friends with us for the profit thereof, and his unwillingness to break with his brother-in-law Yandoolah. The Lieutenant-Governor called for all the information necessary to enable Government to send a punitive expedition into the hills in the cold weather, directed the police to be raised to full sanctioned strength, and sites for posts to the south to be at once selected and occupied. The information obtained was, however, so scanty, and the position of the tribes and their strength so uncertain, while the force estimated by the local officers to be required for an expedition was so great, that the Lieutenant-Governor did not ultimately feel himself justified in proposing the enterprise to the Government of India. There was much to do in the way of strengthening our own position, and meantime the following instructions were given to the local authorities:--

"If any further dacoities or raids should be committed in the Hill Tracts by any of the wild tribes inhabiting the frontier, the marauders should be followed at once, provided there be any chance of overtaking them, and provided the local officer of police have at his disposal a sufficient force for the purpose of attacking and arresting them, and of recovering any persons or property that may be carried away. In that case the pursuers should go no further than they can clearly go with safety, and must run no risk of surprise or discomfiture. Indeed, except under special circumstances, they should not advance further than to admit of

captives, requires the very agency that is now wanting, and which I am about to propose. To attempt to punish these people at the distance they are, and in the country where they live, I know from my own past experience to be futile. To rescue the captives is a work of time.

"Before stating what I propose, I will request the attention of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to the map of the District of Akyab. It shows that more than one-half of that district consists of hilly country, which, I may add, is covered with the densest jungle. To the west is the District Chittagong, which is now the point most threatened. To the north and north-east is country similarly wild, inhabited by like tribes, nominally subject to the Burmese, but practically as independent and as little known as the tribes of Central Africa before the days of Burton, Speke, and Grant. The question is, how are we to control such tribes; how to make them sensible that those of them who are within, and adjoining British Territory, must abstain from attacks upon each other, and respect all that are British subjects?

"This must be accomplished, in the first place, by the exhibition of the power to punish, but no plan can be successful with these people which does not exhibit, resting on the basis of force, the moral influence of personal intercourse by the European Officer direct with the influential men of each tribe.

"As regards intercourse with the Shindoes and other tribes practically independent, I should recommend that the Superintendent (to be appointed to these hills) be directed to endeavour to enter into communication with them in order to discover the following points:--

"*First*.--Whether any captives now among them can be recovered by ransom or otherwise. The means of doing so peaceably might be left to the Superintendent's discretion. He might be authorized to pay reasonable sums to liberate captives.

"*Second*.--With a view to the future, what means should be taken to restrain the Shindoo and other tribes from making attacks?

"It is known that all these tribes depend mainly upon communication with the sea-coast for their supply of salt, and it may be possible by arranging to supply them regularly with that article, and taking measures to prevent their being supplied with that necessary of life except through the Superintendent, that a very strong pressure might be brought to bear upon them. This measure would probably require the co-operation of the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division. Every facility should be given for their cotton and other produce being brought to a depot at Talakmae, or elsewhere, for sale by fair barter or purchase. Powder and fire-arms should be strictly excluded. Here also the co-operation of the Chittagong authorities will be required. With these general instructions I consider that the Superintendent should be left to accomplish the great objects in view by such conciliatory means as his experience will suggest to him. If he ever considers coercive measures necessary, he should, as a general rule, apply for instructions, unless he considers an immediate example is required."

their return to their post within two days. In every case careful enquiry should be immediately made, evidence should be recorded, and all the circumstances promptly reported.

"If the local police be unable to effect an immediate pursuit, but if there still be a probability of surprizing the marauders, or of being able to retaliate upon those who may have been concerned in, or may have instigated the crime, the Deputy Commissioner may, at his discretion, follow the marauders with a sufficient body of police, but should not, as a rule, go beyond two days' march from the most advanced outpost. The same circumspection must be used in this as in the former case, and the expedition should not be undertaken without good information as to the strength of the party to be attacked, the place where they are to be found, and their means of resistance. With these precautions the plan should be to arrange quietly for a surprise; but measures of retaliation should be confined to the arrest of persons implicated in the crime or the abetment of it, and to the seizure or destruction of property belonging to them. All proceedings taken in pursuance of these instructions should be reported immediately for the information of Government."

In August of this year the Poang was relieved entirely of the duty of keeping up frontier guards, his posts being taken over by the Police. The remission of revenue (Rupees 2,600) which he had received on account of this duty was, however, allowed to continue, contingent upon his giving ready aid and co-operation in checking the inroads of savages and meeting the views of Government.

In November, Rutton Poa warned us that the Howlongs meditated another raid, and steps were immediately taken to defend the frontier; three new posts being established at Khokheong (relieving the Poang's guard), at Matamoree, and at Singopha. Reserves from other Districts were ordered up, and all our posts were put on the alert. The Howlongs did not, however, at this time come down.

In December (1866) it was reported that the Banjogis of the Poang's country, who had suffered much from the Howlongs, had sent a war party of 300 men against them, which had been beaten back and was being followed up by the Looshais in force. The people north of the Sungoo were abandoning their villages in fear of what was to follow. The Poang (or Bohmong as he now begins to be called) was ordered to explain how such an expedition left his territory without sanction, and every available Policeman was thrown across the line the Looshais might be supposed to take. Rumours soon began to pour in, that the Howlongs in three great bands were in full march for the British Districts, but no actual attack followed, and it is probable that panic had exaggerated the facts.

On the 7th December Captain Lewin held the Annual Meeting with the Chiefs. The result was not satisfactory. Eleven Chiefs had come in, six of whom left before the day of the Meeting: conduct which indicated a lamentable want of confidence in our intentions.

The Lieutenant-Governor was by these events rendered the more anxious to place the Police of the Hill Tracts on a serviceable footing, and deputed a Special Officer to examine locally and report what arrangements would best serve to secure the safety of the District. At the same time the Commissioner was called upon carefully to review the policy hitherto adopted towards the Kookie tribes, and to ascertain, if possible, why it was the measures adopted to secure tranquillity had failed of success. The utmost endeavors, it was said,

should be made to open negotiations with the Chiefs of the Howlong and Sylloo tribes, with a view to ascertain the causes of the present movement, to settle any feud or difference there may be between them and the tribes inhabiting the Hill Tracts under our jurisdiction, and to induce them to enter into engagements such as that already made with Rutton Poca, for assisting our Police in keeping order and preventing the recurrence of these attacks. Every encouragement should at the same time be given to the Chiefs in the Hill Tracts to adhere to their engagements, and to co-operate with the Police in repelling these forays and pursuing and securing the offenders.

The early part of 1867 was very much disturbed by raids and rumours of raids. Towards the close of January a marauding party appeared between the posts of Chima and Khokheong and cut up several villages, retiring as usual before they could be got at by the Police. The Sungoo Valley was the point on which the Howlongs generally at this time advanced—and in February Rutton Poca warned us again that a war party was out in that direction. Our posts were at once strengthened and patrols thrown out. No attack followed on our villages, but the Kookies passed on and attacked the Shindoos of Arracan. A band of 500 Howlongs was about this time induced by Rutton Poca to turn back when *en route* for British territory, and to divert their attack to Hill Tipperah. For this service Rutton Poca received Rupees 500 reward. The raid on Hill Tipperah was also frustrated, it is not very clear how.

In March 1867, Captain Bowie, the Officer who had been specially deputed to report upon the Police of the Hill Tracts, submitted the result of his investigations. He proposed to throw back to the eastward the line of posts for the purpose of covering the Sumbhooting and Sungoo Valleys—to mass the force in three main posts of fifty men each with connecting posts of twenty men each; a reserve of 100 men being stationed at the Deputy Commissioner's Head-Quarters—that a road traversable for elephants should be made from post to post along the whole line;—and that various subsidiary arrangements, calculated to improve the efficiency of the force, should be carried out. These suggestions were generally adopted. Myamee, Kassalong, and Kungo Tong were made the principal stations, while the intermediate out-posts were placed at Kurkuria, Saichul, Pharoo, Plumdoo, and Chima. Besides these, there were Executive Police posted at Rumghur, Manikserrai, Golabaree, Rungamattee, and Pola Khéejee. If the names above given are traced out on the map, a good idea will be formed of our scheme of frontier defence. The line of posts does not go further south because the Arracan Hill Tracts are now under a British Officer whose duty it is to prevent raids from that quarter.

In December 1867 the friendly Chiefs of the Rutton Poca clan held their Annual Meeting with the Deputy Commissioner at Kassalong. This was a most successful gathering. Seventeen Chiefs and Deputies attended, and what was more encouraging, both the Howlong and Sylloo clans sent in before the Meeting to make offers of friendship and alliance with the British Authorities. After the Meeting, Captain Lewin set out for Rutton Poca's village to meet the Howlongs. Arriving there, he succeeded, after some negotiation, in exacting a solemn oath of friendship, which was ratified by sacrifice and feasting, and in which fourteen Chiefs or their representatives joined: lump sums of money were given as presents to each Chief, and it was settled that these should be in lieu of all annual payments. Early in

February eleven Chiefs of the Syloo Clan sent representatives to Kassalong with presents, and entered into similar arrangements. Immediately on the conclusion of these negotiations, the Kookies of the Syloo and Howlong Tribes flocked in great numbers to our bazars from which, for many months, they had been conspicuously absent. At the end of March Captain Lewin went to meet the Syloo Chiefs near their own hills to ratify the friendship by oaths and sacrifice as in the Howlong case. The Lieutenant-Governor approved of all that had been done, and directed the establishment of an annual fair, to which all the Hill Tribes should be freely invited to come.

The close of January 1869 was marked by a series of raids and an attack on the China Out-post, in which the Shindoos* are supposed to have been concerned. Full information has not yet been received: but the Hill Police has been materially reinforced.

A careful consideration of the few preceding pages seems to lead to the following conclusions:—The peace of our Hill Tracts depends mainly upon our relations with the Shindoos in the south-east and south, and with the Looshais in the north. Of the Shindoos we know very little, and it seems to fall to the lot of the Officer in charge of the Hill Tracts of Arracan to deal with them rather than to us. Pending an improvement in our communications with and influence over this tribe, our only resource appears to be to increase the number of our Police posts in that part of the hills, and to see that a clear connecting path is kept open between them. Something, too, might be done, as has often before been suggested, to encourage a system of self-defence among the villages of the Bunjogis and others who cultivate in those quarters.

But the question of most interest and importance to us, is the securing the tranquillity of our northern boundary. The regulation districts of Chittagong and Tipperah are there open to attack. Tipperah we have once seen devastated by a horde of savages, and in Chittagong Kookie panics are of yearly occurrence. The problem calls the more loudly for solution, when we remember that precisely the same circumstances repeat themselves on the north of the Looshai country, where Sylhet and Cachar are exposed to the ravages of the same tribe under different leaders. In each case, too, we see the Native State of Tipperah by its weakness, misgovernment, and helplessness, provoking attack and endangering the safety of our neighbouring districts. Of what goes on in Hill Tipperah we have no cognizance. Vague rumours reach us from time to time of raids on the Rajah's villages by the wild Kookies, and of raids on the Kookie Tribes by the Rajah's people. But it is only when our frontier line is crossed by some fugitive with a war party of savages in hot pursuit, or when villages, the position of which as to boundary is doubtful, are burnt and plundered, that we awake to the fact that the Hill State is a source of danger to us, and find that we are powerless to protect our subjects or arrest the offenders.

Only last year there was an instance of the unsatisfactory way in which occurrences in the hills reach our ears. In February (1868), a party of armed men, passing one of our Sylhet guard posts, were stopped and questioned. They turned out to be a lot of the Rajah's sepoy's going to reinforce one of his guard posts in Kailasher which had been attacked by Kookies. At the same time numbers of Tipperah cultivators came pouring from the hills in panic, having deserted their jooms, "as the Kookies were out and raiding in the hills." The thing subsided; nothing definite was ascertained; but this year we have the Kookies attacking villages in Sylhet and tea gardens in Cachar.

* Further information makes this point doubtful.

The extent of the Rajah's authority over the tribes in the interior we do not know. Of his mode of dealing with them we have no certain information. The Looshais are probably entirely independent. Certain clans, like that of Mischoey Looce, whom we find at times allied with the Looshais, are nominally at any rate subject to him. But he can neither protect us from the attacks of his subjects nor help us to control the tribes outside his territory. What then ought we to do in this state of things? Friendly communications with the Looshai Chiefs have been more than once established. They have felt our power, too, in a fitful way both north and south of their central site. Some more permanent influence ought now perhaps to be established. North of the waterpent between Cachar and Chittagong we have Sookpilal, Vompilal and Vagnolien. South of it we have the Howlongs, Sylos, and Rutton Poea. With all of these we have had a certain amount of amicable intercourse. But Rutton Poea is the only Chief who for years has been consistently friendly.

The Looshai country appears to stand to Cachar and Chittagong in precisely the same position as the Cossyah Hills stood to Sylhet and Assam. History is now repeating itself on another frontier. The Cossyah Hills were converted to a peaceful district by one great military expedition, followed by the construction of a road right across the hills and the location of a European Officer in their midst. Into the Looshai country an expedition on a large scale has now proceeded: but it will, in all likelihood, effect but little permanent good, if it is not followed by the construction of a good bridle road from Silchar to Kassalong, and the appointment of a special Officer to the Looshai Hill Districts. On the peaks of the central range a station can no doubt be formed, as healthy as Tura in the Garrow Hills and as accessible as Samoogoodting. For years the frontier of Manipore has been ravaged by these Looshais. An Officer in the hills would protect Manipore. A cross road from his station to Agurtollah would enable him to assist, by advice and direction, the Rajah of Tipperah, and secure the wretched inhabitants of the Kookie marches from the fear of attack by the interior tribes.

It appears certain that we cannot longer allow the Tipperah Rajah to remain uncontrolled. The absolute powers of life and death, of war and peace, which this petty Chieftain wields, are more absolute than those of the great feudatories of our Indian Empire. A gross outrage committed in the dominions of Holkar or Seindia would be reported by the Resident to Government, and the grave remonstrance or effectual intervention of the Paramount Power would probably follow. But no control is exercised over the Tipperah Chief, although on the plains he is a British subject and a Zemindar. He may hale recusant Kookies from their villages and hack them to pieces with dâos, as the Tipperahs, truly or falsely, say he does, but no one interferes. Why have so many thousands of his people emigrated from their homes into our Hill Tracts,* if there is nothing rotten in their parent State? If a Superintendent is appointed to the Looshai Hills, then surely the Rajah's judicial powers should be clearly defined, reduced perhaps to the level of those held by the Tributary Chiefs in the Cuttack Mehals, more heinous cases being referred to the Superintendent. We should see that Courts of Justice are established in the hills, and order and good government set up there, and by bringing prosperity and peace to the Rajah's dominions we shall secure for ourselves—both north and south—a quiet border.

* For the fact of this very extensive immigration, see Captain Lewin's, *Hill Tracts and the Dwellers Therein*.

In an early part of this memorandum, the state of Hill Tipperah, during the late Rajah's time, has been depicted. Its condition, under the present Rajah, will be seen from the following extracts from a Report made by the Magistrate of Tipperah in the end of 1868:—

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Roobakaree, forwarding a petition from the Rajah, in which he states that the disturbances in the hills have been connived at, and are being fostered, by his brothers, Neelkishen and Kala Thakoor, &c., &c.

"The Rajah, while making, in my opinion, groundless charges against his brothers, and calling on you for interference, has, I observe, been most careful to conceal all the circumstances attendant on the outbreak, and the fact that it originated between his own Tax Collectors and Ryots.

"The late demand of rent, and the manner in which the Rajah has set about the collection of it, *viz.*, at the point of the bayonet, is the real, and, I believe, the only reason for the combination among the Tipperahs, and the threatening attitude which some of them have assumed.

"The persons sent out by the Rajah to collect rents were armed like regular Sepoys (with our own muskets and bayonets supplied by Government two years ago); as a natural consequence of sending out a number of armed ruffians under no command or discipline whatever, an affray very soon occurred, in which three of the Rajah's men were wounded by spears, and two of the Jametyas shot; the heads of these were cut off, and are now hanging up *in terrorem* at Agurtollah.

"Of course these murders, for I can call them nothing else, since the Rajah's people appear to have been the aggressors, have very much irritated the Tipperahs.

"I am convinced that neither Neelkishen nor Kala Thakoor have had any hand in this rising. The Rajah's conduct in sending out a number of armed ruffians to collect rent, and in afterwards cutting off and hanging up the heads of the murdered men, instead of holding a strict and dispassionate enquiry into the merits of the affray, were quite sufficient to account for the disturbances in the first instance, and the after show of hostility and combination against him, without any connivance or assistance on the part of his brothers, however hostile their own feelings might be.

"Judging from the facts of the case, and the general tenor of the petition in which all mention of the collection of rents is most disingenuously omitted, it appears to me that the Rajah has written to you with the sole object of throwing all the blame and responsibility of the disturbance on his brothers, fearful of the censure and displeasure of Government should the true state of matters come to the knowledge of the authorities.

"The disturbances in the Hills have now occurred in one form or another for several years past, and no proper remedy has as yet been applied to this constantly-recurring evil. I am of opinion, therefore, that the matter should be brought to the serious notice of Government, in order that efficient measures should be taken to prevent like occurrences for the future.

"In requesting you to forward this matter to Government, I would respectfully submit, in the first place, that as the Rajah enjoys his title under the protection of the British

Government, and occupies an important position on our Eastern Frontier, it is our duty to dictate to him some sound policy, and to compel him to abstain from all barbarous and summary proceedings calculated to render our Frontier insecure, and to disturb the peace and tranquillity of all British subjects living in the Eastern portions of this district.

"It appears from enquiries which I have held, that since the removal of the Gooroo from power no method or arrangement of any kind exists in the administration at Agurtollah, and that the Rajah, leaving all matters in the hands of a number of irresponsible and rapacious dependents, exercises no supervision whatever over his own affairs.

"However faulty and short-sighted the policy of the Gooroo may have been, he was at least supreme, and the check he exercised over the crowds of Thakoors* and dependents was so far salutary and preferable to the present state of affairs, when each Thakoor, as I am informed, issues orders on his own account, and the object of each is to enrich himself as far as possible.

"In conclusion, I would draw the earnest attention of Government to the present very unsatisfactory and dangerous state of affairs in our frontier. The Jametya Tipperahs (connected by blood with the Kookies) have been ruthlessly and unjustly irritated, the brothers of the Rajah have been harshly treated, and are unprovided for, while confusion and anarchy exist at Agurtollah, and the Rajah is utterly helpless to control his immediate dependants, or to defend himself in the event of a combined revolt.

"Should matters be allowed to continue in their present course, I have every reason to believe that the Jametyas will take means to verify the current rumours by calling in the Kookies and other wild tribes to their aid; that the insurgents will not be wanting in leaders and powerful adherents; and that the whole of our frontier will be a scene of rebellion and bloodshed during the ensuing cold season."

These predictions were not altogether verified, but no sovereign remedy has yet been applied to the evils so graphically described. Time may have lessened many of them. But the main features of the picture are unchanged. Good advice to be accepted by a petty Indian Potentate must be emphasized distinctly by the accents of command.

Our survey of the political history of the North-East Frontier of Bengal is now complete.

Conclusion.

We have seen that on the north of Kamroop and Durrung our relations with the tribes inhabiting the Himalayan ranges have for many years been peaceful and satisfactory. They have been so because we honestly respected the rights, fancied or real, which the hillmen possessed in the soil, and because we made use of our strength only to repress disorder and not to exterminate or repel. In Luckimpore we have seen an industrious race of hillmen steadily advancing as pioneers of cultivation into the plains, and bidding fair to become the principal occupants of vast tracts of fertile territory. To the extreme north-east we have been called upon to encounter uncouth races of warlike habits, to whom the spectacle of a strong Government in Assam, undisturbed by invasion, courteous and kindly to strangers, is a standing moral lesson as novel as it is telling. Quick to punish outrage, eager to

* Thakoors, a title used for Members of the Blood-royal in many Native States.

encourage trade, the English at Suddya are, to the Abors and Mishmis, representatives of a civilization by which they must in due time be absorbed, and which at present they have no cause either to despise or dread.

The history of our intercourse with the Angamis and Garrows is a tale of often repeated outrage on the one side, and long suffering forbearance on the other. Succeeding on the Naga Frontier to an effete Native Government, unable to protect its subjects, far less to coerce its enemies, it was the work of time to convince the mountaineers that the murder of a Bengali ploughman was more to the British Government than frontier dues,—the blood of a Cachari swineherd, a thing that cried for vengeance. But never, in the most troubled days of our relations with the Nagas, did the Government deliberately, or even indirectly, set before it a policy of reprisal. The ever reiterated command to frontier Officers and Commandants was this:—"Conciliate if you can these savages. Be persistent in demanding surrender of murderers, but endeavour so to approach the tribes, that a basis may be opened for friendly intercourse in the future." The majority of the so-called military expeditions into the Angami Hills were designed, not to burn villages, destroy crops, and slay men, but to bring our Officers with safety into and out of a position in which they could personally negotiate with the Angami Chiefs. And when at length it was thought that all our efforts had been in vain, and outrage heaped on outrage had culminated in Bhogchand's murder, after the one short sharp lesson of punishment, the policy adopted, not wisely perhaps but in all sincerity, was a policy of absolute non-interference—a withdrawal from all intimate relations with incorrigible savages. They might attend our markets, if they came in peace, but we would not enter their hills or intrude on their quarrels. Such moderation was of course misunderstood. It was too thoroughly English to be appreciated by ignorant Nagas. It would be viewed with astonishment by more polished nations.

It failed as a policy—signally failed. Fate seems determined to prove that there shall be no rest for the English in India till they stand forth as the governors or advisers of each tribe and people in the land. As regards the Nagas, this fact, doubtfully at times foreseen,—this policy, dimly now and again foreshadowed,—was grasped firmly and carried forward persistently by the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Direct control, personal influence, conciliatory intercourse,—supported at the same time by adequate strength,—these were the measures Sir Cecil Beadon never ceased to advocate as the only possibly successful policy in dealing with hill tribes. Among the Angamis this system has hitherto promised well; and though it is too much to hope that all our difficulties are over, there is still sufficient encouragement to Government to persevere. There is sufficient precedent to warrant such attempts elsewhere.

It would be a mistake to suppose that to inflict condign punishment for exceptionally gross outrages is any departure from a general policy of conciliation. To submit to outrage is not to conciliate, but to provoke to further attack. But punishment has never, with the sanction of Government, taken the form of mere reprisal. Government has never sent out raiding parties to burn indiscriminately Naga villages. Its first aim has always been to discover the actual parties concerned in the raids on British Territory, and then it has endeavoured to confine the punishment to those so offending. The policy of a Government is not to be learned from any single incident in its history. It must be viewed as a whole in the light of its acknowledged aims and motives.

Among the Garrows the task of management was not less difficult than it had been among the Nagas. We found them exasperated by years of conflict with the great Choudries of the plains; eager to trade but resentful of injury; not very apt to discriminate between the gripping chicanery of the Bengali tradesman, and the dealings of that Government whose Police kept order in the marts. The low-land villages had for generations supplied them with slaves and heads—the spoil of their bow and spear; for without these the souls of their heroes passed unhonored away on the long journey to Mount Chikmung, from which there is no return. To check the custom of raiding on the occasion of the death of a Chief, was to change the cardinal doctrine of a religion, and tamper with the dearest feelings of a Garrow's heart. The central fastnesses of these hills too were more impenetrable, and their bordering jungles supposed to be more deadly than those of any other such tract of country. No British troops had marched across, no road had ever been carried through them; and the people themselves were held to be more uncouth and fierce than any other of our border tribes. But here, too, the Lieutenant-Governor held that a British Officer living in their midst, able to repress outrage, and ready to redress complaints, would do more to secure the safety of the plains than any number of stockaded posts and armed patrols.

It is noteworthy, moreover, that the one occasion of all others upon which the Bengal Government has set aside all considerations of seniority, all questions of Service, has been when it has had to select Officers for these Hill Tract Districts. The best man for the work has invariably been set thereto.

In the Garrow Hills there is now a fair resemblance of order. Raids have ceased. Feuds are vanishing. And the dead Chieftain sets out on his last journey, with store of food and weapons by his side, but with his faithful dog as his sole companion. We have scotched a superstition, and shall in due time kill it.

The Cossyabs who might, from their warlike character and tribal organisation, have given us more trouble than any other hill people have, as we have seen, been for years the most peaceable of our subjects.

In the Jynteah Hills the Sintongs have received that attention which their peculiar system of village administration demands. The Jynteah Hills are now a tranquil Sub-Division.

In North Cachar we see large communities of hillmen living as Government ryots, paying cheerfully the trivial dues demanded from them, and under the surveillance of only a small Police post. There is every probability, indeed, that even this will be removed, and the people left to the control of their own headmen under the direct supervision of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

When we turn to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, we find ourselves face to face with a state of things which has no parallel elsewhere in Bengal. It must not be forgotten that, as regards the hills within our own acknowledged boundary, our administration has been as successful here as it has been elsewhere. The development of prosperity among the subjects of the Kalindee Rance, the Mán Rajah, and the Bôhmong, is as truly due to the British Government as is the flourishing condition of any district on the plains. It is on the outer verge

of our own Hill Tracts that we come upon the disturbing element that seems at times to turn to folly the wisdom of our rule. Tribes, over whom we can exercise no control, come surging up against our out-posts from the unknown mountains of Burmah and from valleys yet unsurveyed. Of the causes that press them forward we know nothing. New names crop up. A raid by savages of a strange fashion of hair tells us a tribal change has taken place across our frontier, and we have nothing for it but to strengthen our out-posts, increase our patrols, and watch to see what the years may bring forth. On the north, within our own nominal territory, we have still the anomalous tract of the Looshai Hills; and it is open to us either to repudiate it politically, or to enter in and dwell there. One way or other the decision must ere long be made.

This Memorandum has set forth historically, briefly, and, it is believed, correctly, the leading facts regarding the relations of the Bengal Government with the hill tribes on its North-East Frontier. That there has been a decided policy towards those tribes must be evident. The policy may have varied as times and Governments have changed, but in its broad aspects it has never been aught else than a policy of conciliation.

NOTE A.

In the foregoing memorandum the policy of direct management adopted towards certain of our North-East Frontier tribes has been set forth and approved. The policy of non-interference described at pages 17 and 18 has, however, met with such high support that it seems proper to give, in the words of its advocates, the grounds and conclusions on which it is based. The following is Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 20th February 1851.

"Angami Nagas.—I concur in the conclusion to which the Hon'ble the President in Council has come respecting the relations to be maintained with the Angami Nagas, and consider that His Honor has judged wisely in directing the withdrawal of the force which has been sent, and of the post which has been established in advance in that country."

"I dissent entirely from the policy which is recommended of what is called obtaining a control, that is to say, of taking possession of these hills, and of establishing our sovereignty over their savage inhabitants. Our possession could bring no profit to us, and would be as costly to us as it would be unproductive. The only advantage which is expected from our having possession of the country by those who advocate the measure, is the termination of the plundering inroads which the tribes now make from the hills on our subjects at the foot of them. But this advantage may more easily, more cheaply, and more justly be obtained by refraining from all seizure of the territory of these Nagas, and by confining ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier."

"I cannot, for a moment, admit that the establishment of such a line of frontier defence is impracticable. Major Jenkins describes the troops who compose the Militia and the Police as active, bold, and hardy. With such materials as these, there can be no impossibility, nor even difficulty, in establishing effective lines of frontier defence, if the plan is formed by Officers of capacity, and executed by Officers of spirit and judgment. This opinion is not given at random. The peace and security preserved on other portions of the frontier of this Empire, where the extent is greater and the neighbouring tribes far more formidable, corroborate the opinion I have given."

"As it is impolitic to contemplate the permanent possession of these hills, so it seems to me impolitic to sanction a temporary occupation of them. We have given our aid to the friendly tribe and replaced them in their villages. We have destroyed the military works and have "broken and dispirited" their enemies. I can see, therefore, no injustice or impropriety in leaving that tribe to maintain the ground which is now its own."

"Our withdrawal now, under the circumstances above described, when our power has been vindicated, our enemies dispersed and our friends re-established, can be liable to no misrepresentation, and can be attributed to no motive but the real one, namely, our desire to shew that we have no wish for territorial aggrandizement, and no designs on the independence of the Naga tribes."

"And as there is, in my judgment, no good reason against our withdrawing, so there are good reasons why we should withdraw."

"The position of the European Officer and of the troops during last season appeared to me far from satisfactory. I should be very reluctant to continue that state of things in another season. The troops so placed are isolated; they are dependent, as appears from Major Jenkins' letter to Lieutenant Vincent, on the Naga tribes for their food, and for the carriage of supplies of every description; while Major Jenkins evidently has no great confidence that even the friendly tribe, for which we are doing all this, can be relied upon securely for supplying the food of the force which is fighting its battles."

"For these reasons I think that the advanced post should be withdrawn now, at the time of our success, and when we have executed all we threatened. Hereafter we should confine ourselves to our own ground; protect it as it can and must be protected; not meddle in the feuds or fights of these savages; encourage trade with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; and rigidly exclude them from all communication either to sell what they have got, or to buy what they want, if they should become turbulent or troublesome."

"These are the measures which are calculated to allay their natural fears of our aggression upon them, and to repel their aggression on our people. These will make them feel our power both to repel their attacks and to exclude them from advantages they desire, far better, at less cost, and with more justice, than by annexing their country openly by a declaration, or virtually by a partial occupation."

"With respect to the share the State of Manipore has borne in these transactions, I must observe, that the reasoning by which Major Jenkins is led to assume that Manipore has been abetting the Nagas is loose in the extreme."

"If, however, better proof of the fact be shown, and the complicity of Manipore, either recently or hereafter, shall be satisfactorily established, there can be no difficulty in dealing with it."

"In such case it would be expedient to remind the Rajah of Manipore that the existence of his State depends on a word from the Government of India; that it will not suffer his subjects, either openly or secretly, to aid and abet the designs of the enemies of this Government; and that if he does not at once control his subjects and prevent their recurrence to any unfriendly acts, the word on which the existence of his State depends will be spoken, and its existence will be put an end to."

"The increase of Police which is asked should be granted, and Major Jenkins should be desired to submit his scheme of frontier posts when it is prepared, together with a map showing its disposition."

"In conclusion I would observe that I have seen nothing in these papers to change the unfavorable opinion I expressed of the conduct of affairs relative to the Angami Nagas, as it appeared in the documents previously transmitted to me."

The following extracts from the correspondence of 1854-55 will show how the non-interference policy was supported at a later date. The Governor General's Agent had reported that the Muniorees had invaded the hills and sacked the Angami village of Mozomah which had always been well disposed to us. He urged upon Government the policy of checking such incursions. The Governor General in Council wrote on 29th April 1854:—

"His Lordship in Council is of opinion that the British Government is not authorized to demand of the Government of Muniore that it shall not invade the Angami country in future, except in communication with our Political Agent or yourself; the Angami country, generally at least, not being affirmed to be under the protection of the British Government."

"But before coming to a conclusion upon the particular case of invasion brought to notice by Colonel Jenkins, the Governor General in Council would wish to be more particularly informed of the relation in which the village of Mozomah, and the tract of Angami country in which it is, stand towards the British Government. Colonel Jenkins says, that the Muniore Government knows the tract of Angami country in question 'to be so far under our protection that the summit of the ridge of hills was declared the boundary between their country and ours.' If this expression is to be understood literally, the tract in question is our country, but this seems hardly reconcilable with other parts of the correspondence."

"His Lordship in Council begs that Colonel Jenkins may be called upon to explain fully all the circumstances connected with the declaration of boundary to which he alludes; and to say distinctly whether he considers the Angami tract in question to be British territory or not, or to be under British protection or not; and in any case to state the grounds of his opinion."

The Agent, upon receipt of this, reported on 5th June as follows:—

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1148 of the 8th ultimo, calling upon me to state the circumstances connected with the declaration of boundary between Muniore and Assam, and to state distinctly whether I consider the Angami tract in question to be British territory or not."

"With regard to the boundary, I beg to say that in Captain Bigge's report No. 28 of the 7th June 1841, forwarded to Government with my letter No. 89 of the 19th of that month, that Officer, adverting to the unsatisfactory state of the boundary as generally acknowledged, proposed that, during the next deputation of an Officer from Assam, the Political Agent at Muniore should be directed to join the expedition for the purpose of laying down the boundary to be agreed on."

"Captain Bigge mentions that the existing boundary was the great central ridge or waterpent as laid down by Captain Pemberton as 'the generally received line of boundary separating Assam from Manipore' and as the established boundary; this line was so displayed in Captain Pemberton's map of the North-East Frontier, and Captain Pemberton's map of his survey of Manipore extends to this ridge, and comprises all the Naga country north of Manipore, which was in obedience to that Government when Captain Pemberton, Captain Gordon, and myself crossed from Manipore to Assam in 1831-32."

"This map does not include a single village of the Angami Nagas, who were at that time entirely independent of the Maniporees, and are really so to this day, although, since that time, their hills have been several times invaded by the Maniporees."

"Captain Bigge's proposition was approved of by the Governor General in Council in Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter No. 1929 of the 19th July 1841, and authority was conveyed in the 7th paragraph of that letter for Captain Bigge to define a boundary in concert with the Political Agent at Manipore."

"And the boundary so adjusted was subsequently confirmed by the Hon'ble the President in Council in Mr. Secretary Bushby's letter No. 479* of the 20th July 1842. In the joint letter of Captain Gordon and Bigge, annexed to Captain Bigge's letter of the 3rd January 1842 it is distinctly stated that the boundary line there defined separates all the Angami country from the Naga clans† in obedience to Manipore, and that this latter Government exercised no control or authority north of that line, though an allusion is made in a separate paragraph to the claims of the Manipore Government on the grounds 'of priority of discovery.' "†

* See my letter No. 64 of 17th June 1842, forwarding Lieutenant Bigge's letter Nos. 57 and 3 of 3rd January and 27th February, and 10th and 17th March 1842.

† These clans are generally called "Kutika" Nagas.

"The greater part of the country could be shown to have been in subjection to the Cacharee Rajahs, who were apparently driven out of it by the Angamis, — and the Kutika Nagas, the original inhabitants, to have been destroyed by that turbulent and powerful tribe."

"I am not aware what communications were made to the Political Agent at Manipore regarding the observance of that line of boundary; but I presume that Government was duly informed of the orders of our Government by the Political Agent."

"With regard to the subject of the Angami Nagas being under the protection of the British Government, I beg to say that in the 5th paragraph of Mr. Maddock's letter above quoted, a transcript of which I have the honor to annex in the margin, His Lordship in Council was pleased to approve of the suggestions of taking verbal engagements from the Angami clans of submission to the British Government, and, with a view to show that they were in submission to the Government, His Lordship deemed it expedient that, on the first favorable opportunity

Para. 5— "With the Angami Nagas in like manner His Lordship in Council would be satisfied that verbal engagements should be taken from them of submission to the British Government, and, although Lieutenant Bigge describes them as too poor to pay tribute, it appears expedient that some acknowledgment, however trifling, or however rarely made, should be required to show their submission to the Government. If you consider it imprudent at the present moment to insist upon these proofs of the fidelity of the Angami Nagas, you will bear in mind the importance attached by Government to putting our relations with them on this footing on the first favorable opportunity; for, it appears to the Governor General in Council, that the only method by which we can expect to maintain permanent peace and tranquillity among these tribes, and to introduce that degree of prosperity and civilization of which the country they inhabit is eminently capable, will be found in the introduction of our own protective authority, and by increasing their confidence in our good will towards them, and the certainty of our protecting them against aggressions of their neighbours."

we should insist on their paying us some trifling acknowledgment, in the way of tribute, as the proof of their fidelity."

"Acting up to these instructions, an Officer would have been detached the next season, and Mr. Grange had commenced his march towards the Angami hills for the purpose of receiving the submission of the Angami Chiefs, but the death of that gentleman on the road, and the removal of Captain Bigge, left Captain Gordon without an assistant, and he was therefore unable to carry out the views of Government by a personal expedition to the hills; but he called upon the Chiefs to attend him at Nowgong, and his summons was obeyed by the Chiefs of Konomah and Mozomah, who entered into agreements for themselves and 48 dependent villages to pay a tribute to Government and to refer their feuds to our Officers' adjudication."

"This result was reported to Government in my letter to Mr. Secretary Bashby, No. 26 of the 19th March 1843, and in Mr. Secretary Davidson's letter No. 192 of the 12th of April following was conveyed the expression of the entire satisfaction and approval of His Honor the President in Council in regard to those proceedings."

"These agreements were, indeed, repudiated by the leading clan of the Konomah men on Mr. Wood's deputation to the hills in the following year, when Mr. Wood went up to the hills for the purpose of assembling the Chiefs and receiving their offerings as an acknowledgment of the supremacy of our Government; but a part of that village all along remained faithful to their agreements, and many of the Chiefs of inferior villages did wait upon Mr. Wood with their presents."

"Our relations with the Angami Nagas were for the next two or three years interrupted by their outrages upon traders and villages within our territory and within that of Manipore, and also by their constant attacks on each other; but the instructions of Government, to endeavour to conciliate the Nagas and engage them to acknowledge submission to our Government, were always steadily kept in view by our Officers; and during Captain Butler's expedition of 1846-47 that Officer received the submission of the most powerful villages in

* See Captain Butler's report No. 2 of the 10th February 1847, forwarded to Government with my letter No. 16 of the 25th March 1847.

the Angami hills, paying in their tribute and entering into solemn engagements of future good conduct and fealty to the British Government."

"It was on this occasion, at the urgent solicitation of the Nagas, that Captain Butler established a Military and Police post on the hills at Samoogoodting, under the superintendence of Bhog Chund Darogah."

"The subsequent murder of this Officer in July 1849 brought about the military expeditions of 1850-51, to which I need not advert further than to notice that they led to the entire withdrawal of our troops, and to the orders of Government against any further interference with the internal feuds of the Angami Nagas."

"The death of Bhog Chund arose out of the injudicious management by him of a quarrel between two clans of the same village, and could not, I conceive, be attributed to any defiance of our supremacy; but there was reason to suppose, from subsequent enquiry, that Bhog

Chund had made himself disliked by many of the Nagas, and had abused his authority. Notwithstanding this result of his superintendence of the hills, the experiment of placing an Officer in the Naga hills had, I think, been so far successful that it led to a greatly increased intercourse with these Nagas, which has been going on increasing to this day. They have ever since been visiting our stations on the plains in large numbers for the purpose of traffic, and they have constantly sought opportunities of making themselves acquainted with the Assamese dialect. Parties of young men having resided here at Nowgong and Goomye Gomo for months together for the purpose of learning to read and write, and it appears to me that our connection with these Angami clans cannot now by any means be dissolved."

"The Government may prevent our troops from ever again occupying their hills, but the same feuds with, or outrages upon our villages, which first led us to become acquainted with the Angamis, have been repeated lately, and cannot possibly be prevented by any cordon of troops, and I feel persuaded that no series of punishment, however severe, will prevent the recurrence of similar barbarous atrocities, unless the country is really and fully annexed."

"Our daily increasing acquaintance with the habits and feelings of these Nagas leads me to believe that almost all the outrages on our villages have originated with blood feuds,

† Even amongst tribes comparatively civilized, as among the Circassians to this day. which, as with all rude and uncivilized peoples in all parts of the

world, they consider it their most sacred duty to prosecute and revenge by murder, and it is not practicable for them to forego this duty, nor to forgive any injuries, except through the mediation and adjudication of a third and superior power."

"From time to time every Angami village has sought our protection and offered to pay regular rents, and there is every reason for supposing that all the clans are unanimous in sincerely desiring this arrangement as their only chance of bringing to an end the state of extreme disturbance and hostility which prevails throughout their country; although, whilst they do so, every one may entertain the idea that he would still be able to follow up his own individual quarrels. It seems to me that it is only a change of religion, either by their becoming Huadoos or Christians, that can effect an alteration in the religious regard with which they are now impelled."

"I do not conceive that the orders of the Government, not to interfere with the internal feuds of the Angami Nagas, of which I am reminded in your letter No. 1191 of the 17th inst., which have been strictly adhered to, can

be said to have dissolved our connection with these Nagas; at least they have not so understood them, and from their physical position, their habits and wants, their connection must be continued, and the only question to be considered, in my opinion, is whether this connection is to remain in its present unsatisfactory state, or whether it can be improved for the benefit of both parties."

"To this subject, one of great importance, with reference to the immense tract of country now rendered useless by the inroads of the Angamis, I shall have to advert shortly, and for the present I trust His Honor the Deputy Governor will believe that I can

have no possible object in submitting my humble opinions to the Government but to secure the tranquillity and amelioration of the country entrusted to my charge.

The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir F. Halliday) replied to this by the following orders (dated 29th November):—

"You have explained in your letter No. 49, dated the 5th of June, that the boundary which you spoke of in your previous letter No. 27 of the 24th March, regarding which the Supreme Government required an explanation, was a line adopted by Captain Pemberton and the Political Agent at Manipore many years back as the boundary of the Manipore territory, and in paragraph 7 of the same letter you have referred to certain orders of the Supreme Government in 1841 as affording warrant for speaking of the Angami Nagas as being 'under our protection,' regarding which expression the Supreme Government also required explanation."

"With reference to your explanations on these points, and to the opinions which you have now expressed, the Lieutenant-Governor has referred to much of the previous correspondence regarding the Angami Nagas, and has more especially perused with attention the correspondence which passed between yourself and the Supreme Government in 1850 and 1851."

"The Lieutenant-Governor finds that a very distinct line of policy was prescribed by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council in 1851. The attempt to obtain control, or to establish sovereignty over the inhabitants of the Naga hills, was decidedly negatived, and you were informed that your efforts should be confined to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier, all interference with the internal quarrels of the Naga tribes being especially avoided. Nothing appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to have since taken place, which should induce the Government to reverse the policy which was thus declared in 1851."

"You express, it is true, a strong conviction that it is not possible to maintain the position towards these tribes which the Government desires to maintain, and at the same time to prevent them from making incursions upon our subjects. But the Lieutenant-Governor cannot admit that there is at present evidence of any real and earnest endeavour having been made to establish, with respect to the Naga tribes, the policy which the Government has dictated. He does not gather from the correspondence which has been before him what special measures have been adopted, and what pains have been taken to explain to the Naga Chiefs the position which we desire to hold towards them, as indicated by the orders given to you in 1851. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion your personal action and influence should have been brought to bear in this matter, for there can hardly have been, during the last few years, any duty devolving upon the office which you hold more important than the adjustment of our relations with the wild and hardy tribes who border upon our Eastern Frontier. And in saying this, the Lieutenant-Governor does not desire to conceal that, as at present informed he is not able to feel satisfied that this part of your duty has received that share of your personal interest and attention which its great importance assuredly demanded. He doubts whether it has not been left too much to the guidance of junior Officers of the agency, whose energy and zeal, however great and however praiseworthy, do

not always guarantee a scrupulous observance of the caution and reserve, though at the same time perfectly conciliatory attitude which it has been the object of the Government to maintain towards the tribes in question.

Colonel Jenkins replied:—

I regret to perceive that I have incurred the censure of His Honor, for I am not conscious of having in any way neglected to explain and carry out the orders of the Most Noble the Governor General as declared in 1851.

Since that time both Major Butler and myself, and Lieutenant Vincent, have been in constant communication with nearly all the clans of Angamis, and we have availed ourselves of nearly every occasion of meeting them to explain the policy the Government had determined to adopt towards them. With Major Butler and myself parties of Naga lads or rather men have been residing for a year at a time, trying to pick up familiar acquaintance with the Assamese language, and these Nagas, and their relatives who have come to visit them, have been in unreserved and daily personal communication with us, and they have been informed by and appeared to understand fully, the measures that had been dictated by the Government, though they have never ceased to regret them, as has been reported to the Government from time to time. To show the interest that our Officers have always taken in these Nagas, I beg to mention that two parties have been taken to Calcutta by Major Butler and Lieutenant Vincent, and some of the Mozomab people, who had attached themselves to Lieutenant Vincent, are still with that Officer, and they have been diligently taught under his superintendence to read and write Assamese. A party in like manner has resided with Lieutenant Bivar. All the parties now alluded to have been constantly passing backwards and forwards to the hills, and it seems impossible that the instructions of Government towards the Angami Nagas should not be known throughout the hills."

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